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Preface 
The purpose of this present study is to critically examine the dynamic of the Anglo-
American “special relationship” in the context of the Cyprus question in the 1950s. While 
there are some very fine studies which singularly examine British and American policies 
towards Cyprus during these years, there are few, if any, that specifically focus on the 
formulation and internal machinations behind those policies. This study aims to fill this 
gap. More importantly, however, it might be more useful to discuss what this study does 
not do:  unlike most popular literature about the Cyprus problem, it does not take an 
ideological position, nor does it assign nefarious motives or conspiratorial designs to the 
actors involved. Indeed, if anything, it seeks to demonstrate that many of the furtive 
maneuvers and alleged conspiracies surrounding the Cyprus problem have been woven 
from whole cloth. Given the fact that the parties involved, except on very few occasions, 
were rarely in accord, any conspiracy would not only have been unlikely, it would have 
been impossible. 
Following an overview of the historical background of the island, which includes the 
push towards internationalization and the 1955 armed struggle against the British colonial 
administration, the study then shifts to an analysis of the many and varied attempts by 
Britain and the US to resolve the problem during the period of 1954-1959.  During this 
period a number of solutions were put forward, including the June Plan, the Holmes 
mission, the Spaak initiative, and the Foot and Radcliffe proposals. For a number of 
reasons, which this study thoroughly explores, none was successful. Although in its first 
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incarnation, the Macmillan plan also failed, later modifications to it provided the basis for 
the ultimate settlement.  
It was during this period that Britain finally confronted the fact that there actually was a 
Cyprus problem with wide-reaching implications, not merely an internal dispute between 
HMG and its incorrigible colony. Prior to the 1950s, the Cyprus dispute was a British 
rather than an American problem. This all changed in 1954, when Greece brought the 
question before the United Nations, thus shifting the Cyprus problem from a dispute 
among Britain, Greece, and Cyprus to an international conflict involving the interests of 
Turkey and the United States. Between 1954 and 1958, Greece resorted to the UN five 
times in attempts to resolve the Cyprus question. The eventual settlement was not decided 
in the international body, however, but in an impromptu meeting between the Greek and 
Turkish Foreign Ministers. 
 These were also the years in which Britain, and later the US, began the search for a final 
settlement and where much of the mythology relating to the workings and resolution of 
the Cyprus problem have their origins. The study ends in 1960, following the 
implementation of a constitution based on the London- Zürich Agreements and the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the defining points of the end of one era and the 
beginning of another. 
About the Sources  
This work draws heavily upon published and unpublished official documents from the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and especially the United States. Particularly useful were the 
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FRUS series (Foreign Relations of the United States) and the enormous number of 
unpublished documents available from NARA (National Archives and Records 
Administration). The FRUS series is available electronically and, while the NARA 
collections are best searched at the National Archives in College Park, MD, documents 
can also be searched electronically. Some other useful official documents relating to 
Cyprus can also be found in the Official Documents on Canadian External Relations 
(DFAIT). These are also available electronically in both French and English.  
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas is home to several valuable 
collections, including the Papers of John Foster Dulles, Presidential Papers, and the 
White House Central Files. The United Nations Yearbook collection is another valuable 
resource, especially for the General Assembly discussions pertaining to the 1950s.  
The British Office of Public Records (PRO) provided the best place for documents 
relating to the Anglo-American relations regarding Cyprus. Most of the materials are 
contained in the records of the Foreign Office (FO), the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM), 
and the Ministry of Defense (DEFE). These too can be searched electronically.   
Published British documents on Cyprus are scarce, with the exception of the 
parliamentary debates (Hansard) and documents pertaining to constitutional proposals. 
The End of Empire, edited by Frederick Madden is a rare exception. The Survey of 
International Affairs is useful, but it is a semi-official publication which contains no 
actual documents.  Much of the analysis of British policy and its realization with regard 
to Cyprus in this study is base on the outstanding work of Robert Holland, Ioannis D. 
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Stefanidis, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou. These studies draw heavily upon PRO and other 
British archival documents. 
A number of fine scholarly published works have contributed not only to shaping this 
study, but also to the general manner in which the author views the subject at hand. 
Claude Nicolet’s, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974 is a pioneering study 
based largely on US and UK archival sources. Meticulously documented, Nicolet does 
not suffer fools easily and goes further than any other author to date in dismantling the 
conspiracies so popular in the literature of Cyprus.  
Robert Holland’s Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, is a masterly work which 
critically covers the historiography of the decolonization of Cyprus. It is now a standard 
text on British policy towards Cyprus in the 1950s. George Horton Kelling’s, Countdown 
to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955 provides a detailed and critical study of 
British policy from the outbreak of World War II to the EOKA uprising of 1955.  
A critical analysis of American Foreign policy towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus can 
be found in Monteagle Stearns’ highly readable, Entangled Allies. A career diplomat and 
former Ambassador to Greece, Stearns brings a clear and insightful personal perspective 
to a difficult and often paradoxical subject. 
A comprehensive critical analysis on the internationalization question, with an emphasis 
on British official documents, can be found in Evanthis Hatzivassiliou’s Britain and the 
International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59.  Ioannis D. Stefanidis,’ Isle of Discord: 
Nationalism, Imperialism, and the Making of the Cyprus Problem covers not only the 
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internationalization question, but also devotes several pages to US policy towards 
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom between 1949-1955.  
Hubert Faustmann’s Divide and Quit is a broad analysis of Colonial rule in Cyprus which 
includes a special survey of the Transnational Period from February 1959 to August 
1960. “The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949-58” contained in The 
Historical Background to the UN’s Involvement with Cyprus is an excellent, detailed 
analysis of Greece’s adventures in attempting to get Cyprus inscribed on the agenda of 
the United Nations.   
Nancy Crawshaw’s The Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with 
Greece is a classic study which focuses on the period between World War II and the 
international agreements that created the Cyprus Republic. Crawshaw, was also 
instrumental in connection with the research project which produced François Crouzet’s, 
Le conflit de Chypre.   
Turkish language sources on Cyprus are, to say the least, disappointing.  Most of them 
still lean towards the conventional nationalist narrative, though in recent years there has 
been an effort to move towards a more balanced approach. One exception is Emer O. 
Kürkcüoğlu’s, Turkiye’nin Arap Orta Doğusuna Karşi Politikasi, 1945-1970. (Turkey’s 
Policy Towards the Arab Middle East). It was especially useful for its homegrown 
analysis of the very different perceptions of İnönü and Menderes towards the 1958 
coup in Iraq. Turkish Newspapers from the 1950s such as Cumhurriyet (still in 
circulation), contain countless articles about Cyprus, though the reportage tends to be 
chock-full of hyperbole, especially with regard to the Archbishop Makarios and British 
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policies on the island. Not surprisingly, they are all sympathetic towards the TMT (Türk 
Mukavemet Teşkilatı). 
 
In addition to the scholarly literature, there are also numerous personal accounts and 
memoirs containing valuable material relating to Cyprus. These include: E. Averoff-
Tossizza’s Lost Opportunities: the Cyprus Question, 1952-1963; Glafkos Clerides’ My 
Deposition; Sir Hugh M. Foot’s  A Start in Freedom;  John Reddaway’s Burdened with 
Cyprus, the British  Connection; Dwight D. Eisenhower’s  The White House Years: 
Waging Peace, 1956-1961; and Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 and Tides of Fortune, 1945-
1955 by Harold Macmillan.   
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Chapter I 
 
Those who work in sovereign territory have to cultivate a suppleness and dissimulation, a 
tactical mind and a reserve because no issues can be forced: they must be engineered. The 
difference is between the craft of a fly-fisherman and someone who dynamites from a rowing 
boat.—Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons 
 
Introduction  
A nineteenth century observer once remarked “he who would become and remain a great power 
in the East must hold Cyprus in his hand. That this is true, is proved by the history of the world 
during the last three millennia” [sic.].1 Situated in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is at the 
crossroads of three continents, and its strategic value has not gone unnoticed by statesmen and 
strategists from Ankara to Athens and London to Washington. The Cyprus question has proven 
to be the most enduring remnant of what was commonly known as the Eastern Question, 
summed up by Lord Morley as "that intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, 
rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths." 2
 
 
Cyprus, unlike the Sultan’s real estate in Europe and the Balkans, did not fall under the control 
of successor nation states after the dissolution of the Empire, but instead remained in protracted 
colonial suspension. The question developed into a problem, later metastasizing into a series of 
full-blown crises. Long after the moribund Ottoman Empire crumbled, Cyprus not only 
                                                     
1 Quoted in Michael and Hanka Lee, Cyprus, (Newton Abbott Devon UK: David & Charles PLC, 1973), 2. 
2 Quoted in American Assembly, Georgina D. Stevens, ed., The United States and the Middle East, (Plainview, New 
York: Books for Libraries Publishers), 148. 
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continued to be a “bone of contention” between competing Greek and Turkish nationalisms, but 
a persistent source of frustration, division, and conflict for Britain and the United States.3
 
  
Historical Overview 
 
Beginning in the fourteenth century BC, Cyprus was colonized consecutively by the Mycenaean, 
Ionians, Phoenicians, and Persians. Later, it was invaded and captured by the Ptolemies of Egypt 
and, later still, annexed by Rome. In the seventh century AD, Cyprus was attacked repeatedly by 
the Saracens.  In 1191 it was seized by Richard I of England who later sold the island first to the 
Knights Templar and then to Guy Lusignan. Between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries the 
island was ruled by the French Lusignan Dynasty, falling into Venetian hands in 1489. In 1572, 
Cyprus became part of the Ottoman Empire, where it remained for three hundred years until the 
ultimate phase of its colonial history when, in 1878, it was incorporated by Great Britain under 
the Defensive Alliance with the Ottoman Empire in return for British support against further 
aggression from Czarist Russia.4
 
   
In 1914, as a punitive consequence of Ottoman Turkey’s alliance with Germany during World 
War I, Cyprus was annexed by Britain. Upon succeeding the Ottoman regime, the new Kemalist 
administration recognized Britain’s annexation of the island under the terms of the 1923 Treaty 
of Lausanne. While Turkey relinquished claims to all its Arab holdings, it retained the Turkish 
inhabited areas, including Eastern Thrace. Cyprus was formally declared a Crown colony in 
1925.5
                                                     
3 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem, (New 
York: New York University Press, 1999), 1; Constantine Svolopouloas, “The Lausanne Treaty and the Cyprus 
Problem” in, Greece and Britain during World War I (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1985), 233-241. 
  
4 Doros Alastos, Cyprus in History: A Survey of 5000 Years, (London: Zeno Publishers, 1955), 27-28. 
5 Fernc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 29-31. 
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The Genesis of the Enosis Movement 
Upon their arrival in Cyprus in 1571, the Ottomans were regarded as “liberators.” The restoration 
of the Orthodox Archbishop and the abolition of the feudal system were welcomed by the 
Orthodox Greeks. Ottoman rule, which operated on the Millet system, granted religious 
authorities jurisdiction over their own non-Muslim communities. Accordingly, each group within 
the empire became a separate legal entity. While the system afforded each non-Muslim 
confessional group many rights, these were usually dependent upon the benevolence of the 
Sultan and local officials. In Cyprus, the Eastern Orthodox Church became increasingly 
influential during the Ottoman period since it represented the single Christian authority on the 
island. Church leaders held important positions within the government and the Orthodox 
Christian elite often ruled side by side with their Muslim counterparts.6  Moreover, the 
Archbishop enjoyed complete recognition from the Sultan as the millet başı, leader of the 
community.7
 
 
During the 1821 Greek War of Independence,8  the Ottoman governor, Küçük Mehmet executed 
the
                                                     
6 The concept of “citizenship” did not exist beyond the Ottoman Millet. Identity was based on social factors, region, 
and religion and not ethnicity: Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig, Wiebke Sievers, eds., Citizenship Policies in 
the New Europe, (Amsterdam: Imiscoe/ Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 264. For a comprehensive study of 
relations between the Ottomans and the Eastern Orthodox establishment see Andrekos Varnarva, British 
Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915. The Inconsequential Possession, (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2009).  
 Archbishop of Cyprus, Kyprianos, along with 500 other members of the Greek Orthodox 
elite, ostensibly for trying to foment an insurrection among the Orthodox Christians. Since the 
Church leadership enjoyed a privileged place in Cyprus and had no reason for discontent, it is far 
7 7 Bauböck, n. 286. 
8 Greece won its independence from the Porte in 1828. 
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more likely that the Governor was threatened by the Archbishop’s considerable power and 
influence rather than by any nefarious plot against the Porte.9
 
  
The birth of the Megali Idea – the “Great Idea” to unite all territories historically dominated by 
Greek communities, including Constantinople under the auspice of one national state followed 
Greece’s successful war of independence. It would play a crucial role in the Greek national 
narrative and foreign policy from 1840 until the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 (Asia Minor 
Disaster).  
 
When Britain took over the administration of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, the 
Turkish – or in the terminology of the time the ‘Muslim’ – population of Cyprus was about one-
fourth, while almost all of the rest of the inhabitants were Greek.10
 
 Over time, the presence of the 
British would grow increasingly less tolerable for the Orthodox Christians and become a 
significant factor in the development of Greek nationalist sentiments and aspirations. These 
aspirations would later be manifested in the enosis movement. 
                                                     
9 Bauböck; Varnarva, ibid. 
10 The idea of “Greekness” arose among what we now call ‘Greek Cypriots’ at the beginning of the Twentieth 
century. Turkish Cypriots, however, had to wait for the Turkish Republic to be established in 1923 before it made 
sense for them to identify themselves as Turks. Prior to 1910, the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus identified themselves 
in religious, not ethnic terms. Ethnic identity has always been a dicey issue for Cyprus. For example, Rauf Denktaş, 
who, among other things, would later become President of Northern Cyprus, is credited with saying “there is 
nothing Cypriot except for Cyprus donkey,” although he insists that it was Makarios who made the statement: 
Quoted in Agnieszka Rakoczy, “A Life dedicated to the Cyprus Problem,” Cyprus Mail, 2009. For the purpose of 
this study, subsequent chapters will refer to the two communities as Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively. 
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The enosis movement [the desire for union with Greece] was not part of the framework of the 
Megali Idea, although periodically the British and Turks would falsely make this claim by 
linking it to the revival of irredentist nineteenth century nationalism.: 
  
…claiming that Greece was pursuing the Megali Idea in Cyprus is to misunderstand the whole idea of the Greek 
Grand Design of the past. The Megali had aimed at the reestablishment of a large Greek kingdom, something which 
could not be achieved by the annexation of Cyprus alone.11
 
   
 
 At the 1912 conference in London over the Balkans crisis, Lloyd George made an informal offer 
of enosis to Prime Minister Venizelos as a quid pro quo for a British base at Argostoli or 
Cephallonia.12  In 1915, Britain made the Greek Government another offer of enosis in addition 
to concessions in western Thrace and Asia Minor in exchange for its support of Serbia. Although 
the offer was declined, Greece was drawn into the war a few years later. The offer at that point 
was no longer on the table. At the end of World War I, Britain’s official policy towards Cyprus 
was that the status of the island would remain unchanged for strategic reasons.13
 
  
In 1931, less than six years after the British assumed control of Cyprus, economic grievances, 
combined with Greek nationalist aspirations, ignited a crisis resulting in an armed insurrection 
against the colonial administration. Although the insurrection was quelled in a matter of days, 
Britain countered by arresting more than 2000 persons, deporting the church leadership, 
imposing restrictions on the press, and dissolving all representative institutions, including the 
                                                     
11 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-1959, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 6. 
12 W. Miller, “A New Era in Greece,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 14 no.4, July 4, 1936, 658. 
13  The possibility of ceding Cyprus to Greece was also briefly considered in 1919: Stavros Paneli, The Making of 
Modern Cyprus, (Nicosia: Interworld Publication, 1990), 97. 
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Legislative Assembly.14
 
 This left the power to legislate exclusively in the hands of the Governor 
and his Advisory Council.  According to Stefanidis:  
[T] he Deportation Law of 1931 and the restrictive laws of 1937 on the Orthodox Church ensured that the Greek 
nationalist movement was bereft of both its ecclesiastical and lay leadership. Significantly, after the death of Cyril 
III in 1933, the all important throne of Archbishop and Ethnarch would remain vacant for fourteen years. 15
 
   
The growth of the enosis movement provoked strong reactions from the Muslim population. As 
the ethnic minority on the island, they viewed any call for Cyprus’ unification with Greece as a 
tacit threat to the survival of their community. Moreover, to counter Greek demands for enosis, 
the Turkish Muslims pointed out at every opportunity that Cyprus had never been a Greek 
possession and, if Britain were to ever relinquish control of the island, it should be given to 
Turkey, the heir of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Postwar Nationalism in Cyprus  
 
During World War II, Britain made no attempt to reinstate the constitutional liberties that it had 
revoked in 1931. Nor did the British make any effort to draw up new constitutional provisions or 
to guarantee civil liberties. After October 1941, however, Britain began to loosen its grip on the 
island and political meetings were again allowed. More importantly, permission was granted by 
the governor for the formation of political parties.  The communists wasted no time in taking 
advantage of the relaxed political climate, and soon after established the Progressive Party of the 
Working People (AKEL), which was the successor to an earlier communist party that had been 
established in the 1920s and banned following the unrest of the 1930s. 16
                                                     
14 Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 1-5. 
 
15 Stefanidis, ibid., 1-2.  
16  François Crouzet, Le conflit de Chypre 1946-1949, vol. I, (Bruxelles: Establissements Ḗmile Bruylant, 1973), 
135-150. 
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Due to the wartime alliances with the Soviet Union, US officials did not regard communism as 
the evil specter it would become in later years.  There were, however, some, such as the clergy, 
who were uncomfortable with the growing influence of the new party. In order to meet this 
challenge, a group of nationalists known as the Panagarian Union of Cyprus (PEK), was 
established.  The municipal elections of 1943 yielded impressive results for AKEL. The next 
election, held in 1946, AKEL’s National Liberation League (EAS) candidates captured the four 
metro centers, including Nicosia.  
 
In addition to permitting the formation of political parties, the British began to rescind some of 
their restrictive measures toward the church. In 1946, the government repealed the 1931 
Deportation Law and other repressive measures, allowing the Church to once again reassert itself 
in the political life of the island.  
  
On June 21, 1947, Cyprus elected its first archbishop since the 1931 uprising. Leontios died 
shortly after his election. He was succeeded by the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, who, until 
his death in 1950, refused to entertain any alternative to enosis.17  This was a timely event for the 
politically conservative Ethnarchy— the traditional leadership of the Orthodox Church— which 
now had the opportunity to reclaim the archbishopric. From that time forward, right wing politics 
and the ecclesiastical powers that be would be intimately linked.18
 
   
In addition to controlling PEK, the Ethnarchy also established the “national” Cyprus Workers 
Confederation (SEK) to challenge the AKEL-oriented Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) 
                                                     
17   Ibid., 135-150; T.W. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus, (Stanford, California: 1971), 21-29.  
18 Robert F. Holland, Diana Markides, and Diana Weston Markides, The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for 
Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 219; Stefanidis, 2. 
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for the support of labor. From that time forward, an intense division between Left and Right 
would be a salient feature in the politics of the Greeks on Cyprus, leaving no quarter for more 
moderate voices.  
 
During this period, the Turkish Muslims were also experiencing a political awakening and 
beginning to feel their “Turkishness” more acutely.  In 1943, a group of nationalists established 
the Cyprus Turkish Minority Association (KATAK). In 1944, Dr. Fazil Küçük split from the 
organization and formed the Cyprus National Turkish People’s Party (KMPHT).19
 
  One of the 
principal objectives of the KMPHT was to prevent the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. 
Between 1945 and 1949, the British colonial administration was forced to contend with an 
increasingly chaotic political situation which was more the result of competition between Left 
and Right factions within the Greek community rather than nationalist fervor. This competition, 
however, did not mean that the two communities had abandoned their opposition to the colonial 
administration and they continued to agitate against it.  
 
The latter half of 1945 saw a marked increase in violent incidents. The aftermath of the war also 
brought economic hardship as military expenditures declined and agricultural markets 
experienced a downturn. Strikes became commonplace. At the same time, Cyprus began to play 
an important role as a way station for Jews immigrating to Palestine. The establishment of 
internment camps for Jewish immigrants attempting to enter the British mandate became a 
                                                     
19  In 1949 KATAK and KMPHT merged to form the National Turkish Union Party of Cyprus: Nancy Crawshaw, 
The Cyprus Revolt: An Account for the Struggle for Union with Greece, (London: 1978), 43; Stanley Kyriakides, 
Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 27-28. 
18 
 
further source of contention, as well. Once again, social unrest and economic fears served to 
further strengthen support for AKEL.20
 
    
Cyprus again became the object of ethnic nationalist designs by the Greeks, prompted by World 
War II. In March 1941, prior to the German invasion of Greece, Prime Minister Alexandros 
Koryzis requested British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to revisit the question of ceding 
Cyprus to Greece as a reward for its contribution to the war effort. Eden responded by saying 
that he was not ready to entertain that “most delicate political question at that time.” 21 
Immediately prior to the invasion of Greece, Emmanuel Tsoudero, who had assumed the 
Premiership following Koryzis’ suicide, appealed to the British government to install King 
George in Cyprus. The request was denied. Although Tsouderos, as head of the Greek 
Government in exile, factored Cyprus into Greece’s post-war territorial claims, the official 
position of the British government was that such claims would not be considered while the 
Empire was still at war.22
 
  
Hence the post war years found Greece engaged in bitter civil conflict, and subsequent 
governments were too reliant upon British aid to revisit the Cyprus question with any 
representative of the Crown, even unofficially. The ambivalence of the Greek government 
towards Cyprus did not dampen the enthusiasm of the Greek Left who raised the Cyprus 
question at every opportunity. On a visit to London in September 1945, Archbishop Damaskinos, 
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the Greek Regent, offered bases not only on Cyprus, but also anywhere on Greek territory.23 The 
British, however, were quite adamant about keeping the whole of Cyprus permanently within the 
Empire, believing that economic development could dampen the fires of Greek nationalism:24
 
 
 
Having made our position clear on the question of union with Greece we shall be better able to go forward with a 
policy of economic improvement, social welfare and constitutional advance. But before we can start on this policy 
with any hope of eliciting any adequate amount of local goodwill and support, we must make it clear that we are not 
playing with the idea of handing the island over to a foreign power.25
 
 
 
Lord Winster's Mission 
Meanwhile, the British government began to appreciate that ruling the island as a colonial 
possession was not only unpopular, it was “inappropriate.” In October 1946, the British Colonial 
Government had lifted some of the repressive measures taken since 1931 and announced a 
program for constitutional reform and economic development In March 1947, the Labour 
government appointed Lord Winster as the Governor of Cyprus with a special mission to 
establish a consultative Assembly of leading Cypriot representatives to work towards a new 
constitution based on self-rule.26
 
 
The new archbishop continued to resist British policy in general and any policy in particular that 
did not actively endorse enosis. Nevertheless, the assembly opened with eighteen members 
present. Although the Ethnarchy refused to cooperate, Leftist representatives from the Greek and 
Consultative Assembly and the Proposals 
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Turkish communities accepted to participate in the workings of the Consultative Assembly 
created to consider the new constitution.
 
  
The Assembly convened in November 1947, and the Winster Constitution was submitted in 
1948. The constitution would grant greater autonomy to Cyprus by providing for the 
establishment of a legislature with an elected majority, proportional community representation, 
and an executive along with a formally nominated majority of ministers. Foreign affairs and 
defense, however, would still be under the control of the Crown.27 The British proposals did not 
come anywhere near satisfying the expectations and aspirations of the Greeks. Consequently, the 
call for “enosis and only enosis” became an even more attractive prospect to the population at 
large. Much to the dismay of the Ethnarchy, AKEL was forced to abandon its endorsement of 
full self-government and unite with the Right-leaning elements in support of enosis. The 
organization also reached out to Turkish community to join in the anti-colonial struggle.28  
 
The Greek representatives rejected the British proposals. The Archbishop and the Greek right 
wing organizations denounced them and the leftist, reiterating their objections, withdrew from 
the Assembly on May 20, 1948. Lord Winster dissolved the Assembly on August 12 stating that 
the offers would remain open for consideration for any representative leaders who wished to re-
examine the proposals for the purpose of their implementation. He also re-affirmed that no 
change in the status of Cyprus and its sovereignty was contemplated. The constitutional offer 
technically remained on the table until 1954, but was never again revisited. Thus a step forward 
that might have lead to independence was not taken.
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symbolizes the only serious attempt by the British to propel the island “along the classic path of 
self-government.”29  According to Holland, the draft constitution represented the “a very modest 
proposition which fell markedly short of the degree of self-government recently acquired, for 
example, by Malta.”30 By January 1949, AKEL, too, gave its unconditional support for enosis. 
The idea of self-government as a precursor to self-determination was denounced as a “serious 
error.”31
When the British withdrew from Greece in early 1947, the Greeks felt more at liberty to assert 
their own views regarding Cyprus. Emboldened with the knowledge that they had the full 
support of the motherland, in March of that same year, the Greek National Assembly declared 
official support for union with Greece. AKEL and the Nationalist Right reiterated their demands 
for enosis.
  
32
 
  
The rising influence of AKEL did not go unchallenged by the colonial administration nor 
unobserved by the Americans—ever watchful of the communist threat. Ronald Turnbull stepped 
in as Acting Governor following Winster’s resignation. Similarly to Winster and British officials 
in general, Turnbull had convinced himself that only a minority of Greek community favored 
enosis—and the movement was not “authentic.” That it appeared to be larger than it actually was 
due to intimidation by the Church and the Communists who shared a mutual distaste for the 
British. He also believed that the movement had been co-opted by politicians, journalists, 
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“intellectuals” and other assorted opportunists for their own gain. This was, of course, wishful 
thinking.33
  
 
In an effort to curb Leftist activities, Turnbull initiated measures reaffirming the supremacy of 
the colonial administration. Harsher penalties for sedition were introduced, and a number of 
Leftists were arrested and imprisoned. Political activities by civil servants were prohibited and 
restrictions were placed on trade union activities. Moreover, there were allegations of 
manipulation of the electoral registers in the 1949 municipal elections.34
As Louis put it, “the Winster Constitution foundered on the shoals of enosis.” Interaction 
between the colonial administration and the Nationalist Right was as strained as ever with 
virtually no contact between colonial and church officials. The installation of Sir Andrew Wright 
as Governor was met with encyclicals issued by Church leadership who urged their flock to 
resist participation in governmental affairs.  It was in this environment that the enosis movement 
took a turn that would impact all future negotiations regarding Cyprus. 
 A suggestion by the 
Americans, however, that the influence of Greece and Turkey be brought to bear in influencing 
the elections in support of an anti-communist candidate was rebuffed by the colonial 
administration on the grounds that it amounted to nothing less than foreign meddling.    
35
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Chapter II 
 
Cyprus and the UN                                                               
 
On September 27, 1949, AKEL took the initial step towards internationalization of the Cyprus 
problem by proposing cooperation between itself and the Ethnarchy to advance the cause of 
enosis at the United Nations. In November of the same year, the AKEL dominated city councils 
petitioned the Security Council against colonial rule and proclaimed the Greek Cypriot’s desire 
for enosis.  Believing conditions to be favorable for union with Greece, AKEL petitioned the 
United Nations to sponsor a plebiscite and soon after began collecting signatures in support of 
the effort.  While rejecting AKEL’s proposed alliance, Makarios, the Bishop of Kition, through 
the Orthodox Church, organized a plebiscite.  
 
The campaign, which began on January 15, 1950, resulted in a 96 per cent vote in favor of union 
with Greece. The results, along with a petition for enosis, were taken to the Colonial Governor. 
The Secretary for the Colonies responded by reiterating that any talk of union with Greece was a 
closed matter. The plebiscite results and a petition for enosis were also presented to the Greek 
Chamber of Deputies, where Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos urged the deputies to 
acknowledge the petition and integrate the Greek Cypriot appeal for enosis into national policy. 1
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In the meantime, AKEL again made an overture to the Ethnarchy to join forces and, among other 
things, called for the establishment of an all-party delegation to appeal to the Greek Government 
to formally claim Cyprus--and if Britain objected--to proceed to the United Nations.2 The 
Ethnarchy again refused cooperation with AKEL. While the Ethnarchy endorsed the spirit of the 
initiative, it had a corresponding proposal of its own. Represented by Kyprianos, the Bishop of 
Kyrenia, the Ethnarchy sent its own delegation to Athens, London, and finally the UN. Results of 
the plebiscite would be presented to the United Nations as confirmation of the Greek Cypriot 
desire for union with Greece. AKEL, which would not be included in the UN mission, sent out 
its own group, called the People’s National Delegation, to lobby European officials for support 
before embarking on its mission to the UN.3
 
  
Meanwhile, the British were attempting to persuade the new coalition government in Athens to 
discourage the delegates from approaching the UN and, should this be unpreventable, to ban 
them from being received by any senior government official. The British cautioned that such a 
move would be tantamount to “interference into the affairs of the United Kingdom.”4 Despite 
assurances that the Greek government had no intentions of making a case for Cyprus, 
Ambassador Sir Clifford Norton stepped up the pressure. Unconvinced, Norton tried to impress 
upon King Paul that the receipt of “unruly subjects” would set a “dangerous precedent, 
comparable to the attitude of the Bulgarian Government to dissident Greeks.” The King evaded 
the issue, citing public sensitivity towards the matter.5
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Assurances, however, did not diminish the growing unease that the British had regarding the 
possibility of internationalization. From the beginning, HMG tried to elicit the support of the 
American Government in restraining the Greeks and to prevent the Cyprus question from being 
brought to an international forum. Although the US admitted, at least at this stage, that the 
Cyprus question “was not a matter of direct concern,” it proved to be more accommodating in 
the first instance. 6  While the US Embassy did unofficially approach Greek officials to caution 
them against agitation, Washington was reluctant to pursue this matter any further than necessary 
for fear of damaging the Greek Government.7
 
  
American Ambivalence towards Cyprus 
 
Beginning in May 1950, petitions sponsored by the Greek-American Lobby began to circulate 
around Washington requesting that the American delegation take the lead in presenting the 
Cyprus Question to the United Nations. This pressure, in conjunction with traditional anti-
colonial sentiment, made Britain more than a little disconcerted.8 Since many of these petitions 
were sponsored by members of Congress, the State Department was forced to reply, stating that 
the United States government was not “directly involved” with this issue and thus could not lend 
its support in sponsoring such an initiative.9
                                                     
6 John D. Jernegan to Spiros Minotos, Memorandum, February 10, 1950: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-150, NARA. 
 This did not mean that the US did not hold strong 
views on the status of the island and have a stake in how the Cyprus question unfolded: “in view 
of the strategic considerations involving Cyprus, agitation for enosis […] must be discouraged. 
7 Stefanidis, ibid., 12. 
8 Ibid., 12. 
9  Raymond A. Hare to Jack K. McFall, Memorandum: SDCDF, doc.747C.00/6-250, NARA. 
 26 
However, continued examination of the question is essential in order to provide a long range 
solution mutually satisfactory to all parties interested.”10
 
 
UN Delegation 
 
On May 20, 1950, the Ethnarchy delegation arrived in Athens. Broad popular support in the 
country made it impossible for the Greek government to deny them an audience. Their arrival 
spurred a debate in Parliament, during which several deputies expressed their support for enosis, 
with the exception of leftist representative Ioannis Sofianopoulos, who favored direct Anglo-
Greek negotiations over a route to the UN. 11
 
 This view prevailed, and the delegation received no 
more satisfaction from the Greek Government than it did from the British.  
With their mission unsuccessful, the delegates appealed for help from the Church and the court  
of public opinion. The General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) also lent support to the 
cause, helping to create the Panhellenic Committee of Struggle with the Union of Cyprus. 
(PEAEK). 12 This organization was primarily involved in lobbying activities in Parliament, in 
addition to fueling public interest in the issue. Subsequent to a second unproductive meeting with 
the Greek Government, the delegation sponsored a petition calling for the parliament to 
acknowledge the validity of the plebiscite and publicly proclaim its support for enosis 13
 
    
At this moment, the delegation received unexpected assistance in form of British incompetence. 
Responding to a parliamentary question on June 21, Colonial Under-Secretary John Dugdale not 
only restated Britain’s “no change” policy regarding the Cyprus question, but also offered an 
                                                     
10 “Regional Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey and Iran, Washington, December 28, 1950: FRUS, 1950, V, 256. 
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unflattering critique regarding Greek administration of the Dodecanese which had been ceded to 
Greece in 1947. 14 This incident provoked righteous anger in Greece followed by mass 
demonstrations, and fueled support for the enosis to such a degree that no “no public figure dared 
to oppose it or try to put the brake on too openly.”15 Both the British and the United States 
embassies, which had earlier expressed relief over the extraordinary lack of public anti-British 
sentiment on Cyprus, reported that this was not true.  For example, on May 26, Ambassador 
Norton commented that, “the press is perhaps more universally friendly to us than I 
remember.”16
 
  
The Korean crisis, combined with trouble stemming from the rapprochement between 
Yugoslavia and Greece, made agitation about Cyprus all the more unwelcome.17 On June 27, 
1950, then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asked the American Embassy in Athens to remind 
the Greek government that the country had much more serious existential problems and that, in 
present circumstances, Greece’s “number one problem […]was its survival as a free nation.” 
Nationalistic aspirations were a “luxury” that Greece could simply not afford: “US is trying to 
keep Greeks afloat in [a] sea of current difficulties and guide them into [a] relatively safe harbor. 
It cannot do so if Greeks continue to exhaust themselves and embarrass us in heading for such 
distant shores as Cyprus” 18
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government that permits “red infiltration” into its ranks after “so much blood and money has 
been spent […] to suppress Communist aggression.”19
 
  
Despite the questionable policies of the Plastiras Government, the State Department stopped 
short of granting Britain’s request for an official reprimand, nor was the US forthcoming in 
supporting Britain’s efforts in excluding discussion of the Cyprus at the UN. The main point of 
disagreement between the US and Britain regarding UN involvement was the disagreement 
between the two allies over the organization’s capability in dealing with the Cyprus issue. Britain 
maintained that Article 2 (7) of the Charter prohibited discussion of Cyprus on the ground that it 
was a matter of internal jurisdiction. The US, on the other hand, took a broader view whereby 
“any international question could be discussed in the appropriate UN forum.” 20  The State 
Department greatest fear was the possibility of the Soviets using the Cyprus issue to their own 
advantage at the UN. In order to avoid this, it was suggested that the Greek delegation be 
persuaded to negotiate a direct settlement with Britain. Britain, of course, wished to avoid this 
route at all costs. Thus the British campaign to win over the Americans continued throughout the 
summer of 1950, but with no success.21
 
  
Despite pressure from the American and Greek governments, the Cypriot delegation maintained 
that a UN forum was still the most effective Cyprus means to exert pressure on Britain. While it 
supported the idea of enosis in theory, the Greek government went out of its way to discourage 
bringing it into a public arena. Following a parliamentary debate on the matter, the government 
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released a communiqué emphasizing the potential “harmful developments that might result,” if 
“irresponsible” debate on the Cyprus question continued.22
 
  
After an unsuccessful attempt to meet with parliamentary officials in London, in July, the 
delegates arrived in the United States, where Greek-American associations and Congressional 
sympathizers had actively begun laying the foundation for their case. In a meeting at the State 
Department with Assistant Secretary of Congressional Relations, Jack McFall, on September 13, 
1950, the delegates requested that the Americans hold mediation talks between the British 
government and the Cypriots in an effort to circumvent any discussion of the matter at the UN. 
McFall responded by insisting that the question concerned British domestic policy, and citing the 
general trend in international affairs, said that it would be inappropriate to raise the issue at this 
point.23
 
  
Although the attempts by the delegation proved fruitless, they did, however, succeed in drawing 
attention to the Cyprus issue.24 The Greek press had been especially useful in garnering publicity 
for the State Department meeting in which they portrayed the Americans as being sympathetic to 
the Greek point of view.25
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an anemic reference by a Polish representative who censured the Greek Government for its 
failure to support the Cypriot people.26
 
  
Anglo-Greek Relations and the Enosis Cause 
 
On October, 18 1950, Makarios III was elected Archbishop of Cyprus.  Meanwhile, the British 
continued to press the Americans for support for their position regarding the future of the island, 
this time employing both military and diplomatic conduits. The following day, a review of 
Britain’s Middle East Policy and Strategy was forwarded to the State Department which, among 
other things, emphasized the importance of taking measures to retain Middle East countries, 
including Cyprus within the Western orbit.27
 
  
Although both the British and American military agreed on this point, the State Department did 
not share the British view that either party had heard the last from the Cypriots regarding 
internationalization. Accordingly, it submitted a variety of views targeted at mitigating the 
problem. These included a renewed constitutional proposal and more aggressive British foreign 
aid to the island. 28 While the Americans were eager to avoid raising the Cyprus question at the 
UN, the State Department was not pleased with what it perceived as Britain’s indulgence of 
AKEL. In response, Britain argued that a resuscitation of the 1948 Constitution would only 
encourage further agitation for enosis.29
 
 
                                                     
26 Porter, Contel Nicosia 30, September 6, 1950: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-650, NARA; Stefanidis, 16. 
27  “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 
to the Ambassador at large (Jessup),”Washington, October 19, 1950: FRUS, 1950, V, 217. 
28 “Regional Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey and Iran, “December 28, 1950: FRUS, 1950, V, 260. 
29 Stefanidis, ibid., 17. 
 31 
In January, 1951, the colonial administration took a step backward, and re-instated the sedition 
laws on Cyprus. The administration issued four amendments intended to fortify existing 
“sedition” legislation. These included the power to arbitrarily take action against any persons 
suspected of illegal activity, as well as the suppression of newspapers and other publications. 
Archbishop Makarios denounced these measures as being “illiberal” and “undemocratic.” 30 The 
actions of the British also revived the enosis issue in the Greek press and in the minds of the anti-
colonialists in the US. London responded to the public relations debacle by urging “utmost 
leniency” and the laws were quietly allowed to expire.31
 
 
Confronted by opposing demands from Makarios, Britain, and the United States, the Greek 
Government convened a council of the party leadership on March 21, attempting to reach an 
accord regarding the government’s policy towards Cyprus. The meeting accomplished three 
things. First, the council reiterated its commitment to work within the construct of the “ancestral 
Anglo-Greek friendship;” secondly, it gave the government the right to present a twofold 
proposal to the British that included ceding Cyprus to Greece as a quid pro quo for bases 
anywhere in Greek territory, and a promise by the British to settle the issue consistent with the 
right of the Cypriot people to self-determination. Lastly, it provided a forum whereby the Greek 
government formally claimed Cyprus for the first time. In February, in a reaffirmation of the 
Greek Government’s commitment to the island, the new Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelios32
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and the whole of the Greek people the demand for union with Mother Greece, a matter which 
constitutes the ardent desire of the Greek people.”33
 
  
Any mention of recourse to the UN was noticeably and deliberately omitted. Initially, it appeared 
that this strategy would be acceptable to Makarios. On March 27, the Archbishop met with 
British Ambassador and remarked that while it was one thing to avoiding the matter “in present 
circumstances,” it was quite another to consider it a closed subject. The Archbishop pointed out 
that Britain had the power to “quell” agitation for enosis if only they would issue a statement 
explaining that, while there could be no “alteration of the island’s status at present,” HMG would 
be “willing to discuss the question at some specific time in the future.”  
 
While explaining the Greek Cypriots’ “ardent desire” for enosis the Archbishop downplayed the 
potential pitfalls of internationalization by dismissing any Turkish reaction as “relatively 
unimportant.”  Makarios pointed out that Cyprus would be [a] “safer military base” for Western 
powers if it were united with Greece as this would curtail the hazards inherent in a disaffected 
population. Such concern might be surprising coming from someone who would later fight to 
limit the size of the British SBAs on the island, but it is indicative of Makarios’ attitude towards 
enosis at this point. The Archbishop also stressed that if the present impasse continued, it would 
only provide more opportunities for communist propaganda against the “imperialist US and  
UK.” 34
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known better, they believed that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was not as genuine and passionate 
as theirs.”35
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Chapter III 
 
  
 
 
First American Initiatives 
 
In April, the American Embassy in Greece issued an unofficial collection of ideas similar to the 
ones earlier presented by Makarios. These included a British assurance to discuss a potential 
change in the status of the island, a rehabilitated constitutional proposal, an offer of dual 
nationality and, finally, an understanding between the British and Greek governments whereby 
the latter would work to discourage enosis agitation in exchange for support of Greece’s 
admission to NATO. The final point, however, was later rejected by the State Department. This 
was the beginning of an inquiry into the consistency of American policy towards Cyprus 1 
which, at this point, was targeted only towards maintaining the status quo.2
 
 
Before the Foreign Office could issue a response, however, Makarios rejected any consideration 
of compromise, saying that a future promise to discuss Cyprus was essentially meaningless 
unless followed by a guarantee to cede Cyprus to Greece “within a reasonably short time.” 
Makarios then appealed to the Greek Government to issue an urgent message to the British. If 
this was unsuccessful, they should state their claim in the upcoming UN General Assembly. In 
any event, the Archbishop and the Greek Cypriots seemed bound and determined to steer a 
course towards internationalization, regardless of the consequences.3
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for its part, seemed reluctant to consider the American proposals beyond the point of discussion 
and was loath to raise the question of a change in the status of the island for fear it would 
encourage the proponents of enosis to “redouble their efforts.” 4
 
 
Unaware of the American initiative, the Greek Government did not present its earlier proposals 
until May 2, 1951, despite Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison’s unambiguous message that 
HMG would neither consider the Greek proposals nor discuss the status of Cyprus for the 
immediate future. Not only were the Greek Government’s proposals rebuffed, it was also advised 
to discourage enosis agitation so as not to unduly antagonize the Turks.5
  
 
In the early 1950s, American thinking with respect to the Cyprus issue had no clear definition. 
While State Department officials had kept a low-keyed interest in Britain’s handling of the 
problem, it was evident that the US considered Cyprus a matter between Britain and Greece. The 
Cold War dogma of the period tended to assign a communist connection to just about every 
disturbance and popular movement occurring in a colonial region and Cyprus was no exception.  
The US may not have held a consistent policy regarding Cyprus, but it knew what it did not want 
to happen.  
 
In October 1951, at the urging of the British, the Americans were forced to confront the question. 
Referencing the British aide-mémoire of August 13, 1951, which essentially reaffirmed the 
position that Cyprus should be retained on strategic grounds, the State Department basically 
reaffirmed this view when it concluded that “the surrender of British sovereignty over Cyprus 
would have a most serious effect on the Allied position in the Middle East.” The Department of 
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State also recommended that further agitation for enosis as well as attempts to raise the problem 
in an international forum would be “unwise and inopportune at this time,” and every effort 
should be expended to prevent this from happening. Moreover, at the conference on colonial 
questions on October 9, the American representative was instructed to consider with his British 
counterpart “possible tactics” to be engaged if the question was brought forward at the General 
Assembly.6
 
  
While State Department officials agreed that there was nothing that could be said or done at this 
point to pacify those Greeks who were determined to agitate for enosis, it believed that “certain 
helpful adjustments” could be made by the British that might reinforce the position of Britain 
and the United States in any potential General Assembly discussion. For example, it was 
recommended that Britain steer clear of issues that might provide “material inimical to the 
common objectives” of the US and the UK.  Although Britain received some of the support it 
wanted, the State Department stopped short of advising the Government to issue a joint US-UK 
statement regarding retention of British sovereignty over Cyprus, and believed that it might be 
more beneficial if the US refrained from publicly identifying with the issue.7
 
 At this stage, while 
there was little concerted effort between the US and the UK on the Cyprus issue, a hint of 
daylight was beginning to emerge.  
Makarios and the UN Campaign: an Overview 
  
Whatever views the US and the UK might have held made little difference to Makarios, who 
doggedly kept up the pressure to increase international awareness and create international 
                                                     
6 Aide-mémoire Department of State to the British Embassy, Annex 1,  October 1, 1951: FRUS, 1951, V, 539- 540. 
7 Ibid. 
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pressure in support of Greek Cypriot aspirations. Between October 1952 and March 1953, the 
Archbishop made visits to the United States, Britain, France, and Greece, as well as Lebanon, 
Syria, and Egypt. In Damascus, much to the amusement of the British, the Archbishop was 
forced to listen to the irredentist claim that Cyprus was actually part of Greater Syria. But 
Makarios was determined to at least create the appearance of support of the Arab countries for a 
UN alternative. On April 25, 1952, the Archbishop gathered a Pancyprian National Assembly. 
Addressing 600 delegates, he reiterated his pledge to intensify his enosis campaign and to resist 
any or all compromises with the British colonial administration. Most of all, he vowed to step up 
the effort towards internationalization. The meeting ended with a resolution to bring the Cyprus 
question to the UN.8
 
 In retrospect, the Archbishop would have been wise to be careful what he 
wished for because taking the question before an international forum opened the door for Turkey 
to stake its claim on the island.  
Through a barrage of press conferences and meetings with diplomats and politicians he promoted 
the demand for union with Greece. He particularly focused on the representatives to the UN 
General Assembly of the countries he visited. Even more importantly, Makarios moved to invite 
the Leftists to join his endeavors. On June 28, 1953, about 10,000 Cypriots, including many 
AKEL supporters, gathered at Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia to hear Makarios. He announced 
his intention to bring the Cyprus question to the UN and appealed for support in the struggle for 
enosis from anyone and everyone, including the communists. He was convinced that the 
                                                     
8 Crawshaw, ibid., 51-52. 
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communists would lend support to his efforts given their history of pursuing the Cyprus question 
through the UN as well.9
 
 
On August 10, 1953, Makarios sent a petition to the UN General Assembly calling for the 
Cyprus problem to be inscribed on its agenda. The Archbishop was seeking to persuade the 
General Assembly to issue a resolution demanding recognition of the right of self-determination 
in Cyprus.10 In view of the fact that only sovereign states had the right of appeal to the UN, and 
no member state had sponsored the request, his petition was ignored. Greece, anxious to 
circumvent a public disagreement with Britain, declines to submit the petition to the international 
body. In response, Makarios announced his intent to do so with the support of Arab states if the 
Greek position remained unchanged.  Prime Minister Alexandrou Papagos, whose Rally Party 
had swept the elections in November, would have lost face if he failed to respond.11
 
  
Subsequently, on September 21, 1953, the Greek Ambassador to the UN, Alexis Kyrou, 
announced at a plenary session that Greece, regardless of intense public opinion, “for the time 
being” would not sponsor Makarios’ call for discussion of the Cyprus question at the UN.12
                                                     
9 The AKEL-affiliated organization (EAS) National Liberation Coalition (Ethnikos Apeleftheroticos Synaspismos), 
demanded in 1951 that the Cyprus question be taken up at the UN. In 1952, AKEL favored shared action in the 
struggle for enosis but its attempts to create a united front were rebuffed by the Right.Stavros Panteli, A New History 
of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, (London: East-West Publications, 1984), 244-245; Hubert  
von Faustmann, “The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949-58”  in The Historical Background to the 
UN’s Involvement with Cyprus, 
 This 
was an event, according to Faustmann, that marks the first time Greece had used the UN— but 
ironically only to express its intentions not to use it in this matter. Although the overture seemed 
www.palgrave.com, 2003, 8. 
10 Faustmann,  ibid., 9 
11 The center-liberal government of Plastiras-Venizelos resigned on October 10, Ibid. 
12 “Speech by Alexis Kyrou, Head of the Greek Delegation, at the VIII Session of the General Assembly of the UN, 
September 21, 1953, “Press and Information Department, 9; Embtel, Yost Athens 614, August 26, 1953: FRUS, 
1952-1954, VIII, 676. 
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to satisfy Makarios and the Greek public, it was a red flag for Britain. It did, however, buy 
Papagos much needed time to advance the high-level bilateral negotiations his government was 
seeking.13
 
   
Kyrou had earlier approached the Archbishop and attempted to persuade him to abandon his 
appeal to the UN on the grounds that it stood no chance of success without US support and 
would serve only to benefit the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Stephanos Stepanopoulos, who 
had approached the US in the hope of engaging its assistance in dissuading Makarios from 
bringing the Cyprus question to the UN, feared that if the Archbishop moved forward without 
Greek support, he might publicly accuse Papagos of betraying the Cypriots, thus weakening his 
government. Conversely, if the Greeks decided to support the appeal, bilateral negotiations with 
Britain would be impossible. Moreover, the likely failure of the initiative would only serve to 
undermine the Greek public’s confidence in the UN, which would be particularly inopportune at 
a time when Greece was increasing its military presence in Korea.14
While cancelling a planned visit to Cyprus, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as part of 
his Near East tour, did meet with Prime Minister Papagos in Athens. In the meeting, the Greek 
Prime Minister attempted to link the Cyprus question with Greek prospects for joining the 
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), pointing out the importance of Greek membership 
in the organization. The Greek Government, he said, “seeks a solution [to the Cyprus question] 
which would not disrupt the existing pleasant Anglo-Greek relationship,” but cautioned that “no 
  
                                                     
13 Faustmann, ibid., 9. 
14Yost, Embtel Athens 614, August 26, 1953: FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, 677. 
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Greek Government [could] afford to ignore the Cyprus issue.”15 After commenting on the slow 
progress that was being made towards resolving the issue, Dulles assured Papagos that in “an 
area so historically important to Greece,” his country’s position would be thoroughly 
considered.16
 
 It was clear that the Secretary’s primary concern was to secure Greece’s 
commitment to fulfill its obligations to the anti-communist cause, primarily with regards to 
Korea, and did not wholly appreciate what was really at stake with Cyprus. 
Papagos-Eden Incident  
 
Following Greece’s announcement at the UN, on September 22, 1953, British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden met with Papagos, who was convalescing in Athens from a liver ailment. When 
the Cyprus issue arose, Eden abruptly refused to discuss it saying, “[…] for the British 
Government there exists no Cyprus question, either at present or in the future,” adding that “after 
all there was a Greek population in Alexandria and New York, but that did not suppose that the 
Greek Government was demanding enosis for them.”17   Papagos responded by saying that if that 
was the British position then Greece reserved the right to handle the matter in the manner that it 
deemed “best and most expedient” and with “full and absolute freedom of action.” 18
                                                     
15 Peurifoy, Embtel  Athens 3476, May 28, 1953:ibid., 835; Memcon by the First Secretary of Embassy in Greece 
(Schnee) with Office of the Prime Minister of Greece, Athens 51, May 27, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, IX, pt. 1, 156. 
 The Greek 
Prime Minister was offended and furious, while Eden did not regard the meeting as particularly 
notable, since in his mind, he was not saying anything new. On October 15, Papagos addressed a 
note to Eden suggesting bilateral talks which the Foreign Secretary ignored.  The rebuff made it 
impossible for Papagos to later accept an invitation to London, “if he had to return and say that 
16 Ibid., 156-157. 
17 Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Field Marshall Papagos, quoted here in Robert 
Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 32.  
18 GPR Meeting, February 7, 1955, 671, quoted here in Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, 48. 
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the question of Cyprus had not even been discussed.”19 According to Holland, the Eden-Papagos 
incident marked the “beginning of the end of the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic 
friendship,20” and the “trigger” leading to the internationalization of the Cyprus question.21
 
 
Following his exchange with Eden, the Greek Prime Minister’s stance did indeed harden, and he 
concluded that Britain might never be ready to discuss the Cyprus question with the Greek 
Government.  The combined pressure from Makarios, the Ethnarchy, public opinion, and the 
Greek Left led the Greek Prime Minister to the realization that to oppose enosis for the sake of 
securing Greek–Anglo relations was a losing proposition.22 Britain responded by enlisting US 
support.  In 1953, the State Department’s anti-colonial sentiments regarding Cyprus were a 
distant second compared to its Cold War objectives. State Department officials still held to the 
British viewpoint that any tempering of the Cyprus question could only have dire consequences 
for Britain’s remaining imperial holdings. This fact, combined with Makarios’ willingness to 
accept support from AKEL, drew the US and Britain closer at this stage. As a result, the 
American Embassy in Athens was directed to preclude any attempt by Greece to bring the 
Cyprus question to the United Nations.23 At least for the moment, Britain felt secure. 24
 
 
In December 1953, Kyrou, informed the United States and the Britain’s delegates that if the 
United Kingdom Government continued its present uncompromising position, the Greek 
government would bring the Cyprus question to the UN. British officials, however, still held fast 
                                                     
19 Memcon between Baxter (Acting Director, GTI),  Athanase G. Politis (Greek Ambassador) and Henry A. Byroade 
(Assistant Secretary, NEA) Washington 366, April 5, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, 685-686. 
20 Holland, ibid., 32. 
21  Nicolet, US Foreign Policy Towards Cyprus, 44. 
22 Faustmann, ibid., 7- 8. 
23 Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 130–2. 
24 Faustmann, ibid., 8. 
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to the belief that the Greeks were not sincere and, in any event, the US would do everything in its 
power to prevent this from happening, despite the fact that the Americans continued to insist it 
was not a party to the problem. 25
 
 
In November 1953, when the State Department learned of Greek intentions to take the Cyprus 
question to the UN, the initial American attitude was tentative. While it was clear that the US 
had a stake in the dispute, it still preferred, as much as possible, to remain above the fray. This 
attitude changed, however, when it became clear that Greece would bring the issue to the UN 
unless Britain relented in its hard-line position regarding bilateral discussions. In January, 1954, 
Britain submitted another aide-mémoire to the State Department this time requesting official 
support for its policies on the Cyprus question.  
 
The document covered three essential points, the American response to which would form the 
basis for future US policy towards the island. 26  First, the British wanted “assurances that the 
United States continues to share the British view that joint strategic interests of both countries 
demand the maintenance of the present status of Cyprus.” Secondly, Britain sought 
“confirmation that the United States will continue to discourage the Greek Government from 
pressing its claims to Cyprus.” And lastly, Britain wanted “an agreement to inform the Greek 
Government that the United States would oppose placing the Cyprus question on the agenda of 
the General assembly or its discussion at the UN.”27
                                                     
25 Panteli, ibid., 248; Kelling, ibid., 142. 
 While the first two points were tentatively 
agreeable, subject to the views of the Department of Defense, it was decided to adopt a non-
26 Stefanidis, ibid., 185. 
27 Aide-mémoire prepared by William O. Baxter, Memcon: “Request of British Government for US Support on the 
Cyprus Question,” February 2, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, 679-680. 
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committal view with respect to the third.28
 
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose to not take a position 
in the dispute between Britain and Greece which, in their view, did not currently affect US 
interests.   
Concentrating on the defense aspect of the British formula, they limited their statement to US 
military interest in the island. While they admitted the importance of the base facilities to US 
strategic interests, they did not necessarily hold the opinion that the strategic interests of Britain 
and the US required the retention of the present status of the island, instead preferring “those 
arrangements which are most likely to permit their continued use by the armed forces of the 
United States.” 29
 
 It was probable that the Joint Chiefs were aware of the Greek proposal in 
which Britain would receive bases in Cyprus and Greece in exchange for enosis.  
The Ambassador to Turkey, Avra M. Warren, agreed with all three points, but with regard to the 
third, advised that “discussions [of] this issue can only serve to weaken existing friendly 
relationships between Greece, UK, and Turkey, and thus further Soviet efforts to disrupt western 
unity.” He also warned that any excursion into the UN would give Turkey a “voice in any 
decision [to] alter [the] status of Cyprus.”30   In a State Department telegram of April 5, Dulles 
had reaffirmed the US position that it was “firmly opposed” to raising the Cyprus question at the 
UN, echoing concerns about negative effects on  international relations and concern over 
disruption within NATO.31
 
  
                                                     
28 Ibid., 679-680. 
29 Robert B. Anderson to Dulles, Memorandum, May 19, 1954: ibid, 687. 
30 Warren, Embtel Ankara 1016, March 30, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, 683-684. 
31 Dulles, Deptel Athens 2901, April 5, 1954: ibid., 684. 
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The official US response to the British aide-mémoire was not issued until July. It stated that the 
US Government “recognizes that Cyprus is of strategic importance to the United States, but is 
unable to confirm that United States strategic interests require that there be no change in the 
sovereignty over Cyprus.” Regarding the third point, it was noted, “should the Greek 
Government raise the matter in the United Nations, the United States Government would be 
confronted with the importance it attaches to the “principle of the self-determination of the 
peoples.”32
 
 Needless to say, this was not the ringing endorsement the British were expecting. 
 The British request for support on the Cyprus issue had compelled US policy makers to tackle 
the gnarly question of how to square its traditional anti-colonial doctrine when it conflicted with 
national imperatives.33 This point is underlined by Stefanidis in his observation that “the British 
aide-mémoire forced upon US decision makers the dilemma they had been evading since 1950, 
namely that of reconciling general principles with concrete political and strategic interests.”34
So far, 1954, then, had not been a banner year for Anglo-American relations. In addition to the 
Cyprus issue, differences between the two countries had emerged over US policies in Indochina 
during the Geneva conference in March.
  
35 The UK had also been critical over purported CIA 
involvement in a coup against Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the communist-friendly leader of 
Guatemala and the installation of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas.36
                                                     
32 Draft aide-mémoire attached to Baxter, June 25, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-2554, NARA. 
 Indeed, Dulles was so 
33 According to Stefanidis, the US traditional principles could be “bent’ whenever they conflicted with strategic 
interests, or relations with allied colonial powers. For example, the US had chosen to abstain from voting on 
Resolution 637A (VII) in support of self-determination, 184. 
34 Stefanidis, ibid., 185. 
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China in retaliation for its activities in Indochina, see Robert L. Beisner, Acheson, (New York: New York Oxford 
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36 Ibid., 581. 
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infuriated over Britain’s lack of support for Guatemala that anyone merely mentioning the 
Cyprus issue was in danger of “being thrown out of the room.”37
 
 
 
 
Never Say “Never” 
On July 24, the Cyprus issue took a turn for the worse escalating into a full-blown political crisis 
when the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, whose “job,” according to 
Holland, was to “divert attention to Cyprus,” announced a vague and unserious constitutional 
offer, followed by the declaration that “the British Government cannot contemplate a change of 
sovereignty in Cyprus.”38
 
 It was clear that Hopkinson was unprepared for the inevitable attack 
by the opposition that this announcement would inspire. When questioned by his hostile 
colleagues in Labour whether this would mean that island could not expect self-determination in 
the near future, he responded with the following:   
[…][I]t has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing 
to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent…I have said that the question of the 
abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise—that British sovereignty will remain [italics mine].39
 
 
According to a desk officer in the Colonial Office, the beleaguered Hopkinson “had completely 
gone off his prepared brief.”40
                                                     
37 B. Salt to Young, September 9, 1954, FO 371/112848, WG108/185. 
  A short time later, matters were made worse when Hopkinson’s 
department chief, Oliver Lyttleton, stated that due to Greece’s volatility that he could “imagine 
38 Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1953- 1954), 531, July 
28, 1954, col. 504; also quoted in Holland, ibid., 37. 
39 Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), July 28, 1954, col. 508.  
40 Holland, ibid., 38. 
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no more disastrous policy for Cyprus than to hand it over to an unstable though friendly 
Power.”41
 
 
These statements, along with the bad-tempered exchange between Papagos and Eden, were 
surely decisive factors in convincing the Greeks that they had no choice but to raise the Cyprus 
issue in the UN General Assembly. The word “never” infuriated Greece as it signified that 
Britain had eliminated any prospect for enosis now or in the future. While these missteps surely 
contributed to future strife on the island, they were simply a blunt admission of Britain’s post-
World War II policy.  For the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, however, they represented Britain’s 
final word on the subject.  
 
The British Constitutional Offer 
 
The constitutional offer, which was approved by the cabinet on July 26, was later described by 
then press officer Lawrence Durrell as a constitution “for Zulus.”42
                                                     
41 Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), 1953-54, 531, July 28, 1954, col. 552. 
 Not only was it less liberal 
than the one offered in 1948, it was more restrictive than any pre-war constitution. The 
justification for this backward step was that since the Greeks had not been responsible enough to 
take up the 1948 offer which, in Britain’s view, had provided “a high degree of internal self-
government,” a modified version was in order. Among other things, the proposed arrangements 
called for a majority of official and nominated members in the assembly, with a token number of 
elected officials. In the 1948 constitution, representation was the other way round. There was a 
majority of elected as opposed to official and nominated members. Furthermore, unofficial 
42 Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons, (Boston: E.P. Dutton, 1957), 147-148. 
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members of the legislature would be appointed to the Executive Council to take control of the 
Departments. It also proposed to now enforce the sedition laws. 43
 
    
Needless to say, the offer was denounced from Athens to London. After hearing the conditions 
proposed in the new offer, Labour minister Aneurin Bevan rightly concluded that the new 
constitution assured that “under no circumstances can Cyprus look forward to self-
government.”44 Washington was also disappointed since it had hoped that the British could have 
seen their way to produce some sort of arrangement based upon mutual agreement that offered 
genuine political reform.45
 
 
The First Greek Appeal to the UN 
 
In the aftermath of Hopkinson’s unqualified statement in the House of Commons and Lyttelton’s 
accompanying blunt remark, it came as no surprise when on August 16, 1954,46  Papagos 
submitted an appeal to the UN demanding the “application, under the auspices of the UN, of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in case of the population of the island 
of Cyprus.”47 Makarios and the mayors of Cyprus endorsed the Greek petition under a separate 
memorandum presented by the Greek representative at the UN.48
                                                     
43 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus 15. 
  Meanwhile, the British 
Embassy in Athens received two alternative proposals from Papagos. The first was an option for 
mediation from the Council of Europe, where the Greeks had already submitted a request for a 
44 “Cyprus Constitutional Arrangements, “HC Deb, July 28, 1954, vol. 531, cc 504-514, Hansard. 
45 Wood to Arthur L. Richards, director of GTI, Memorandum, August 10, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1054, 
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Yearbook, Kelling, 145; UN Yearbook, 1954, New York, 94. 
47 Ibid., 94. 
48 Faustmann, ibid., 14. 
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discussion on Cyprus.  The second suggestion was for secret negotiations for a new constitution, 
which the Prime Minister would then try to pitch to the Ethnarchy. The British remained 
unresponsive on both points. 49
 
 
In a meeting with Papagos on August 11, Cavendish W. Cannon, the US Ambassador to Greece, 
made one last effort to clarify the American opposition to bringing the Cyprus question to the 
UN. What followed was a “candid discussion” during which Cannon attempted to define the 
difference between political realities and lofty principles. The Ambassador explained that while 
the US held a principled position with regard to self-determination, its policy, such as it was 
towards Cyprus, was conditioned by broader strategic interests and commitments, and that the 
US and Britain had more important uses for their time. Consequently, Greece should not expect 
“a sympathetic attitude” if it brought the Cyprus question to the UN.50
 
  While Papagos expressed 
understanding for the American position, the meeting did nothing to change Greece’s advance 
towards the UN.   
On the day of the appeal, President Eisenhower wrote to Churchill with an offer “to do 
something,” and expressing concern that Britain’s handling of the problem might have a negative 
effect on US opinion. The letter was in response to the August 20 letter from the Prime Minister 
in which he warned that failure of the US to support Britain at the UN would cause “deep 
distress” and “difficulties in guiding public opinion into the right channels in much larger 
matters.”51
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Two US mediation attempts by private citizens followed. On August 21, Churchill met with 
Spiros Skouras, the Greek American President of Twentieth Century Fox and a personal friend 
of Eisenhower. Skouras tried to persuade Churchill to send a letter to Papagos telling him “that 
the present situation was not a suitable one in which to discuss the Cyprus question but at some 
time in the future HMG would do so.” The idea was rebuffed by the British Prime Minister who 
responded by saying, “  ‘[t]he Greeks should have a sense of proportion in looking at world 
problems and might also do well to remember with gratitude what the country did for them at the 
end of the war.”52  The second attempt by socialite Fleur Fenton Cowles, a former consultant to 
President Truman’s Famine Emergency Committee and editor of Flair magazine, was no more 
successful. Cowles, did, however, manage to impress Papagos enough to extract a promise to 
moderate Greek agitation once the item was inscribed on the agenda.53
 
 
Turkey Enters the Dispute 
 
Meanwhile, Turkey had largely remained largely silent on Cyprus, and was content to do so as 
long as it felt secure that Britain would succeed in holding the island. The Greek appeal to the 
UN, however, alarmed the Ankara Government and signaled a potential threat to the status quo. 
The possibility that Cyprus might fall into the hands of a mercurial Greece represented a threat to 
the security of Turkey’s southern border. Turkey also felt some responsibility for the welfare of 
the Turkish Cypriot community, or at least that is what it claimed whenever Greece pressed a 
claim on the island.  Until the Greek appeal, the Turkish Government had held to the argument 
that there was no Cyprus problem, and any questions regarding the status of the island was a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction.  
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Indeed, in early April, Foreign Minister Köprülü reaffirmed this line, adding that no change in 
the island’s status was anticipated. But in the event that should happen, Turkey had a right to 
advance its claim.54 Greece’s determination to make Cyprus an international issue, however, 
drastically changed the dynamics of the situation. As a result, Turkey moved from the sidelines 
into active involvement in the dispute by declaring its intention to “coordinate very closely with 
Britain” at the UN. Turkey had inadvertently become Britain’s unofficial ally in the Cyprus 
question and would use its new status in the future as means to advance its position.55
 
  
The temptation to exploit Turkish weaknesses regarding Cyprus was not new. While wary of the 
potential pitfalls in doing so, Clifford Norton, the UK Ambassador in Athens commented soon 
after the Church-sponsored plebiscite: “the Turkish card is a tricky one, but useful in the pass to 
which we have come.” 56 Greek determination to move ahead in the UN erased all past 
reservations the FO had about playing the ‘Turkish card.” 57 Eden needed no convincing and was 
especially keen on going this route.58
 
 
 On February 24, the Embassy in Ankara asked Turkey to express its opposition to Washington 
about raising the Cyprus question at the UN. The British also wanted the Turks to approach 
Athens in the same manner. While agreeing to the first request, the Turks refused to sound out 
the Greeks for fear that it might discredit the Anglo-Turkish position that the Cyprus question 
did not exist.59
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The Anglo-Turkish alliance was officially confirmed by Turkish Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes in Ankara on August 28. A few days later, as per a British request, Menderes sent a 
dispatch to Dulles in the State Department denouncing Greek policy and reaffirming Turkey’s 
“vital” interest in the island. He also requested that the US make every effort to oppose the Greek 
initiative at every turn.60 In response, a letter was sent by Acting Secretary of State Smith on 
September 6 on behalf of Dulles, expressing regret over Greece’s decision to bring the Cyprus 
question to the UN and assuring the Turkish Prime Minister that the US government would 
“weigh with [the] fullest sympathy” the views of his government in “formulating its policy.”61
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Chapter IV 
 
Charting a Course: US Policy for Cyprus  
The prospect of UN intervention compelled the US to take into account the interests of all 
parties in formulating a strategy for the inevitable UN showdown. For their part, the 
Greeks attempted to get the Americans in their corner by reminding them of a core tenet 
set forward in the joint declaration between Eisenhower and Churchill on foreign policy 
(“Potomac Charter”) which states: we uphold the principle of self-government and will 
earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries 
whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence.”1
 
  
Greece took care to ground its claim on the principle of self-determination and not enosis 
since they understood that the latter would not be acceptable to the US and Britain, let 
alone the Turks. Britain, on the other hand, sought to appeal to American strategic 
interests and its communist obsession by arguing that British sovereignty over Cyprus 
was critical for the establishment of a base for its Middle East Air Force in addition to its 
Middle East Land Forces. Citing Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the UN Charter, Britain also 
maintained that since Cyprus was a domestic issue, the UN could have no jurisdiction in 
                                                 
1 The Eisenhower-Churchill Declaration (“Potomac Charter”) reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic 
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deciding the matter. Since this interpretation conflicted with the “Potomac Charter,” the 
US did not agree. Furthermore, the British insisted that their position was a reflection of 
the will of the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot people, a dicey argument at 
best, given that it was Britain that had been actively pursuing the Turks in an effort to 
ensure support for its position at the UN.  
 
When it was discovered that the Turks were waffling regarding their support for Britain 
at the UN, the Colonial Office grew alarmed and reminded the Foreign Office that it 
would be “wise to give the Turks further encouragement to keep them on the mark” since 
it would “severely damage our position at the UN if the Turks were to adopt a neutral 
attitude on the question of Cyprus on the Assembly agenda.”2
 
  
The mantra by British officials that that the Americans did not fully appreciate Turkey’s 
interest in the Cyprus issue is called into question by the existence of documentary 
evidence to the contrary. A record of a conversation as early as February 26, 1954 
between Ambassador Warren and Turkish Undersecretary Nuri Birgi stated that the 
Turkish Government “would consider such action by Greece ‘most unfortunate,’” and 
believed it “most desirous to avoid involvement if the issue is raised.” Furthermore, if 
this should happen, Turkey “will assert its interest and ask [to] participate [in] any Anglo-
Greek discussions.”3
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The charge of American obtuseness with respect to Turkey is further called into question 
by a March 1954 memorandum of conversation between Feridun C. Erkin, the Turkish 
Ambassador to the US, and GTI Deputy Director Baxter: 
 
 
Although the question of Cyprus with Greece has been a controversial one for many years, the Turkish 
Government has taken no note of it and has always attempted to play down any press agitation because the 
enosis issue has never before been officially supported by the Greek Government. It has been the view of 
the Turkish Government that there has been no reason for any change in the status quo but it must now 
express its concern at the Greek Government’s announced intention of presenting this question in the UN. 4
 
 
 
Regarding the Greek Cypriots’ argument that the status of Cyprus should be based on 
majority will, the Turkish Ambassador explained to Baxter “that it is not the international 
custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of the majority wishes of 
the population, but there are equally important geographical considerations which must 
be taken into account”—clearly a reference to the close proximity of Cyprus to the 
Anatolian mainland. Erkin concluded by pointing out that the Soviets would be the real 
winners in a UN debate, a concern shared by both Britain and the US.5 The accusation 
that the Americans did not understand Turkish views on Cyprus is further disproved by 
the fact that Bowker, the British Ambassador in Ankara, had told the Foreign Office that 
the Turkish Government’s position had been made quite apparent to Washington and 
Athens.6 What was really gnawing at the British was not that the US did not understand 
the Turks, but that the State Department did not agree with British tactics and had no real 
appetite for pressuring the Turks on behalf of HMG.7
 
  
                                                 
4 Baxter, Memcon,”Turkish views on Cyprus,” March 10, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, 682. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Bowker to FO 20, March 30, 1954: CO 926/183, doc. 247. 
7 Passage based on an analysis by Nicolet, ibid., 49. 
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In the summer of 1954, the Greeks and Turks were anxious to maintain a low profile with 
regard to Cyprus, and both wanted to keep the issue off the UN agenda. While the Greeks 
still believed that the issue could best be resolved through bilateral negotiations with 
Britain, the Turks remained steadfast in their belief that Britain would continue to remain 
on Cyprus. Moreover, Greece and Turkey had been co-signators in the 1953 “treaty of 
peace and friendship“ and, in August 1954, jointly signed the Balkan Pact with 
Yugoslavia. Neither country wanted to risk these gains by taking a hard-line position with 
respect to Cyprus.8
 
 The Turkish Cypriot community, though it had consistently opposed 
enosis, had generally refrained from direct action because under British rule their 
minority status and identity were secure.  
The Greek Cypriots, however, and Makarios in particular, had none of these restraints. In 
July 1954 the Archbishop took to the wires with a telegram campaign aimed at enlisting 
the support of US officials. A cable to Eisenhower declared that “on behalf of the Greek 
people of Cyprus we strongly protest [the] intended move to Cyprus of the British Middle 
East Joint Headquarters,” warning “so long as Cyprus remains under foreign rule [the] 
headquarters will be in an unfriendly land.” 9  On July 30, the Archbishop made a speech 
rejecting the prospect of a constitution and stating that although the campaign would 
remain peaceful, “British supporters of imperialist dreams only understand force.”10
                                                 
8 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 43. 
 The 
not so subtle threat of violence seriously disturbed State Department officials who urged 
9 Makarios to Eisenhower, Telegram, July 5, 1954: Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, White 
House Central Files, 122 Cyprus, Dwight D. Eisenhower-DDE Library. 
10 Circular telegram 766 to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia, July 31, 1954: SDCDF, 747C.00/7 3154, 
NARA.  
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the Greek Government to take steps to “’restrain Makarios’ from stepping out of his role 
as religious leader and inciting the Cypriot population to violence.’ ”11
 
      
The US now understood where all interested parties stood in respect to the issue. The 
decision now had to be made which side the Americans would support or whether the 
item should be discussed at all. After outlining possible lines of action, Chalmers B. 
Wood of the Office for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI) recommended that the 
US “[…]seek to obtain postponement of consideration of the question in the General 
Committee [and seek] direct negotiations between[…]representatives of all segments of 
the population of Cyprus and the British authorities.”12 While the GTI was calling for 
abstention and postponement of the Cyprus question, the Office of Dependant Affairs 
argued for the inclusion of the item on the agenda since it was anticipated that anti-
colonial sentiment would be running high in the General Assembly: “were we to 
advocate a full-scale discussion of Soviet ‘colonialism’ our sincerity would be challenged 
unless we advocated a strong anti-colonial position [on all items, including Cyprus],” 
even though the situation would “jeopardize our relationship with our closest allies, two 
of whom are on opposite sides of the debate.”13
 
  
A third view expressed by the  Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNA) argued for a vote 
against the inclusion of the issue on the agenda, maintaining that “Assembly discussion 
or action cannot lead to constructive results” and “would raise serious questions affecting 
                                                 
11 Dulles, Deptel 230 Athens, July 27, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, 696. 
12 Wood to Baxter, Memorandum: “United Nations Procedure on the Cyprus Question” August 28, 1954, 
doc. 747C.00/8-2354, NARA. 
13 Robert R. Robbins to Director, O. Benjamin Gerig, Memorandum: “Soviet Colonialism” 9th General 
Assembly, August 12, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, III, 1407. 
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Article 2/7 of the Charter.”14  The UNA view came closest to the British and Turkish 
positions, who at this stage, had been jointly lobbying against the inclusion of the Cyprus 
question on the agenda.15 A new element, however, was about to be introduced into the 
equation, the possibility of linking the Cyprus issue to the item of Chinese representation 
at the UN.16
  
 
Undersecretary Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to the UN, was the first 
to suggest that the Cyprus issue might be a useful lever for obtaining British support on 
the issue of Chinese representation.17
                                                 
14 Draft position paper, “9th regular session of the General Assembly: The Cyprus problem,” August 27, 
1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-354, NARA. 
 In August the Ambassador began pressing for 
indirect negotiations with the British. In a memorandum of conversation dated August 17, 
Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, David Key, recounted a 
conversation with Lodge where the Ambassador urged Robert D. Murphy to take a 
forceful position with Minister Scott regarding the Chinese representation issue. Lodge 
urged that Murphy point out to Scott that the Chinese question is “of greater concern to 
us than anything else on the Assembly’s agenda.” The Ambassador further suggested that 
if this appeal failed, “it might be necessary to link the Cyprus question with the Chinese 
issue: […] “ since “there is a great preponderance of opinion in this country that Cyprus 
15 Nicolet, ibid., 50. 
16 In brief, the issue of Chinese representation at the UN revolved around Britain’s position tending towards 
recognition of the PRC in the UN which the US firmly opposed:”Eden advised Dulles that the growing 
consensus in Britain, the Commonwealth, and Europe generally, leaned toward recognition of Communist 
China and the best course was to “face the problem squarely and get it over with.”Consequently, the 
Secretary could not guarantee that the British Government would maintain a cohesive front with 
Washington on this issue: Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy towards Taiwan, 
1950-1955, (Chapel Hill NC: UNC Press, 1996), 142.  
17 Ibid., 50. 
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should be turned over to Greece and that we will have to take this into account in our 
position on this question.”18
 
   
In a meeting with British UN delegate, Sir Pierson Dixon, in early September, Lodge 
brought up the matter of Cyprus and Chinese representation, and asked Dixon if “had any 
objection to discussing [the] two subjects concurrently.” 19
 
  Dixon laughingly responded 
saying, as it happened, he had specifically been instructed by Eden not to ‘”link” the two 
issues, though it was undeniable that the two were obviously linked. Turning to the 
subject of the Greek inscription, Dixon tried to pin down the Ambassador regarding the 
American position. Lodge’s reply, however, was less than definitive, saying that while he 
“could not speak officially on the subject,” he believed that the US was not in favor of 
inscription.  
Despite Dulles’ prior warning “not to do anything which savored ‘crudities,’”20
 
 Lodge 
could not resist baiting the British delegate: “we could thus either abstain or we could 
vote ‘no’ or we could vote ‘no’ and lobby our friends.” Those were the three possible 
alternatives. But whatever position we might take, the item might well get on the Agenda. 
What our decision would finally be I could not possibly tell.”  When Dixon commented 
that it looked as though the US was refusing to define its position on Cyprus until the UK 
defined theirs on Chinese representation, Lodge did not respond.  
                                                 
18 Key, Telcon, Memorandum, “Negotiations with UK on Chinese Representation Issue,” August 17, 1954: 
FRUS, 1952-1954, III, 753. 
19 Lodge to Dulles, Memorandum September 9, 1954: ibid, 779-781. 
20 Ibid, Dulles’original admonition can be found in Dulles, August 31, 1954, quoted in Howard, 
Memorandum:”Summary of Development with Regard to the Cyprus Question,” September 13, 1954: 
SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-1354, NARA.  
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 At this point, the British were convinced that the US was leaving them to twist in the 
wind on the inscription issue. Consequently, they began a diplomatic campaign 
throughout Western Europe and “white” Commonwealth countries to persuade those 
governments to close ranks in opposing Greece. The Australians reluctantly agreed to 
lend their support, but privately complained to Selwyn Lloyd that Britain’s failure to 
make any genuine strides towards the constitutional issue made the situation awkward.  
France on the other hand was standing firm, though given its track record, especially in 
North Africa and Indochina, “backing from that quarter was not entirely advantageous—
as if a hitherto sober citizen was suddenly seen consorting with a notorious alcoholic.”21
 
  
 On the upside, Britain was having some success in enlisting the support of several 
governments. The downside was that these were mainly inconsequential countries, with 
less than wholesome reputations.22 At this stage, some officials were growing 
uncomfortable with the position that their government had obliged them to defend; as one 
sardonically commented, “if the Ethiopians understood the issue, they probably would 
not support us.”23
 
 The Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, sided with Greece. 
Despite the best efforts of Britain, the composition of the General Committee weighed 
heavily in favor of Greece.  
Of the fifteen members, only Australia, France, and the Netherlands were seen as 
dependable, though the British were headed for a world of hurt with the Dutch.24
                                                 
21 Holland, ibid., 42. 
 The US, 
along with Canada, Colombia, and Ecuador were expected to abstain. On September 23, 
22 Iran, Pakistan, and India were among the countries to support Britain. 
23 Buxton minute, September 24, 1954, FO112862, WG1081/589, quoted here in Holland, ibid., 42. 
24 Despite British support for the Dutch claim in West Irian, the Netherlands voted with Greece. 
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Greece won the first round, and the item was inscribed on the agenda.25
 
 The British were 
furious with the Americans. In a telegram from New York following the UN defeat, 
Selwyn Lloyd, then British Prime Minister of Supply, bristled over the absence of 
American support: 
Bob Dixon and I are both most dissatisfied with the behavior of the US Delegation. So far as we can see 
they have not lifted a little finger to help us […] Cabot Lodge expressed complete ignorance of any idea 
that they should help us […] When I indicated that it might perhaps have occurred to them to try and help 
us without any agreement, his reply was a reference to the Greek vote and the telegrams he had from 
Senators, etc. asking him to vote for inscription.26
 
 
It was not only the British who were angry about the alleged perfidy of their American 
ally.  On October 23, Papagos met with Secretary Dulles for a brief luncheon in Paris, a 
sojourn from his extended tour of the Iberian Peninsula.  In the meeting, the Greek Prime 
Minister protested a remark by Ambassador Cannon to Acting Prime Minister 
Kanellopoulos whereby he allegedly told him that the “US would not maintain its 
neutrality on the Cyprus question in the UN.”27  Clearly irritated by this remark, Papagos 
sought reassurance from Dulles that the US would retain its neutrality about the Cyprus 
question at the UN and to refrain from lobbying other nations in this regard.28
                                                 
25 Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, 85.  
  He also 
handed the Secretary a lengthy memorandum accusing the US of assisting the UK on the 
Cyprus question.  Attached was a personal message to Eisenhower with a warning that 
26 Lloyd to Eden, Letter, September 23, 1954: FO 371/112867, doc. WG 1081/728. 
27 No record of this conversation is found in State Department files. Papagos’ memorandum stated that 
Cannon told Kannellopoulos on October 15 that the US would “oppose any substantive recommendation by 
Committee I of the General Assembly on the Cyprus question:” FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, n. 721. 
28 Wood, Memcon:’Cyprus,” October 26, 1954:ibid., 720. 
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the US could expect an “extremely unfavorable reaction by the Greek people” should its 
current policy on the Cyprus question continue. 29
 
   
Dulles tried to downplay any question of the American position by pointing out that since 
the British had a voiced similar criticism; it was a good indication of US neutrality.30
 
  
Obviously, the Greek Prime Minister took this statement as a promise that the Americans 
would remain neutral. But according to a memorandum of conversation dated December 
16, 1954, Dulles had “promised” nothing to that effect and “made no commitment.” 
Furthermore, State Department officials parsed the definition of “neutrality,” arguing that 
the word itself was subject to interpretation:  
By supporting a motion which was not directed against either Greece or Great Britain, the United States 
had, it seemed to Mr. Baxter, played a neutral part. We could not interpret the term “neutral” in such a 
narrow sense as to mean nothing but abstention on a Greek motion seeking application of the principle of 
self-determination to the People of Cyprus.31
 
 
While it is evident that throughout 1954 the Americans were sending confusing signals, 
this particular misunderstanding was as much the result of what the Prime Minister 
inferred, as anything the Secretary said.  It is significant, however, that in this 
conversation Papagos suggested if the US could not retain its neutrality, it might help to 
have the item postponed for the year.32
                                                 
29 Enclosure of Memorandum from Key to Lodge, October 29, 1954: USUN files- Cyprus-August 1950-
1954:ibid., VIII, n.720. 
 This statement points to the fact that the Greek 
Prime Minister left the meeting uncertain as to where the Americans stood.  When in 
November, following the Congressional elections, the US tried to persuade the rival 
parties to move for postponement, their initiative was rebuffed across the board. The 
30 Wood, Memcon:’Cyprus,” October 26, 1954: ibid, 720. 
31  Baxter, Memcon Washington, December 16, 1954:ibid., 744-745. 
32 Ibid., 719-720. 
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rejection for postponement frustrated the US. Lodge told Foreign Minister Sir Anthony 
Nutting and Dixon that the best he could promise was to vote against the Greek 
resolution, and the US “would not button-hole delegates or actively lobby on UK behalf” 
if Britain persisted in its efforts to have the Greek item “dealt with” and “killed.” 33
 
   
The New Zealand Resolution 
Once the Greek appeal had been inscribed, Britain tried to resort to procedural means in 
an attempt to defeat the appeal. London enlisted the help of the “friendly nation” of New 
Zealand to submit a draft resolution not to consider further the Cyprus question.34 It was 
decided that the committee should be asked to discuss and vote on this proposal before 
taking up the substance of the Greek item.”35
 
 
On December 14, when Committee I considered the Greek item, New Zealand put 
forward a draft resolution on a point of order stating that the General Assembly would 
decide not to pursue it further. The rationale for this maneuver was that the New Zealand 
government was concerned “over the political consequences which would ensue from a 
debate on the substance of the question [… [and that since] the Greek claim for union 
with Cyprus with Greece […] was bound to adversely affect relations between Greece 
                                                 
33 Lodge to Dulles, Embtel USUN New York, November 25, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-2554, 
NARA; Dixon, New York FO 1226, November 26, 1954: FO 371/112875. 
34 Editorial note, 747: ibid.; Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 13. 
35 Message of the British UN delegation to the Foreign Office, December 13, 1954: FO 371/112880, 
quoted here in Faustmann, ibid., 13. 
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[…] the United Kingdom and Turkey […] The Cyprus question involved the stability and 
security of the Middle East.”36
 
 
Britain needed for the New Zealand draft resolution to show that the Greek motion was 
not based on a principle of self-determination, but rather a “territorial claim”.37  
Abandoning its previous “neutral” position, the US stepped in to support the British. 
Ambassador Lodge, commenting on the ruling and the New Zealand resolution, stated 
that “it did not prevent Greece from stating its case since a decision not to consider the 
Cyprus question did not preclude discussion.” Moreover, he added,  “’prolonged’”  
consideration of the matter would only increase tensions and embitter national feelings  at 
a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing 
solidarity among freedom-loving nations.”38
 
 The British move was successful, and 
Committee I decided to give precedence to discussion of the New Zealand resolution 
over that of the Greeks.’  
Prior to the vote, however, Colombia and El Salvador submitted an amendment to the 
effect “that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the 
question of Cyprus.”39
                                                 
36 UN Yearbook, 1954, 94. 
 This was significant in that it addressed the competence of the 
General Assembly to deal with the Cyprus question rather than permanently removing it 
from its agenda.  It also gave Greece a chance to save face even though its own motion 
had failed. Confronted with the realization that this was the most that could be achieved 
37 Message of the British UN Delegation to the Foreign Office December 16, 1954: FO 371/112879, 
quoted here in Faustmann, ibid., 14.  
38 Editorial note: FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, 747. 
39 Ibid, 748; UN Yearbook, 1954, 96. 
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at this stage, Greece cast its vote in favor of the New Zealand resolution and in the 
process, nullified its own.40 The amended draft resolution was adopted 49 to 0, with 11 
abstentions. Greece, Britain, the US, and all NATO members voted in favor. The General 
Assembly endorsed the amended resolution 50 to 0 on December 17, with 8 
abstentions.41
 
 The Greek resolution was never put to a vote. 
As expected, the contending parties had widely divergent interpretations of the 
proceedings. The British and Turkish delegates emphasized that their votes for the 
resolution did not imply recognition of UN competence to discuss the item. The Greeks, 
on the other hand, interpreted it to mean the exact opposite. According to Kyrou, in 
inscribing the item on the agenda, the General Assembly “had recognized the 
international character of the issue.”42 Even more importantly, the insertion of the phrase 
“for the time being” left the door “wide open” for future discussions of the issue.43 What 
both sides overlooked was that these resolutions were in no way binding for future 
Assembly proceedings.44
 
   
                                                 
40 Faustmann, ibid, 14. 
41 The resolution of the General Assembly read: “The General Assembly, considering that, for the time 
being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus, decides not to 
consider further the item entitled ‘Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus.’” 
Resolution 814 (IX), UN Yearbook, 1954, 96. 
42 Editorial note, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, 748; Crawshaw, ibid., 88. 
43  Ibid. 
44 Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, 91. 
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Chapter V 
 
An Emerging Pattern: Preventing a Second UN Round 
 
The ink had not yet dried on the New Zealand resolution when the parties to the dispute 
began gearing up for a second UN showdown. The US had received word that the matter 
would again be brought up in the next General Assembly unless substantive progress was 
made towards the situation. The Americans, who had yet to formulate its eventual Cyprus 
policy, feared that they could be confronted with even more “serious difficulties” in the 
UN and even on the island itself. 1  The State Department, obsessed as ever about 
keeping a balance within NATO, believed that the best course was to retain a “flexible 
attitude” with regard to Cyprus by encouraging an “orderly and evolutionary 
development of Cypriot political rights.”2
 
    
Meanwhile, the British had been contemplating ways in which to win American support 
should the Cyprus question again arise in the coming year. The Foreign Office had 
convinced itself that the principle of self- determination, and enosis in particular, had 
been hijacked by the communists and by Alexis Kyrou.3
                                                     
1 Dulles, Deptel London 3865, January 27, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 269-270. 
 They now believed they had a 
chance of keeping the Cyprus question off the international stage since four leading 
Cypriot communist had been recently killed in a plane crash in China, and Kyrou was no 
2  Dulles, Deptel Athens 2275, March 15, 1955: Ibid, 270-271. 
3 Kyrou, a Cypriot himself, and an ardent advocate of enosis, was expelled from Cyprus by the British for 
anti-British activities during the 1931 uprising. He was believed to be one of the main agitators in pushing 
the Greek agenda at the UN, Warren, Embtel Ankara 897, February 26, 1954: ibid, 681. 
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longer with the Greek Foreign Office.4 The US, however, did not share this optimism and 
continued to press the British for a negotiated rather than an imposed constitution which 
seemed to be the default approach by Britain whenever the issue arose. Britain, therefore, 
believed that the best way to secure future American support would be to give the 
Cypriots a stake in the governance of the island. 5 Thus the State Department welcomed 
the news that the Colonial Governor of Cyprus now believed that, “it may be possible to 
find [a] way out of [the] local impasse only if some declaration favoring eventual self-
determination can be made,” and that he had cause to be optimistic that the British 
Government was now open to such as formula.6
 
  
The US may have been too optimistic in this regard. A National Intelligence Estimate for 
Greece, dated, January  18, 1955 indicated that, “ although the enosis issue is likely to be 
a continuing irritant in Greek relations with the UK, Turkey, and the US, it is unlikely 
that Greece’s alliances with these powers will be strained by this or any other issue.”7
                                                     
4 Nicolet, American Policy Towards Cyprus., 54. 
 
This assessment could not have been further off the mark. In early spring, disagreements 
between the Colonial and Foreign Office in London, and especially the offices of Eden, 
dashed all prospects for developing a more laissez-faire approach. Furthermore, the 
“serious difficulties” feared by US officials were not the communist intrigues or inter-
communal violence they had anticipated for the island. The Cyprus issue was about to 
become even more complex and violent with the onset of the EOKA campaign. It was the 
beginning of what the British quaintly refer to as ‘the troubles.’ 
5  Raymond Courtney, US Consul in Cyprus, to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 68, February 17, 1955: SDCDF, 
doc. 747C.00/3-1755, NARA. 
6 Ibid, 55. 
7 NIE: “The Outlook for Greece,” January 18, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 529. 
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The EOKA Campaign  
 
The reigning calm that had existed in Cyprus since the end of the Greek confrontation at 
the UN abruptly ended. On the morning of April 1, 1955, in what appeared to be a 
coordinated campaign, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston), founded by the 
ultra Cypriot nationalist Colonel George Grivas, launched an armed struggle aimed at 
ending British rule and uniting Cyprus with Greece. On the same day, leaflets were 
distributed all over the island by EOKA calling for Greek Cypriots to “throw off the 
English yoke.” 8 The campaign targeted government buildings and installations including 
the police and military, but with the exception of one EOKA fighter, no one was killed. 
Turkish Cypriots, however, were not targets in the campaign. At least at this stage, 
EOKA had no desire to transform inter-communal tensions into all out warfare since such 
a development would only serve to make a British withdrawal all the more difficult.9
 
  
EOKA’s armed struggle came as shock to the Americans, who were unfamiliar with the 
organization. Though violence on the island was not unknown to US officials, they were 
unprepared for an organized campaign. The British, too, were taken by surprise. Contrary 
to prior assessments, the communists were not at the center of this new violent activity. 
Following the attacks, AKEL, along with the communist-controlled trade unions, issued a 
sharp condemnation, distancing them from the violence.10
                                                     
8 Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, 31. 
 For the Americans, especially, 
this was a perplexing development since it was an article of faith among the cold war 
9 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: US Policy Towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 92; Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, 165. 
10 Courtney Contel Nicosia 74, April 4, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-455, NARA. 
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warriors in the Government that the communists were the root of all evil in Cyprus. And 
this faith was not easily shaken.  
 
Almost three months after the attacks, the US Consul to Cyprus Raymond Courtney still 
insisted that although the communists “do not seem to have taken part in these events, 
[…] one could hardly expect [them] not to be preparing to make good use of them.”11 If 
the usual suspects could not be held accountable, then just who was behind the violence?  
Britain had been incensed by the anti-colonial broadcasts by the state-owned Athens 
Radio in Cyprus. Neither Papagos nor any other Greek official seemed eager to condemn 
or discourage violence on the island, despite numerous pleas from US and UK 
diplomats.12 Already in January 1955, the British had seized a Greek vessel smuggling 
arms and explosives into Cyprus, further fueling suspicions.13  Although never 
definitively proven, both the British and Americans were convinced that the Greeks, 
namely Papagos, had “[given] the green light for EOKA to start its operations in 
Cyprus.”14
 
  
Near the end of March, there were signs that the British were searching for some sort of 
formula for self-determination, one which would “imply no definite British obligation for 
its application” but which would reassure the Greeks.15
                                                     
11 Raymond Courtney, FS Dispatch from Nicosia 118, June 30, 1955:ibid., 3273, doc. 747C.00/6-3055, 
NARA. 
 While the US and Britain shared 
a mutual interest in preventing the Greeks from again taking the Cyprus issue to the UN, 
Britain’s motivation for avoiding the forum centered on retaining the colonial status of 
12Thurston, Embtel Athens 2763, June 21, 1955: ibid., doc. 747C.00/6-2155, NARA. 
13 According to Panteli, in a meeting with Grivas on January 11, 1955 Makarios informed the Colonel that 
he had indeed “secured the support of Papagos for their aims which were still to be sabotage,” 154. 
14 Tozun Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990), 35. 
15 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 25. 
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the island. The Americans, on the other hand, wanted to prevent the Soviets from 
benefiting from any friction within the NATO alliance. While encouraged by this more 
liberal trend, the US continued to maintain that any formula needed to include a specific 
promise for self-determination if the British hoped to gain American support.  
 
A tentative agreement between British and American officials regarding the future of 
Cyprus was reached in return for supporting the British policy and for US pressure to 
prevent a second Greek UN initiative. But the EOKA uprising and the upcoming 
elections in Britain took precedence, and the political future of Cyprus was, for the 
moment, set aside. In early April, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced 
by Anthony Eden. The Americans hoped that the new change in leadership might prompt 
a more flexible approach to the Cyprus issue since “it was well known that Churchill was 
determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”16
  
 The US would, 
over time, discover just how wrong this assessment was.  
First Tripartite Conference Initiative  
 
The British response to the EOKA campaign was to invite the Greeks to participate in a 
Tripartite conference in London for a discussion on the “political and defense questions 
affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.” 17  In June, Dulles raised the 
Cyprus question with Macmillan in San Francisco, who told the Secretary that he had “a 
plan” that he could not yet reveal, but which he hoped that it would “relax the tension.” 18
                                                     
16 Dulles, Memcon with Greek Ambassador Melas, April 4, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 534. 
   
By August 1955, Britain all but guaranteed Turkey would have a decisive role in charting 
17 Stavrinides, ibid., 28. 
18 Editorial note: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 273. 
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the course for the future of Cyprus by extending an invitation to Ankara to also 
participate in the upcoming conference. Britain knew that neither country was in a 
position to decline the invitation since doing so would compromise their respective 
positions before the UN. Turkey’s inclusion in the conference was a source of dismay for 
Dulles who feared that Greece would not be pleased with this development. The British 
Ambassador, however, responded to his concerns by saying that since Greece was 
Turkey’s ally in NATO, they should welcome the prospect of Turkish participation 
“unless they were completely intoxicated by their own propaganda.”19
 
  
Britain needed to ensure that Greece would either feel the pressure to concede or 
compromise its position. In order to achieve this, Turkey needed to present a strong 
enough case at the conference, and if that did not succeed, to win the debate at the UN. 20 
The Foreign Office hoped that with Turkey as a political partner, Greece would find the 
British colonial presence and the vague promise of enosis a preferable course. The 
alternative was to risk the implications that Turkish interference might bring.21 Not 
surprisingly, in July, Ambassador Melas called on Dulles to protest the inclusion of 
Turkey in the conference. Dulles reminded the Greek Ambassador that “Greece should 
not make it difficult for her friends to support her, and that that since the conference 
would include discussions of defense questions, the inclusion of Turkey was not 
“inappropriate.”22
                                                     
19 Washington to FO 1508 June 29, 1955:FO371/117640, doc. RG 1081/537, quoted here in Nicolet, US 
Policy Towards Cyprus, 59. 
 The Greek Ambassador was in no way satisfied and left the meeting 
20 Nicolet, ibid., 59. 
21 Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 19. 
22 Dulles, Deptel Athens 4, July 1, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 273.  
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repeating the charge that Britain was “once more following its policy of divide and 
rule.”23
 
   
The British already knew that the Turkish mindset going into the conference was to keep 
the status quo on Cyprus.24 On August 18, Warren met with Turkish Prime Minister 
Zorlu and informed him that the US seriously hoped that the parties would not come to 
the conference “with fixed and irreconcilable positions,” and while the US had not yet 
formulated a policy on the Cyprus question, “time was on the side of the Greeks.” 25 On 
August 23 Ambassador Melas met with Assistant Secretary Warren, who also told the 
Ambassador that he too believed time to be on the side of Greece, and they could 
“therefore afford to be reasonable.”26  Seeking further clarification of this remark, Melas 
met with Secretary Dulles the next day. Dulles explained that since current world opinion 
was moving towards favoring self-determination, it was only a matter of time until the 
Cyprus question was resolved along the lines of what Greece wanted. The Secretary also 
explained that the US had made a similar statement to the Turks, advising them to show 
some degree of flexibility or else risk damaging Anglo-Turkish relations,27 although he 
did offer reassurances to the Turks that the US had no intention of taking sides and would 
remain non-involved in the conference.28
 
  
                                                     
23 Ibid. 
24  Butterworth, Embtel, London 503, August 10, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 276; Ahmet C. 
Gazioğlu, Ingiliz Idaresinde Kıbrıs, (Cyprus under British Rule), (Istanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1960), 42-43. 
25  Drafted by Baxter and Wood, Deptel Washington 231, August 18, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1855, 
NARA. 
26 Dulles, Deptel, London 1057, August 25, 1954: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 278. 
27  ibid., 277. 
28 Baxter, Memcon:”Cyprus,” August 23, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 8-2355, NARA. 
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Britain’s invitation to a conference on Cyprus was a double source of anxiety for the 
Greeks. First, the invitation suggested that Britain no longer considered the Cyprus 
question to be an internal domestic affair, signaling a shift in Britain’s ‘never’ position. 
Second, the Greek government feared that the conference was a ruse calculated to 
frustrate the forthcoming Greek appeal to the UN and give Turkey parity in the dispute.29 
Essentially, the Greeks found themselves in almost untenable position: accepting the 
invitation would invite a strong negative reaction from the press as well as the Cypriots. 
Refusal, however, would surely invite almost universal condemnation and compromise 
the Greek position at the UN.30
 
  
In the end, Greece chose to accept the invitation but decided not to include Cyprus in its 
UN appeal during the regular application period.31 Both of these decisions by the Greek 
Government prompted a strong reaction from Makarios, who immediately went to 
Athens. What followed was a heated confrontation between the Archbishop and Papagos. 
This resulted in a shift in policy by the Greek Government, which submitted its appeal for 
the supplementary agenda of the General Assembly on July 23.32
 
  
The Tripartite conference convened in London between August 29 and September 7 
1955. Almost immediately, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Britain, and Turkey hit an 
impasse. Britain, which had anticipated this development, planned to break the stalemate 
by presenting its new constitutional proposals.  For some time the Americans had been 
                                                     
29 Faustmann, ibid., 20. 
30  Dulles, Deptel Athens 4, July 1, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 273. 
31 Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, 124-125. 
32
 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 1945–1955, ( London: Macmillan, 1969), 
 666; also Faustmann, ibid., 20. 
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anxious to discover the contents of these proposals, but at the same time, keep cordial 
relations with Britain. In order to entice them into revealing the plan, the US Embassy in 
London revealed to the Foreign office a text to be presented to Greece that called for a 
denunciation of the violence in Cyprus and a plea for the Greeks not to bring the issue to 
the UN.33  This maneuver pleased the British, but incensed US Embassy officials in 
Athens, who called it “most inappropriate that ‘the British had been given a tip-off on the 
Department’s instructions.’”34 This move by the London Embassy ran contrary to the US 
position formulated by the NEA which stated, “[u] ntil we know whether the British plan 
[contains] any constructive steps we should keep our position quiet.”35
 
 
Following Macmillan’s opening remarks, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos took 
the stage and set forth his government’s basic position which called for a plebiscite at a 
time to be determined; Britain would also be allowed to maintain a military presence on 
the island. It was then Zorlu’s turn to speak. Encouraged by the British, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister expressed his country’s position in the most extreme manner, using a 
creative Turkish interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to justify his argument. He 
claimed that any alteration of the Treaty of Lausanne would effectively void the Treaty 
and jurisdiction of Cyprus would then revert to Turkey.36
 
 He also underlined the terms 
under which Britain was granted sovereignty over the island: 
…when Turkey receded within the boundaries of her national pact with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish 
Government felt the need of specifically determining the fate of Cyprus and, by Articles 20 and 21 of that 
                                                     
33 FO to Athens 319, June 11, 1955: FO 371/117637, doc. RG 1081/4477. 
34 FO to Washington, 2777, June 11, 1955: FO 371/117637. 
35 John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, 
to Dulles, Memorandum :”Suggested Conversation with Foreign Secretary Macmillan re Cyprus,” June 13, 
1955:SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1355, NARA.  
36 Le conflit de Chypre, 690-708. 
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Treaty, determined the status of the Island. According to Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish 
sovereignty of Cyprus lapsed on the 5th November, 1914 and Cyprus was legally annexed to Great Britain 
as from that date. Article 21 of the same Treaty contains definite stipulations as to the conditions under 
which the people of Cyprus who were all Turkish subjects would assume Turkish or British nationality. By 
the terms of this Article the signatories have agreed that those of the inhabitants of Cyprus who do not opt 
to remain Turkish citizens could only become British subjects. In other words, the fate of the Island was 
exclusively a matter of concern between Turkey and Great Britain. It was thus agreed and consented to by 
all the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, and it was on those terms that the Island went to Great 
Britain.37
 
 
Stephanopoulos was shocked by Zorlu’s speech and accused the British of being behind 
Turkey’s unreasonable position. It was all that Foreign Secretary Macmillan could do to 
keep both parties from walking out of the conference.38 On September 6, Macmillan 
revealed Britain’s new constitutional plan for Cyprus in the hope that Stephanopoulos 
and Zorlu would agree to give them some consideration. The plan called for internal self-
government with guarantees of proportionate representation of the Turkish Cypriots and a 
supervisory committee consisting of British, Greek, and Turkish representatives. While 
recognizing the right to self-determination, it steered clear of any commitment to a 
precise date.39
 
  
Stephanopoulos’ reaction was measured. He told Macmillan that the Greek Government 
was still undecided, but that he knew his government would be disappointed since the 
proposals failed to give a “categorical assurance for self-government and a specific date 
for the promulgation of the constitution.”40
                                                     
37Statement by the Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the London 
Conference on Cyprus, August 31, 1955.  
  On the other hand, Macmillan found himself 
38 Butterworth to Dulles Embtel London 877: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00//9-255, NARA. 
39 Faustmann, ibid., 20. 
40 Butterworth, Embtel London 447, September 9, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 279. 
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pleading with Zorlu to be reasonable or risk making a “deplorable impression” by 
allowing the usually high-strung Greeks to appear more levelheaded than the Turks.41
 
   
The foremost question on Zorlu’s mind was whether the British Government accepted 
“any principle of self-determination, which might ultimately lead to the independence of 
the Island or to its accession to another country.” Macmillan responded by saying that 
“we do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application. We 
think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, 
strategical, and other considerations.”42  Macmillan further explained that while this was 
“the basic principle on which British policy was founded, […] it was not necessarily in 
all circumstances [the] overriding principle.”43 This was, in the words of Holland, “just 
another more complicated way of falling back on Hopkinson’s ‘Never’ statement of 28 
July, 1954.44
 
 
Anti-Greek Riots in Turkey 
 
On the same day, riots erupted in Istanbul and Izmir, sparked by the news that the 
birthplace of Ataturk in Thessaloniki had been bombed.  Serious attacks against Greeks 
and Armenians followed. It was later discovered that the bombing was carried out by a 
Turkish agent provocateur and that the riots were orchestrated by the Menderes 
Government, which took the opportunity to suggest that the trouble was the direct result 
of Greek-Turkish tensions over the Cyprus issue. In contrast, Stephanopoulos, unaware of 
                                                     
41  Record of Conversation, September 7, 1955, quoted here in Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 
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the Turkish complicity in the incident, apologized on behalf of the Greek government. 
This incident not only sabotaged any hope for progress in the conference, but would also 
be a factor in the shift in international opinion in favor of Turkey. 45
 
 
The Americans reacted by immediately issuing a statement to the Menderes government 
deploring the incident and “apparent lack of effective police intervention which 
[appeared] to have been [the] result of coordinated planning. “46  No official US reaction 
was offered to Greece. Liberal Party leader George Papandreou feared that the US might 
be abandoning Greece since it had failed to condemn “the atrocities in Turkey against the 
Greeks.” 47
 
   
On September 13, a Foreign Ministry official reported that the Greek Government, 
particularly Stephanopoulos, was “deeply concerned” about the growing public and press 
attacks against the US for failing to officially condemn the violence.48  During a meeting 
with Ambassador Melas on the same day, Assistant Secretary Jernegan finally 
acknowledged the atrocities, telling him that the US was “shocked by the outbreak of 
violence in Turkey” and had made its views known to Ankara. Jernegan was also quick to 
add that it was important not to allow this incident to further damage inter-allied relations 
within NATO and the Balkan alliance. 49
 
  
The Americans were trying to appear to be the honest broker by trying to mitigate 
relations between Greece and Turkey, but their main concern was an earlier 
                                                     
45 Butterworth, Embtel London 929, September 7, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 280. 
46 Hoover, Deptel Ankara 447, September 9, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 281. 
47 Thurston to Baxter, Letter, September 12, 1966: ibid, 281. 
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49 Memcon between Melas and Jernegan, September 12, 1955: ibid, 543. 
 77 
announcement by Greece that its forces would not participate in NATO maneuvers, and 
that it was contemplating severing diplomatic relations with Turkey. It was clear that the 
US had underestimated the depth of Greek resentment regarding the slow US response in 
condemning the Turkish actions. A message to Dulles from King Paul not only drove 
home this resentment, but also served as a warning that an affirmative vote for inscription 
of the Cyprus issue at the UN would be regarded as “a positive sign of friendship.” 50 But 
not this, nor an appeal from Stephanopoulos, nor the sober assessment of Ambassador 
Cannon that the Greeks would risk estranging its allies to put Cyprus on the agenda could 
compel Washington to look beyond its preoccupation with its own immediate interests.51
 
 
Aftermath of the Tripartite Conference 
  
On September 17, the Greeks rejected the British plan on the grounds that it did not 
provide for future self-determination for the island, saying that “this constitution was a 
type that could not be regarded as adequate for so highly developed and civilised a people 
as the Cypriots.”52  Moreover, the Greeks believed that the committee’s right to intervene 
in the administration of Cyprus would only serve to undermine the experiment in self-
government.53
                                                     
50 King Paul to Dulles, Message (undated):ibid., 77-78. 
  For its part, Turkey also rejected the British proposal outright, arguing 
that a constitution which did not afford equality to the Turkish Cypriots was a non-starter, 
and would never be acceptable. Macmillan’s comments to Zorlu, which unequivocally 
rejected the principle of self-determination, emboldened the Turks and made it easy for 
51 Hoover, Deptel Athens 853, September 20, 1955:ibid.; It was Cannon’s conclusion that  despite the best 
efforts of the US the Cyprus issue might be inscribed “by virtue of support that Greece may receive from 
the Afro-Asians, Soviets, and Latin Americans.:” Cannon to Baxter, Embtel Athens 752, September 21, 
1955: ibid., 301-303. 
52Cmnd.9594, “The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus: ibid.,” 43. 
53 Edward Johnson, “Anglo-American Relations and the Cyprus Issue at the United Nations 1954–58,” 
3rd Pan-European Conference in International Relations, Vienna, September 16, 1998, 9. 
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them to rebuff the proposals, while citing Greek intransigence as the reason. Although the 
Tripartite conference was a diplomatic failure, it was a watershed moment for Greece and 
Turkey in that it established the two as interested parties in the Cyprus dispute. 54
 
 As 
Hatzivassiliou concludes: 
From now on, the Cyprus question could no longer be approached as “a colonial” issue with an 
international perspective, but an international question with a colonial aspect. This development is 
important for two reasons:  first, if the Cyprus issue was viewed from a colonial perspective the will of the 
majority population (Greek Cypriots) would be considered more carefully than if it were an international 
question; secondly, in an international question, the views of the most important ally of Britain, which in 
this case was Turkey, would most likely prevail.55
 
  
From this time forward, Greece would focus all of its energy on making the UN an 
instrument of Greek policy.   
 
Britain was the one country to benefit from the London conference. The riots in Turkey 
had shifted international public opinion in favor of the British view that an open debate 
about Cyprus would only worsen the situation. 56 Moreover, Britain’s sponsorship of the 
conference combined with Macmillan‘s constitutional proposals, unacceptable as they 
were, created the sense that Britain had made a genuine attempt to move towards self-
government for Cyprus.57
 
 
Second UN Appeal 
  
When movement for a second Greek recourse to the UN began in the spring of 1955, US 
officials were still hopeful that some agreement could be reached that would make this 
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option unnecessary. In the aftermath of the failed London conference, the British were 
desperate to win US support at the UN, and were clearly alarmed by rumors that the 
Americans were contemplating supporting Greece. The Greeks were also harboring the 
unfounded belief that, this time, the Americans would come through in the international 
forum 58  Once again, pragmatism fell to GTI Director Chalmers Wood, who 
recommended the US take a laissez-faire position in any UN debate. According to Wood, 
a vote for inscription would give the UN jurisdiction over a question where it clearly 
should have none. On the other hand, a vote against inscription would place the US in a 
position where it was publicly opposing its friends. Thus, the best course of action would 
be for the US to abstain, so as to “remain non-committal on a question which involved 
three of our allies.”59
 
   
 Despite misgivings, in the end, Dulles agreed with Britain, and the US voted against 
inscribing the Cyprus issue at the UN.60 On September 23, absent US support, the Greek 
appeal was rejected by the General Committee 7 to 4 with 4 abstentions.61 The US 
defended its vote by again emphasizing that the “importance [of] free world unity and 
[the threat] to NATO far exceeds that of [the] Cyprus question.”62 The majority of the 
General Assembly backed the Anglo-American position and sustained the decision of the 
General Committee. As was the case in 1954, support for Greece came largely from the 
communist countries, Latin America and Arab states.63
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advocate in the General Committee, arguing that negotiations, not international 
involvement, were the surest path to a solution for Cyprus.  While Britain and Turkey 
reiterated their arguments from the 1954 session, Greece argued that the situation had 
deteriorated to the point where UN intervention was the final resort.64
 
 
The US had pinned its prospects on the success of the London conference in the hope that 
recourse to the UN might be avoided. The Turkish riots, however, alarmed the State 
Department which was “ever fearful of doing anything that might look to some right-
winger on Capitol Hill as a concession to Moscow.” 65
 
  While the US had few tangible 
interests in Cyprus, Turkey, in addition to being a NATO country, was also a member of 
the Baghdad Pact, thus making her a more valuable ally than Greece.  By voting against 
inscription, the US believed that it could compel the three parties to continue discussions, 
which were considered key to resolving the Cyprus question and securing NATO unity.  
What the Americans failed to appreciate was the profound effect that the vote against 
inscription would have on the NATO alliance and Greek-American relations at large. 
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Chapter V 
 
An Emerging Pattern: Preventing a Second UN Round 
 
The ink had not yet dried on the New Zealand resolution when the parties to the dispute 
began gearing up for a second UN showdown. The US had received word that the matter 
would again be brought up in the next General Assembly unless substantive progress was 
made towards the situation. The Americans, who had yet to formulate its eventual Cyprus 
policy, feared that they could be confronted with even more “serious difficulties” in the 
UN and even on the island itself. 1  The State Department, obsessed as ever about 
keeping a balance within NATO, believed that the best course was to retain a “flexible 
attitude” with regard to Cyprus by encouraging an “orderly and evolutionary 
development of Cypriot political rights.”2
 
    
Meanwhile, the British had been contemplating ways in which to win American support 
should the Cyprus question again arise in the coming year. The Foreign Office had 
convinced itself that the principle of self- determination, and enosis in particular, had 
been hijacked by the communists and by Alexis Kyrou.3
                                                     
1 Dulles, Deptel London 3865, January 27, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 269-270. 
 They now believed they had a 
chance of keeping the Cyprus question off the international stage since four leading 
Cypriot communist had been recently killed in a plane crash in China, and Kyrou was no 
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longer with the Greek Foreign Office.4 The US, however, did not share this optimism and 
continued to press the British for a negotiated rather than an imposed constitution which 
seemed to be the default approach by Britain whenever the issue arose. Britain, therefore, 
believed that the best way to secure future American support would be to give the 
Cypriots a stake in the governance of the island. 5 Thus the State Department welcomed 
the news that the Colonial Governor of Cyprus now believed that, “it may be possible to 
find [a] way out of [the] local impasse only if some declaration favoring eventual self-
determination can be made,” and that he had cause to be optimistic that the British 
Government was now open to such as formula.6
 
  
The US may have been too optimistic in this regard. A National Intelligence Estimate for 
Greece, dated, January  18, 1955 indicated that, “ although the enosis issue is likely to be 
a continuing irritant in Greek relations with the UK, Turkey, and the US, it is unlikely 
that Greece’s alliances with these powers will be strained by this or any other issue.”7
                                                     
4 Nicolet, American Policy Towards Cyprus., 54. 
 
This assessment could not have been further off the mark. In early spring, disagreements 
between the Colonial and Foreign Office in London, and especially the offices of Eden, 
dashed all prospects for developing a more laissez-faire approach. Furthermore, the 
“serious difficulties” feared by US officials were not the communist intrigues or inter-
communal violence they had anticipated for the island. The Cyprus issue was about to 
become even more complex and violent with the onset of the EOKA campaign. It was the 
beginning of what the British quaintly refer to as ‘the troubles.’ 
5  Raymond Courtney, US Consul in Cyprus, to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 68, February 17, 1955: SDCDF, 
doc. 747C.00/3-1755, NARA. 
6 Ibid, 55. 
7 NIE: “The Outlook for Greece,” January 18, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 529. 
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The EOKA Campaign  
 
The reigning calm that had existed in Cyprus since the end of the Greek confrontation at 
the UN abruptly ended. On the morning of April 1, 1955, in what appeared to be a 
coordinated campaign, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston), founded by the 
ultra Cypriot nationalist Colonel George Grivas, launched an armed struggle aimed at 
ending British rule and uniting Cyprus with Greece. On the same day, leaflets were 
distributed all over the island by EOKA calling for Greek Cypriots to “throw off the 
English yoke.” 8 The campaign targeted government buildings and installations including 
the police and military, but with the exception of one EOKA fighter, no one was killed. 
Turkish Cypriots, however, were not targets in the campaign. At least at this stage, 
EOKA had no desire to transform inter-communal tensions into all out warfare since such 
a development would only serve to make a British withdrawal all the more difficult.9
 
  
EOKA’s armed struggle came as shock to the Americans, who were unfamiliar with the 
organization. Though violence on the island was not unknown to US officials, they were 
unprepared for an organized campaign. The British, too, were taken by surprise. Contrary 
to prior assessments, the communists were not at the center of this new violent activity. 
Following the attacks, AKEL, along with the communist-controlled trade unions, issued a 
sharp condemnation, distancing them from the violence.10
                                                     
8 Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, 31. 
 For the Americans, especially, 
this was a perplexing development since it was an article of faith among the cold war 
9 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: US Policy Towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, (New York: 
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warriors in the Government that the communists were the root of all evil in Cyprus. And 
this faith was not easily shaken.  
 
Almost three months after the attacks, the US Consul to Cyprus Raymond Courtney still 
insisted that although the communists “do not seem to have taken part in these events, 
[…] one could hardly expect [them] not to be preparing to make good use of them.”11 If 
the usual suspects could not be held accountable, then just who was behind the violence?  
Britain had been incensed by the anti-colonial broadcasts by the state-owned Athens 
Radio in Cyprus. Neither Papagos nor any other Greek official seemed eager to condemn 
or discourage violence on the island, despite numerous pleas from US and UK 
diplomats.12 Already in January 1955, the British had seized a Greek vessel smuggling 
arms and explosives into Cyprus, further fueling suspicions.13  Although never 
definitively proven, both the British and Americans were convinced that the Greeks, 
namely Papagos, had “[given] the green light for EOKA to start its operations in 
Cyprus.”14
 
  
Near the end of March, there were signs that the British were searching for some sort of 
formula for self-determination, one which would “imply no definite British obligation for 
its application” but which would reassure the Greeks.15
                                                     
11 Raymond Courtney, FS Dispatch from Nicosia 118, June 30, 1955:ibid., 3273, doc. 747C.00/6-3055, 
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the island. The Americans, on the other hand, wanted to prevent the Soviets from 
benefiting from any friction within the NATO alliance. While encouraged by this more 
liberal trend, the US continued to maintain that any formula needed to include a specific 
promise for self-determination if the British hoped to gain American support.  
 
A tentative agreement between British and American officials regarding the future of 
Cyprus was reached in return for supporting the British policy and for US pressure to 
prevent a second Greek UN initiative. But the EOKA uprising and the upcoming 
elections in Britain took precedence, and the political future of Cyprus was, for the 
moment, set aside. In early April, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced 
by Anthony Eden. The Americans hoped that the new change in leadership might prompt 
a more flexible approach to the Cyprus issue since “it was well known that Churchill was 
determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”16
  
 The US would, 
over time, discover just how wrong this assessment was.  
First Tripartite Conference Initiative  
 
The British response to the EOKA campaign was to invite the Greeks to participate in a 
Tripartite conference in London for a discussion on the “political and defense questions 
affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.” 17  In June, Dulles raised the 
Cyprus question with Macmillan in San Francisco, who told the Secretary that he had “a 
plan” that he could not yet reveal, but which he hoped that it would “relax the tension.” 18
                                                     
16 Dulles, Memcon with Greek Ambassador Melas, April 4, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 534. 
   
By August 1955, Britain all but guaranteed Turkey would have a decisive role in charting 
17 Stavrinides, ibid., 28. 
18 Editorial note: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 273. 
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the course for the future of Cyprus by extending an invitation to Ankara to also 
participate in the upcoming conference. Britain knew that neither country was in a 
position to decline the invitation since doing so would compromise their respective 
positions before the UN. Turkey’s inclusion in the conference was a source of dismay for 
Dulles who feared that Greece would not be pleased with this development. The British 
Ambassador, however, responded to his concerns by saying that since Greece was 
Turkey’s ally in NATO, they should welcome the prospect of Turkish participation 
“unless they were completely intoxicated by their own propaganda.”19
 
  
Britain needed to ensure that Greece would either feel the pressure to concede or 
compromise its position. In order to achieve this, Turkey needed to present a strong 
enough case at the conference, and if that did not succeed, to win the debate at the UN. 20 
The Foreign Office hoped that with Turkey as a political partner, Greece would find the 
British colonial presence and the vague promise of enosis a preferable course. The 
alternative was to risk the implications that Turkish interference might bring.21 Not 
surprisingly, in July, Ambassador Melas called on Dulles to protest the inclusion of 
Turkey in the conference. Dulles reminded the Greek Ambassador that “Greece should 
not make it difficult for her friends to support her, and that that since the conference 
would include discussions of defense questions, the inclusion of Turkey was not 
“inappropriate.”22
                                                     
19 Washington to FO 1508 June 29, 1955:FO371/117640, doc. RG 1081/537, quoted here in Nicolet, US 
Policy Towards Cyprus, 59. 
 The Greek Ambassador was in no way satisfied and left the meeting 
20 Nicolet, ibid., 59. 
21 Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 19. 
22 Dulles, Deptel Athens 4, July 1, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 273.  
 71 
repeating the charge that Britain was “once more following its policy of divide and 
rule.”23
 
   
The British already knew that the Turkish mindset going into the conference was to keep 
the status quo on Cyprus.24 On August 18, Warren met with Turkish Prime Minister 
Zorlu and informed him that the US seriously hoped that the parties would not come to 
the conference “with fixed and irreconcilable positions,” and while the US had not yet 
formulated a policy on the Cyprus question, “time was on the side of the Greeks.” 25 On 
August 23 Ambassador Melas met with Assistant Secretary Warren, who also told the 
Ambassador that he too believed time to be on the side of Greece, and they could 
“therefore afford to be reasonable.”26  Seeking further clarification of this remark, Melas 
met with Secretary Dulles the next day. Dulles explained that since current world opinion 
was moving towards favoring self-determination, it was only a matter of time until the 
Cyprus question was resolved along the lines of what Greece wanted. The Secretary also 
explained that the US had made a similar statement to the Turks, advising them to show 
some degree of flexibility or else risk damaging Anglo-Turkish relations,27 although he 
did offer reassurances to the Turks that the US had no intention of taking sides and would 
remain non-involved in the conference.28
 
  
                                                     
23 Ibid. 
24  Butterworth, Embtel, London 503, August 10, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 276; Ahmet C. 
Gazioğlu, Ingiliz Idaresinde Kıbrıs, (Cyprus under British Rule), (Istanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1960), 42-43. 
25  Drafted by Baxter and Wood, Deptel Washington 231, August 18, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1855, 
NARA. 
26 Dulles, Deptel, London 1057, August 25, 1954: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 278. 
27  ibid., 277. 
28 Baxter, Memcon:”Cyprus,” August 23, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 8-2355, NARA. 
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Britain’s invitation to a conference on Cyprus was a double source of anxiety for the 
Greeks. First, the invitation suggested that Britain no longer considered the Cyprus 
question to be an internal domestic affair, signaling a shift in Britain’s ‘never’ position. 
Second, the Greek government feared that the conference was a ruse calculated to 
frustrate the forthcoming Greek appeal to the UN and give Turkey parity in the dispute.29 
Essentially, the Greeks found themselves in almost untenable position: accepting the 
invitation would invite a strong negative reaction from the press as well as the Cypriots. 
Refusal, however, would surely invite almost universal condemnation and compromise 
the Greek position at the UN.30
 
  
In the end, Greece chose to accept the invitation but decided not to include Cyprus in its 
UN appeal during the regular application period.31 Both of these decisions by the Greek 
Government prompted a strong reaction from Makarios, who immediately went to 
Athens. What followed was a heated confrontation between the Archbishop and Papagos. 
This resulted in a shift in policy by the Greek Government, which submitted its appeal for 
the supplementary agenda of the General Assembly on July 23.32
 
  
The Tripartite conference convened in London between August 29 and September 7 
1955. Almost immediately, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Britain, and Turkey hit an 
impasse. Britain, which had anticipated this development, planned to break the stalemate 
by presenting its new constitutional proposals.  For some time the Americans had been 
                                                     
29 Faustmann, ibid., 20. 
30  Dulles, Deptel Athens 4, July 1, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 273. 
31 Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, 124-125. 
32
 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 1945–1955, ( London: Macmillan, 1969), 
 666; also Faustmann, ibid., 20. 
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anxious to discover the contents of these proposals, but at the same time, keep cordial 
relations with Britain. In order to entice them into revealing the plan, the US Embassy in 
London revealed to the Foreign office a text to be presented to Greece that called for a 
denunciation of the violence in Cyprus and a plea for the Greeks not to bring the issue to 
the UN.33  This maneuver pleased the British, but incensed US Embassy officials in 
Athens, who called it “most inappropriate that ‘the British had been given a tip-off on the 
Department’s instructions.’”34 This move by the London Embassy ran contrary to the US 
position formulated by the NEA which stated, “[u] ntil we know whether the British plan 
[contains] any constructive steps we should keep our position quiet.”35
 
 
Following Macmillan’s opening remarks, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos took 
the stage and set forth his government’s basic position which called for a plebiscite at a 
time to be determined; Britain would also be allowed to maintain a military presence on 
the island. It was then Zorlu’s turn to speak. Encouraged by the British, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister expressed his country’s position in the most extreme manner, using a 
creative Turkish interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to justify his argument. He 
claimed that any alteration of the Treaty of Lausanne would effectively void the Treaty 
and jurisdiction of Cyprus would then revert to Turkey.36
 
 He also underlined the terms 
under which Britain was granted sovereignty over the island: 
…when Turkey receded within the boundaries of her national pact with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish 
Government felt the need of specifically determining the fate of Cyprus and, by Articles 20 and 21 of that 
                                                     
33 FO to Athens 319, June 11, 1955: FO 371/117637, doc. RG 1081/4477. 
34 FO to Washington, 2777, June 11, 1955: FO 371/117637. 
35 John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, 
to Dulles, Memorandum :”Suggested Conversation with Foreign Secretary Macmillan re Cyprus,” June 13, 
1955:SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1355, NARA.  
36 Le conflit de Chypre, 690-708. 
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Treaty, determined the status of the Island. According to Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish 
sovereignty of Cyprus lapsed on the 5th November, 1914 and Cyprus was legally annexed to Great Britain 
as from that date. Article 21 of the same Treaty contains definite stipulations as to the conditions under 
which the people of Cyprus who were all Turkish subjects would assume Turkish or British nationality. By 
the terms of this Article the signatories have agreed that those of the inhabitants of Cyprus who do not opt 
to remain Turkish citizens could only become British subjects. In other words, the fate of the Island was 
exclusively a matter of concern between Turkey and Great Britain. It was thus agreed and consented to by 
all the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, and it was on those terms that the Island went to Great 
Britain.37
 
 
Stephanopoulos was shocked by Zorlu’s speech and accused the British of being behind 
Turkey’s unreasonable position. It was all that Foreign Secretary Macmillan could do to 
keep both parties from walking out of the conference.38 On September 6, Macmillan 
revealed Britain’s new constitutional plan for Cyprus in the hope that Stephanopoulos 
and Zorlu would agree to give them some consideration. The plan called for internal self-
government with guarantees of proportionate representation of the Turkish Cypriots and a 
supervisory committee consisting of British, Greek, and Turkish representatives. While 
recognizing the right to self-determination, it steered clear of any commitment to a 
precise date.39
 
  
Stephanopoulos’ reaction was measured. He told Macmillan that the Greek Government 
was still undecided, but that he knew his government would be disappointed since the 
proposals failed to give a “categorical assurance for self-government and a specific date 
for the promulgation of the constitution.”40
                                                     
37Statement by the Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the London 
Conference on Cyprus, August 31, 1955.  
  On the other hand, Macmillan found himself 
38 Butterworth to Dulles Embtel London 877: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00//9-255, NARA. 
39 Faustmann, ibid., 20. 
40 Butterworth, Embtel London 447, September 9, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 279. 
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pleading with Zorlu to be reasonable or risk making a “deplorable impression” by 
allowing the usually high-strung Greeks to appear more levelheaded than the Turks.41
 
   
The foremost question on Zorlu’s mind was whether the British Government accepted 
“any principle of self-determination, which might ultimately lead to the independence of 
the Island or to its accession to another country.” Macmillan responded by saying that 
“we do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application. We 
think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, 
strategical, and other considerations.”42  Macmillan further explained that while this was 
“the basic principle on which British policy was founded, […] it was not necessarily in 
all circumstances [the] overriding principle.”43 This was, in the words of Holland, “just 
another more complicated way of falling back on Hopkinson’s ‘Never’ statement of 28 
July, 1954.44
 
 
Anti-Greek Riots in Turkey 
 
On the same day, riots erupted in Istanbul and Izmir, sparked by the news that the 
birthplace of Ataturk in Thessaloniki had been bombed.  Serious attacks against Greeks 
and Armenians followed. It was later discovered that the bombing was carried out by a 
Turkish agent provocateur and that the riots were orchestrated by the Menderes 
Government, which took the opportunity to suggest that the trouble was the direct result 
of Greek-Turkish tensions over the Cyprus issue. In contrast, Stephanopoulos, unaware of 
                                                     
41  Record of Conversation, September 7, 1955, quoted here in Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 
74. 
42 Cmnd. 9594, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, 37; see also  
43 Butterworth, Embtel London 447, September 9, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 279-280. 
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the Turkish complicity in the incident, apologized on behalf of the Greek government. 
This incident not only sabotaged any hope for progress in the conference, but would also 
be a factor in the shift in international opinion in favor of Turkey. 45
 
 
The Americans reacted by immediately issuing a statement to the Menderes government 
deploring the incident and “apparent lack of effective police intervention which 
[appeared] to have been [the] result of coordinated planning. “46  No official US reaction 
was offered to Greece. Liberal Party leader George Papandreou feared that the US might 
be abandoning Greece since it had failed to condemn “the atrocities in Turkey against the 
Greeks.” 47
 
   
On September 13, a Foreign Ministry official reported that the Greek Government, 
particularly Stephanopoulos, was “deeply concerned” about the growing public and press 
attacks against the US for failing to officially condemn the violence.48  During a meeting 
with Ambassador Melas on the same day, Assistant Secretary Jernegan finally 
acknowledged the atrocities, telling him that the US was “shocked by the outbreak of 
violence in Turkey” and had made its views known to Ankara. Jernegan was also quick to 
add that it was important not to allow this incident to further damage inter-allied relations 
within NATO and the Balkan alliance. 49
 
  
The Americans were trying to appear to be the honest broker by trying to mitigate 
relations between Greece and Turkey, but their main concern was an earlier 
                                                     
45 Butterworth, Embtel London 929, September 7, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 280. 
46 Hoover, Deptel Ankara 447, September 9, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 281. 
47 Thurston to Baxter, Letter, September 12, 1966: ibid, 281. 
48 Thurston, Embtel Athens 653, September 13, 1955: ibid, 288. 
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announcement by Greece that its forces would not participate in NATO maneuvers, and 
that it was contemplating severing diplomatic relations with Turkey. It was clear that the 
US had underestimated the depth of Greek resentment regarding the slow US response in 
condemning the Turkish actions. A message to Dulles from King Paul not only drove 
home this resentment, but also served as a warning that an affirmative vote for inscription 
of the Cyprus issue at the UN would be regarded as “a positive sign of friendship.” 50 But 
not this, nor an appeal from Stephanopoulos, nor the sober assessment of Ambassador 
Cannon that the Greeks would risk estranging its allies to put Cyprus on the agenda could 
compel Washington to look beyond its preoccupation with its own immediate interests.51
 
 
Aftermath of the Tripartite Conference 
  
On September 17, the Greeks rejected the British plan on the grounds that it did not 
provide for future self-determination for the island, saying that “this constitution was a 
type that could not be regarded as adequate for so highly developed and civilised a people 
as the Cypriots.”52  Moreover, the Greeks believed that the committee’s right to intervene 
in the administration of Cyprus would only serve to undermine the experiment in self-
government.53
                                                     
50 King Paul to Dulles, Message (undated):ibid., 77-78. 
  For its part, Turkey also rejected the British proposal outright, arguing 
that a constitution which did not afford equality to the Turkish Cypriots was a non-starter, 
and would never be acceptable. Macmillan’s comments to Zorlu, which unequivocally 
rejected the principle of self-determination, emboldened the Turks and made it easy for 
51 Hoover, Deptel Athens 853, September 20, 1955:ibid.; It was Cannon’s conclusion that  despite the best 
efforts of the US the Cyprus issue might be inscribed “by virtue of support that Greece may receive from 
the Afro-Asians, Soviets, and Latin Americans.:” Cannon to Baxter, Embtel Athens 752, September 21, 
1955: ibid., 301-303. 
52Cmnd.9594, “The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus: ibid.,” 43. 
53 Edward Johnson, “Anglo-American Relations and the Cyprus Issue at the United Nations 1954–58,” 
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them to rebuff the proposals, while citing Greek intransigence as the reason. Although the 
Tripartite conference was a diplomatic failure, it was a watershed moment for Greece and 
Turkey in that it established the two as interested parties in the Cyprus dispute. 54
 
 As 
Hatzivassiliou concludes: 
From now on, the Cyprus question could no longer be approached as “a colonial” issue with an 
international perspective, but an international question with a colonial aspect. This development is 
important for two reasons:  first, if the Cyprus issue was viewed from a colonial perspective the will of the 
majority population (Greek Cypriots) would be considered more carefully than if it were an international 
question; secondly, in an international question, the views of the most important ally of Britain, which in 
this case was Turkey, would most likely prevail.55
 
  
From this time forward, Greece would focus all of its energy on making the UN an 
instrument of Greek policy.   
 
Britain was the one country to benefit from the London conference. The riots in Turkey 
had shifted international public opinion in favor of the British view that an open debate 
about Cyprus would only worsen the situation. 56 Moreover, Britain’s sponsorship of the 
conference combined with Macmillan‘s constitutional proposals, unacceptable as they 
were, created the sense that Britain had made a genuine attempt to move towards self-
government for Cyprus.57
 
 
Second UN Appeal 
  
When movement for a second Greek recourse to the UN began in the spring of 1955, US 
officials were still hopeful that some agreement could be reached that would make this 
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option unnecessary. In the aftermath of the failed London conference, the British were 
desperate to win US support at the UN, and were clearly alarmed by rumors that the 
Americans were contemplating supporting Greece. The Greeks were also harboring the 
unfounded belief that, this time, the Americans would come through in the international 
forum 58  Once again, pragmatism fell to GTI Director Chalmers Wood, who 
recommended the US take a laissez-faire position in any UN debate. According to Wood, 
a vote for inscription would give the UN jurisdiction over a question where it clearly 
should have none. On the other hand, a vote against inscription would place the US in a 
position where it was publicly opposing its friends. Thus, the best course of action would 
be for the US to abstain, so as to “remain non-committal on a question which involved 
three of our allies.”59
 
   
 Despite misgivings, in the end, Dulles agreed with Britain, and the US voted against 
inscribing the Cyprus issue at the UN.60 On September 23, absent US support, the Greek 
appeal was rejected by the General Committee 7 to 4 with 4 abstentions.61 The US 
defended its vote by again emphasizing that the “importance [of] free world unity and 
[the threat] to NATO far exceeds that of [the] Cyprus question.”62 The majority of the 
General Assembly backed the Anglo-American position and sustained the decision of the 
General Committee. As was the case in 1954, support for Greece came largely from the 
communist countries, Latin America and Arab states.63
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advocate in the General Committee, arguing that negotiations, not international 
involvement, were the surest path to a solution for Cyprus.  While Britain and Turkey 
reiterated their arguments from the 1954 session, Greece argued that the situation had 
deteriorated to the point where UN intervention was the final resort.64
 
 
The US had pinned its prospects on the success of the London conference in the hope that 
recourse to the UN might be avoided. The Turkish riots, however, alarmed the State 
Department which was “ever fearful of doing anything that might look to some right-
winger on Capitol Hill as a concession to Moscow.” 65
 
  While the US had few tangible 
interests in Cyprus, Turkey, in addition to being a NATO country, was also a member of 
the Baghdad Pact, thus making her a more valuable ally than Greece.  By voting against 
inscription, the US believed that it could compel the three parties to continue discussions, 
which were considered key to resolving the Cyprus question and securing NATO unity.  
What the Americans failed to appreciate was the profound effect that the vote against 
inscription would have on the NATO alliance and Greek-American relations at large. 
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Chapter VI 
 
 
 The Harding-Makarios Talks  
Soon after the decision not to inscribe the Cyprus item on the UN agenda, Britain 
appointed Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, a seasoned military man and retired Chief of 
the General Imperialist Staff, to replace Sir Robert Armitage as Governor of Cyprus. 
Harding, who was given broader powers than his predecessor in regard to security, 
believed that before a political solution could be found, violence on the island first 
needed to be brought under control.1
 
 
The new Governor arrived in Cyprus on October 3, 1955, for a scheduled meeting the 
next day with Archbishop Makarios at Ledra Palace. This meeting would be the first 
significant effort to find a negotiated settlement for the Cyprus problem, and discussions 
between Makarios and Harding would proceed intermittingly over the several months. 
The diplomatic contortions of the Harding-Makarios talks have been thoroughly analyzed 
elsewhere, and will not be covered in any great detail here.2
                                                 
1 Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, 173. 
 The talks were held between 
October 4, 1955, and February 29, 1956, punctuated by a several interruptions and 
backroom haggling over who was responsible for making sure that the discussions did 
not break down.  Sir John Reddaway, then Acting Administrative Secretary, 
2 For a comprehensive and authoritative analysis of the Harding-Makarios talks see Hatzivassiliou, Britain 
and the International Status of Cyprus, 43-65. 
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characterized them as “a dialogue of the deaf.”3 Initially, Harding was confident that a 
satisfactory agreement could be reached based upon the principle of self-determination 
and, in his view; there was no one more moderate than Makarios to negotiate the terms 
for a constitutional government. Although the parties did reach a tentative agreement 
regarding a liberal form of self-government and the right of self-determination, in the 
final stages, the talks broke down.4
 
  
According to Faustmann, the failure of the Harding-Makarios talks rests largely with 
Britain’s reluctance to compromise on a number of critical points. First, the Colonial 
Government refused to rule out a possible Turkish veto with respect to Greek Cypriot 
self-determination and to grant a Greek majority in parliament; secondly; Britain rejected 
Makarios’ argument that the Greek Cypriots and not Britain, should be responsible for 
the internal security of the island; and lastly, Britain flatly rejected any program that 
would grant amnesty to EOKA fighters.5
 
   
While Harding’s political inexperience contributed to the breakdown of negotiations, 
Makarios was hamstrung by his own political constraints. The Archbishop had to proceed 
cautiously since too many compromises on his part could easily brand him a traitor 
among the extremist elements within the high Orthodox clergy and the EOKA. While the 
British had, through procedural means and US assistance, managed to dodge the Cyprus 
issue at the UN yet again, they knew it was a matter of time before the Greeks succeeded 
in having it inscribed on the agenda: “At the United Nations we were successful through 
                                                 
3 Sir John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, the British Connection, (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 
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4 Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 22. 
5 Ibid, 22. 
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the use of a procedural device which enabled anti-colonial delegations and the United 
States to avoid voting against self-determination. We cannot expect to do the same trick 
again, and the Greeks might well get a majority. “ 6
 
  Hopkinson’s 1954 statement, which 
had proposed no change in sovereignty and included the fatal word “never,” had been the 
cause of consternation in Greece as well as Cyprus, but it was Lyttleton’s remark about 
Greece being an unstable country that drove the Greeks over the edge.  The British 
resented US support as much as they needed it, and knew they were in competition with 
the Greeks for American favor. Past resistance by the US made them uncertain as to 
whether they could count on its support should the question again arise in the future. Still 
Britain knew it had to come up with a new formula in order to keep the Greeks from 
seeking a third recourse at the UN. 
By February 1956, Makarios had abandoned his hard-line “enosis and only enosis” 
position, while Britain discarded their uncompromising “never” mindset, replacing it with 
what is probably their best-known abuse of the English language, the now infamous 
double-negative formulation: “it is not therefore their position that the principle of self-
determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a 
practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of 
the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.”7
                                                 
6Anthony Eden, FO,(55) 92,  April 5, 1955, published in Frederick Madden, ed., The End of Empire, 
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From this time forward, Britain’s new formula for self-determination would not be 
“never” but “not yet.”8
 
  
Beginning of Active US Engagement 
 
Following the death of Papagos in October 1955, the US began considering a more active 
policy towards Cyprus.  Ambassador Lodge, who had urged a more vigorous engagement 
on the part of the State Department, advised Dulles to contact the new Greek Prime 
Minister, Constantinos Karamanlis, and his Foreign Minister, Spyridon Theotokis, who 
they believed might be more forthcoming with regard to the Cyprus issue.9
 
 The 
Ambassador was determined to wake the State Department from its ambivalent stupor by 
insisting that the time was “now or never,” and by pointing out that the “Greek element” 
in the US “had been aroused because of this question.” Referring to the messages of 
protests he had received, he reminded Dulles that “next year with all the Congressman 
running,[ Cyprus question] it would be a factor.”  
Moreover, with a presidential election on the horizon the potential for a political backlash 
was a real danger. Lodge emphasized that “it will not be possible to politically to take the 
line next year that was taken this year.” 10
                                                 
8 CO 926/548, Select Documents, 426. 
 It was becoming apparent that the US could no 
longer afford to be ambivalent where Cyprus was concerned. It was now not only an 
international issue, but it was becoming a domestic one as well.  Further pressure needed 
to be applied to the British to find a solution for the Cyprus problem.  
9 Lodge to Dulles, Letter, October 11, 1955: doc. 611.81/10-1155, NARA. 
10 Lodge to Dulles, Telcon, October 20, 1955: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1955, Telephone 
Conversation Series, Telephone Conv.-General September 1, 1955-December 30, 1955, DDE-Library, 
quoted here in Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 70. 
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In a conversation with Dulles, Macmillan indicated that the Foreign Office might be 
agreeable to a formulation for self-determination based on the Eisenhower-Churchill 
Declaration of June 29, 1954 (Potomac Charter).11
 
 Since the declaration did not explicitly 
mention self-determination, Britain felt secure in using it in its new formula. The US, 
however, did not interpret the British position to mean that self-determination could 
never be applicable to Cyprus. In any regard, the Americans had to be pleased that 
Britain at least appeared to take into account the all-important objective of securing 
NATO:  
Her Majesty’s Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the 
[Declaration] Potomac Charter, and the Pacific Charter to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore 
their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position 
that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of 
the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.12
 
  
In a letter to Washington on November 11, the FO anticipated that the State Department 
would be satisfied with the new British formula and thus press the Greeks to also get on 
board: 
 
 
You will no doubt draw Mr. Dulles’ attention to the reference in our new formula to the Potomac Charter 
[…] which he recalled in his message to Mr. Macmillan on October 5 [….]. We hope that he will use his 
influence with the Greek Government to persuade them to accept the new formula and in turn to persuade 
the Greek Cypriot clergy to do likewise.13
 
  
 Ambassador Cannon in Athens noted that the British formula “though less specific than 
some hoped, it is [a] definite step in [the] direction sought by the Greeks and, if saner 
                                                 
11Eisenhower-Churchill Declaration of June 29, 1954, see Chapter  4 of this document. Dulles to 
Macmillan, Letter, November 21, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 305. Hatzivissiliou, ibid., 47 
12 Makins to Dulles, Letter Enclosure, November 21, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 314.  
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judgment could prevail, by [the] Cypriots themselves.”14  On November 24 the British 
Ambassador asked the State Department to instruct Ambassador Cannon to press the 
Greeks to recommend the British formula to Makarios. The State Department instructed 
Cannon to make this approach and any other that would help to keep the British initiative 
“alive.”15  Karamanlis, Theotokis, and Dulles agreed that the new formula was a “real 
step forward,”16  but the Greek Prime Minister felt that he could not commit himself prior 
to the elections, because he believed that the opposition would ‘” make great political 
capital’” out of the ‘”national unity theme.’”17
 
   
This was acceptable to the US, since the overwhelming American interest was to 
safeguard governments in the region responsive to Western security concerns. The 
Karamanlis government, which tended to lean right, needed to tread carefully since it 
already had a dubious reputation at home for being too conciliatory where Western 
interests were concerned.18
 
   Still, the British were grateful for any US support in 
handling the Greeks, and were pleased that some cooperation from Athens was finally 
forthcoming.  
 In an unprecedented move by the British, the FO agreed, for the first time, to include an 
American proposal “to hold talks [with Makarios] for the purpose of clarifying the 
                                                 
14 Cannon, Embtel Athens 1297, November 22, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 11-2255, NARA. 
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formula and exploring [a] method [of] application.”19 They even went so far as to allow 
the US to rephrase the wording of the first paragraph, according to the proposals of 
Ambassador Thurston in Athens—not to expand it, but to make it easier for the 
Archbishop to accept by changing the double negative formulation of self 
determination.20  Although the State Department regarded the revised formula favorably,  
Dulles did express concern for being publicly identified with it should it fail:  “In [the ] 
Department [‘s] view [the] revised formula represents [a] fair offer and [it] is in the US 
interest to continue [to] work for understanding based on it, despite risk of adverse 
publicity. If we use our good offices rather than co-sponsor [the] formula, we can avoid 
some of this odium.”21
 
 
Unlike the Americans, Britain did not harbor a fetish about maintaining the integrity of 
NATO’s southeastern flank. Macmillan, especially, appeared undisturbed by any 
potential communist intrigues. In a conversation with Makins in London he stated that he 
did “not believe the Greeks would go Communist or leave NATO” because “[a]ll Greek 
Parties, including the Opposition were capitalists.” It was this reasoning that led Britain 
to conclude that the Greeks would “[not quarrel] with the United States so long as the 
Americans took a firm view” and did “not allow themselves to be frightened or 
                                                 
19 Foreign Minister Theotokis commented that the British formula was “put in such a way to be practically 
unintelligible:” Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 7, December 17, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 321; Dulles, 
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20 The full text of the US revised formula can be found in an attachment to a note dated December 8, 1955: 
Barbara Salt to Chalmers Wood: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-55, NARA; In a meeting between Dulles and 
Macmillan in Paris, the Secretary of State described the double negative as “awkward,” after which, 
Macmillan reportedly agreed to remove it: Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 7, December 17, 1955: FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXIV, 321;Thurston to Dulles, Embtel Athens 1381 December 1, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-
155, NARA; 
21 Dulles, Embtel Athens 1963, January 13, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 330. 
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bullied.”22 For his part, Eden was in full accord with this opinion. It was apparent, 
however, where British priorities lay; they believed they had less responsibility towards 
securing the Western alliance in the Mediterranean than they did with finding a way out 
of the Cyprus problem.23
 
 
State Department officials were not the only ones disturbed by what they perceived as 
conflicting priorities.  President Eisenhower himself expressed similar concerns and was 
well aware of the fact that Britain and the United States did not “see eye to eye” on a 
number of issues. In a diary entry dated January 1, the President expressed bewilderment 
over Britain’s inability to construct a program for Cypress that would be “perfectly 
acceptable to the Greeks, the Cypriotes [sic], and at the same time would protect Western 
world interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Clearly the President, at least at this 
juncture, did not have a full appreciation of just how tall an order that was.24
 
 
Similarly, Eisenhower also lamented Britain’s strong-arm tactics towards Jordan 
regarding its membership in the Baghdad Pact: “they went blindly ahead and only 
recently have been suffering one of the most severe diplomatic defeats Britain has taken 
in many years” after Jordan’s withdrawal from the Pact “under compulsion of riots.” 
Eisenhower feared that a similar fate awaited NATO. “Likewise,” he continued, “they 
have dilly-dallied with the Cypress situation until now three countries, as well as the 
                                                 
22  Macmillan to Scott, Memcon between Macmillan and Makins, September 23, 1955: PREM 11/834. 
23  Nicolet, ibid., 71. 
24 Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, entry, January 10, 1956:, The Declassified Documents Reference System: 
including the Declassified Retrospective Collection and Annual Collection 1945-, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Libraries), Digital,doc. 1980 445B.  
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island itself, are all excited, namely, Turkey, Greece, and Britain.” 25
 
  These thoughts 
provide a revealing view of the singular opinions held by Britain and the United States, 
not only towards Cyprus, but the Middle East at large.  
While Britain was mainly concerned with the erosion of her empire, the Americans were 
largely focused on the disruption of the Western alliance in the larger framework of East-
West rivalry.26 Despite the disparity between the US and Britain with respect to Cyprus, 
the British understood that American support, no matter how tepid, was indispensable. 
Policy differences aside, during this phase, tensions between the US and Britain subsided 
and a spirit of cooperation prevailed.27
 
  
In the end, attempts to alter the double-negative formula regarding self-determination had 
little impact on Archbishop Makarios’ decision to accept or reject it. The British held 
little hope for a satisfactory resolution for Cyprus anytime soon. To a large degree British 
policy was hobbled by the inflexibility of the Turkish position, which could not be 
dismissed since it was Britain who had invited Turkey into the mix. But the US was still 
determined to try to salvage the negotiations. On March 5, Ambassador Cannon 
suggested that the US try to mitigate the damages by pointing out that the problem had 
been “narrowed” to a few items:  “in describing these we can help [the] British get [the] 
Turks off their high horse in [the] crucial demand for “equal’ representation. Latter point 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26 Nicolet, ibid., 72. 
27 FO to Washington 5770, November 29, 1955: PREM 11/1250; Makins, Washington to FO 3017, 
September 12, 1955: DEFE 11/180.. 
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goes to the heart of the question since there can be no solution if the British continue to 
let the Turks retain their hidden veto over forthright expression of HMG’s true intent.”28
 
 
American support was not without its constraints either, because of its concern with 
preventing the defeat of the Karamanlis government in the upcoming elections. For its 
part and, despite its interests, Turkey kept a surprisingly low profile during this period, 
choosing to remain silent with respect to its interests in Cyprus. As a matter of fact, in 
their meeting in Paris, it was Dulles who had to introduce the subject of Cyprus into his 
discussion with Zorlu 29
 
  
Following the failure of the Harding-Makarios talks, the Archbishop, along with the 
Bishop of Kyrenia and two others, were arrested on March 9, 1956 and exiled to the 
Seychelles. They would remain there for thirteen months. The final straw for Britain 
which led to the Archbishop’s exile was his refusal to publicly denounce EOKA violence. 
The Archbishop’s defiance on this point would be a reoccurring theme in future 
negotiations with Britain. But despite their differences, the Harding-Makarios 
negotiations represent the closest Britain and Greece had come in reaching an 
understanding.30
 
  Makarios’ absence did nothing to quell the violence, and the EOKA 
struggle continued.  Although the Greek Cypriot leadership argued that no negotiations 
could take place without the Archbishop, it was clear that EOKA would continue the 
struggle with or without Makarios.  
                                                 
28 Cannon, Embtel 2395, March 5, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 3-556, NARA. 
29  George W. Perkins, US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), to Dulles, 
Telegram from Paris, Polto 649, October 26, 1955: FRUS, 1955-2957, XIII, 176-177. 
30 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 63. 
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 Reactions to the Deportation of Makarios 
 
News of the deportation of the Archbishop and his associates first reached the US 
Embassy in London via the ticker. The Foreign Office duly informed the Embassy   
shortly thereafter. The FO’s plan had been to inform the State Department as soon as 
Makarios was off the island, but a delay in the transmission of Harding’s cable resulted in 
the news first appearing on the ticker. 31  The deportations, however, had not come as a 
complete surprise to the State Department. As early as June 30, 1955, Consul Courtney in 
Nicosia had alerted Dulles to the likelihood that if the security situation on the island 
continued to deteriorate, it would likely lead to the “arrest of large numbers of persons 
possibly including the Archbishop and his associates.”32  In September, 1955, then 
Governor Armitage had been advised that plans were underway to deport “the other bad 
bishop”, Kyprianos, Bishop of Kyrenia, whom the British always considered to be a 
greater threat than Makarios.33
 
  
On November 26 Harding proclaimed a state of emergency on Cyprus. He had been in 
the process of initiating another round of talks with Makarios in which the Archbishop’s 
continual refusal to publicly distance himself from EOKA violence was becoming a 
major point of contention.34
                                                 
31 Barbour, Embtel London 3861, March 9, 1956: FRUS, 1954-1956, XXIV, 346. 
 The British interpreted the breakdown of the talks not only 
as evidence of “bad faith” on the part of the Archbishop, but also indicative of his 
32 Courtney, FS Despatch Nicosia 118, June 30, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00’6-3055, NARA. 
33 Panteli, ibid., 172. 
34 The state of emergency included: banning public assemblies; introduction of the death penalty for 
carrying a weapon; and declaring strikes illegal. British troops were put on a wartime footing, and 
approximately 300 British policemen were transported to the island as replacements for EOKA 
sympathizers who had been purged from the local forces, see Parliamentary Debates: Official Report: 
House of Commons: “Cyprus,” 546, November 28, 1955. 
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collusion with EOKA. Lennox-Boyd said Makarios’ refusal to condemn the violence 
made him as culpable as one who encourages it.35
 
  
The Americans, sensitive to the importance of keeping the allies at peace with each other, 
refrained from publicly commenting on Makarios’ alleged sympathies with EOKA. 
American intelligence agencies did, however, conduct its own investigations of the 
Archbishop’s activities. The investigations yielded no hard evidence which made 
American support for Britain all the more difficult. Since the US fully understood that the 
Greeks would jump at the chance to exploit any sign of trouble in Anglo-American 
relations, the US resisted public criticism of Britain’s actions. Despite the urgent advice 
of Cavendish W. Cannon, the US Ambassador to Greece, Washington refused to distance 
itself from Britain.36  It was only after the repeated urgings of Cannon and protests from 
Senate Minority leader, William F. Knowland, that the State Department reluctantly 
issued an anemic statement to the press. While emphasizing American commitment to a 
satisfactory solution to the problem, it was conspicuously silent with regard to the 
deportations: "the United States Government earnestly hoped that basic agreements might 
be reached which would enable the people of Cyprus to achieve their legitimate desire of 
cooperation in the establishment of a government truly representative of the people of the 
island."37
 
   
Although privately, many in Washington were appalled at being put in so embarrassing a 
position by an “ally who frisks nuns and deports an archbishop,” in reality, US officials 
                                                 
35 The Times, March 6, 1956. 
36 Ibid., 74-75. 
37 “The United States position on the Cyprus Question,” quoted here in “The US and Enosis,” Time, March 
26, 1956.  
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were less concerned with the deportations than with publicly alienating Britain. The 
British, however, saw the incident in a completely different light. London seethed at the 
implicit censure in the State Department’s declaration and, if that were not enough, the 
next development threatened to bring Anglo-American relations to the “boiling point.”38
 
   
In Athens, Ambassador Cannon followed up Washington’s declaration by issuing his 
own statement to the press expressing his “sympathetic concern” and praising the Greeks 
for their “dignity and statesmanship” in the matter. Apparently, Cannon was unaware of 
Washington’s “tilt” towards Britain when he made his statement. Meanwhile, the London 
Daily Mail, seizing upon the Ambassador’s statement, vigorously denounced it as a “kick 
in the teeth” to Britain, while Ambassador Makins called for an official explanation. In an 
effort to smooth over the incident, the State Department hurriedly issued another 
statement that appeared to back away from its earlier position by insisting that the US 
was “not taking sides."39
 
 
At his press conference President Eisenhower initiated his own damage control by 
emphasizing the special relationship between Britain and the US and, of course, the 
critical preservation of the NATO alliance: 
 
Here is a place where two of our very best friends are engaged in an argument with very great difficulty. 
Now, we are friendly to both, not only friendly in the sense of traditional friendship with these two peoples, 
but on top of that, both are vitally necessary to NATO . . . So we are ready to do anything that is reasonable 
and practicable to help in reaching some solution, but the solution itself is going to have to be reached by 
the people most greatly concerned.40
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid. 
40 “The President’s News Conference, “March 14, 1956:  The Papers of, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, Ann 
Whitman File, Press Conference Series, DDE-Library 302. 
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The President’s well-intended remarks only served to further complicate the situation by 
not for the first, nor even the last time, neglecting Turkey’s interest in the Cyprus 
question. Eisenhower’s omission prompted Sir Ivone  Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office 
to resurrect the earlier accusation that “the Turkish point of view was not sufficiently 
appreciated in the United States, although Kirkpatrick quickly added that “he was not 
defending the Turkish point of view.”41 The Turks, for their part, appeared to not have 
noticed the slight. Nicolet attributes this to the possibility that Turkey interpreted the 
ambiguous “best friends” reference to mean Britain and Turkey.42 Whatever the meaning, 
on March 18, London’s Observer noted that the effect that Eisenhower’s statement had 
had on the whole affair was that it brought “America […] back where she always was –an 
impartial well-wisher planted firmly on the fence.”43
 
 
For the moment, the embattled Ambassador Cannon was forced to defend his words by 
explaining that the embassy staff had “reviewed [the] situation and decided that if [they] 
were to hold the line for major US  interests in Greece and [the] Eastern Mediterranean 
[…] something must be done at once. I therefore decided on a personal statement.” 
Although Cannon accepted responsibility for his part in the whole affair, he was not 
hesitant in assigning the State Department its fair share of the blame. In a telegram to 
Dulles dated March 14, Cannon criticized the State Department’s statement as “not quite 
meeting the national psychological situation” in Greece. In his effort to dodge the 
diplomatic bullet, the Ambassador was aided by Greek officials who informed him that 
                                                 
41 Memcon between Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Secretary of State of the FO and George Allen, 
London, March 15, 196: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 351. 
42 Nicolet, ibid., 75. 
43 “US Diplomacy saved Greek Government, “The Observer, March 18, 1956. 
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his statement came “at five minutes to Midnight for Greece,” and because of it, the US 
“need not now worry about Greek participation in NATO.44
 
   
Cannon’s explanation was quickly followed by a response from Under Secretary Herbert 
C. Hoover, who attempted to bridge the American credibility gap by trying to clarify 
State Department policy: “our statements since [the] deportation [s] were designed solely 
to restore [an] atmosphere permitting [the] resumption [of] negotiations.”45
   
  By the end of 
the week the injured parties seemed somewhat placated, though Britain was less than 
happy about the continued US pressure for a resumption of negotiations, which clearly 
was not possible without bringing the Archbishop back from exile, a move Britain was 
not prepared to make. For the British, the talking was over, at least for the foreseeable 
future. And despite their best efforts, the Americans could not change their minds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Cannon to Dulles, Embtel, Athens 2538, March 14, 1956: SDCDF, 747C.00/ 3-1456, NARA. 
45 Hoover, Deptel Athens 2765, March 20, 1956: FRUS, 1954-1956, XXIV, 355. 
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Chapter VII 
 
New Approaches to the Cyprus Problem 
 
An article in Time magazine characterized the deportation of Makarios as “one of the 
most muddleheaded decisions of Prime Minister Eden's indecisive tenure”1 and, indeed, 
there were many who would agree with this assessment. First and foremost, the 
Archbishop’s deportation created a vacuum in Greek Cypriot representation. Despite 
EOKA’s suspicions about the Archbishop’s commitment to enosis, without him, there 
was little hope for any real progress. The Ethnarchy was especially adamant that no 
negotiations could take place without him, and the Opposition in Britain agreed.2 The 
Americans also shared a similar view. Moreover, they were of the same mind as the 
Labour Party that London was not moving quickly enough in developing a new plan for 
Cyprus.3 But unbeknownst to the impatient Americans, a new formula was in the works 
which, at least partly, reflected the prevailing views of the US diplomatic establishment.4
 
 
In the short-term, there was no plan to return the Archbishop to the island, but the new 
scheme did entail revisiting the question of self-determination and the inclusion of  
                                                 
1 “Exile Comes to the Archbishop,” Time, March 19, 1956. 
2 Following Makarios’ deportation, the Athens Government not only recalled the Greek Ambassador to 
Britain, but it also instructed Greece’s permanent representative to the UN to register a formal protest with 
that organization. Moreover, there was a massive public protest in Athens in which thousands converged on 
Constitution Square waving Greek flags and chanting anti-British slogans, Ibid.; Although Labour made a 
show of attacking  the  Conservatives over Cyprus, it did not represent a very  “effective Opposition  with 
regard to colonial policy in general” in that when confronted by a choice between principle and  politics, it 
purposefully chose the latter, see, Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 120-121 and Stefanidis, Isle of 
Discord,  passim.  
3 Dulles to Lloyd, Message, June 6, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 363. 
4 Holland, ibid., 131. 
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NATO 5 It was Governor Harding, in a memorandum issued in April 1956, who 
introduced a role for NATO into the proposal and, what is more, became the principal 
architect of the plan.6
 
 
Weighing the Options 
 
In February 1956, the politically ambitious Governor of New York, Thomas Dewey sent 
a memorandum to Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams suggesting that “NATO may be 
the only peaceful ultimate haven for Cyprus.”7  In response, Robinson McIlvaine, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public affairs, told Adams that the idea of NATO 
assuming responsibility for the administration of Cyprus was highly unlikely, since any 
placement of NATO forces required the unanimous agreement of all its members.8  And 
there was little chance that Greece, Turkey, and Britain could be brought on board with 
such a plan. He did, however, suggest that NATO might be enlisted in an effort to 
reconcile the differences among the three parties. Greece was especially “cool” to the 
prospect of NATO interference. Among their objections was the belief that NATO 
involvement in the Cyprus issue might give the UN permission to “back away” from the 
issue. 9
 
 
                                                 
5  According to Holland, the idea of self-determination after a fixed interval was one that had been 
suggested several times by the Americans see, ibid., 131. 
6 Harding Memorandum: “The Future of Cyprus,” April 4, 1956: PREM 11/251.  
7 Dewey to Adams Memorandum, February 8, 1956: Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, WHCF 
(Confidential File), 1953-61, Subject Series, Department of State (April 1956), DDE-Library, 3; Dewey 
had three unsuccessful runs for the Presidency of the US, putting him on par with another persistent, but 
failed presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryant. The governor’s interest in international affairs was 
likely motivated by his desire to gain a cabinet appointment in the Eisenhower Administration. 
8  McIlvaine to Adams, Memorandum: ibid., 3. 
9 Cannon, Embtel Athens 2602, March 21, 1956: SDCDF, 747C.00/3-2156, NARA. 
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Shortly thereafter, Dulles also weighed in on the feasibility of a NATO solution. In a 
telegram to Ankara on April 4, 1956, the Secretary of State acknowledged “the growing 
feeling [that] NATO should not sit idly by with all its implications for future unity and 
cooperation.”  But at the same time, the Secretary was not oblivious to the possible loss 
of prestige and unity of the alliance should it become embroiled in the dispute and 
expressed concern that NATO  recognition might also provide the Greek Government 
with a situation where it would reject any solution that did not include enosis. 10
 
  
A few weeks later at a news conference, in response to a question along the same lines, 
Dulles said, “to put a situation like Cyprus under the administration of a council […] 15 
nations acting through representatives who […] cannot agree on anything except after 
lengthy discussion, is not an effective form of government.”11 Despite this opinion, 
Dulles, at a Council Meeting in Bonn on May 3, told Selwyn George that unless the 
Cyprus situation showed some improvement, a NATO solution might be inevitable.12 
According to Holland, the Americans, although reluctant to involve the alliance in the 
Cyprus problem, recognized that “the NATO stick provided one means by which the 
Eisenhower Administration could coax the British into a more conciliatory frame of 
mind.”13
 
   
In April the island experienced its first inter-communal clashes, lending a new gravity to 
the search for a solution to the problem. In the past, EOKA had targeted only those Greek 
                                                 
10 Dulles, Deptel, Ankara, 1638, April 4, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 356-357. 
11 Dulles, “The Role of NATO in the Cyprus Dispute”: Reply Made by Secretary of State to a Question 
asked at a News Conference,” April 17, 1956: American Foreign Policy Current Documents: 1956: 
Western Europe, 403. 
12 Holland, ibid., 125. 
13 Ibid, 126. 
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Cypriots whom they regarded as traitors and British soldiers, and any Turkish casualties 
were collateral damage. Initially, EOKA attacks were mainly directed against Turkish 
constables in retaliation for their cooperation with the British police. Over time, however, 
as the attacks grew more violent, the British redoubled their efforts to solicit Turkish 
support for their policy and to bolster enthusiasm among the Turkish Cypriots for the 
importance of the role of Turkey in Cyprus.14
 
  
Meanwhile, Anglo-Greek relations remained tense. Since the departure of the Greek 
Ambassador to London, the last remaining conduit between the two countries was the 
British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Charles Peake, who had anticipated the early demise 
of the Karamanlis Government and was regarded with suspicion by the Greeks. He also 
believed that the Greek Government had allowed itself too be too closely aligned with 
extremist elements and could not disassociate itself from Makarios.  Indeed, in May, 
Washington had learned that the consensus in London was that the “Cypriot tail still wags 
the Greek dog,” and [the British Government] “could only maintain [the] pretense of 
negotiating without being able to take a constructive position.” 15
 
  
This, however, was not the only reason for Britain’s inflexibility. Cyprus was critical to 
Britain. But events outside of the Cyprus dispute were making the island’s geographical 
location even more important in their minds and, arguably, the imaginations of many in 
                                                 
14 One example of Britain’s propaganda campaign and its continual efforts to play the “Turkish card” in 
Cyprus is in a handbook issued to British troops based on island at the time. Among other things, the 
pamphlet makes use of dubious pro-Turkish arguments such as the idea that Cyprus was actually the 
geographical continuation of Anatolia: Why We Are in Cyprus: Background Notes for British Servicemen, 
March,  in FS Despatch Nicosia 122, April 26, 1956:SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-2656, NARA. 
15 Andrew B. Foster, Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, to Dulles, Embtel London 5063, 
May 3, 1956: SDCDF, doc.747C00/5-356, NARA, quoted here in Nicolet,  United States Policy Towards 
Cyprus, 79. 
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the government. As a result, Harding’s new set of proposals were about to come into 
direct conflict with the ambitions and nationalist sentiments of the “Party of Empire.”  
 
The last British troops were slated for withdrawal from the Suez base on June 13, 1956. 
Accordingly, it is useful to examine the conventional arguments that favored the retention 
of the status quo in Cyprus. First, the island was regarded as "the last remaining British 
base of any importance in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area." Withdrawal 
from the Suez Canal strengthened the strategic value of the island and "made it a 
necessity to securely hold it as a 'spring board' for British troops." It also served as "a 
convenient base both for Air Force operations and the movement of troops by air [within 
the Middle East].” Moreover, Britain had treaty obligations with Iraq and Jordan as well 
as through the Baghdad Pact that might require a swift deployment of troops to the 
region. 16
Furthermore, the volatile situation in the Middle East might easily result in "some 
deprivation of oil to the United Kingdom and Western allies generally, and at the same 
time, would open the way for Russian and Communist infiltration." Finally, Cyprus was 
important to the security of the eastern flank of NATO. The British Government believed 
that in the event of a military crisis, both Greece and Turkey would need further support 
“and this could best be done from Cyprus."
 
  
17
                                                 
16 “Defence Strategy in the Middle East Cairo,” Dispatch 5 March 16, 1956: A1838/2 item152/11/72/1 
pt.4,  National Archives of Australia quoted here in Stavros T. Stavrides, Cyprus in March 1956, Australian 
Documents,” (Athens: National Center for Hellenic Studies and Research, 2006); Hatzivassiliou, Britain 
and the International Status of Cyprus, 70 
  Of course, safeguarding NATO was the 
17 Ibid. 
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foremost concern of the United States. 
 
In anticipation of Britain’s withdrawal from Suez, the Conservatives in Parliament were 
gripped by “a spasm of ultra sentiment.”18 Consequently, Eden’s position shifted 
dramatically from the urgency of preserving Cyprus as a base for defense against the 
communist threat and Soviet aggression, to arguing for the necessity of a strong presence 
in Cyprus as the only way for Britain to safeguard the oil reserves of the Middle East. 
Economic considerations, not military or ideological ones, now defined his new 
doctrine—“Cyprus is a NATO interest, but it is not only that” Eden stated in a speech on 
June 1 [emphasis added].19 The Prime Minister believed that similar to Gibraltar, Cyprus 
needed to remain firmly within the empire and described the slippery slope that would 
ensue should Britain lose the island: “no Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our 
supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.”20
 
  
While this may have been an overwrought statement and oversimplification of the 
problem, it is important to note that it did reflect a current of British thought at the time. 
This thinking may have resonated through the corridors of Parliament, but the British 
military took a somewhat different view of the island’s importance. The Chiefs of Staff 
(COS) now believed that Cyprus, because of its lack of deep water ports, was of no 
                                                 
18 Holland, ibid., 135. 
19 FS Despatch London 2990, June 4, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C00/6-456, NARA, 1. 
20  Quoted here in James Robert Rhodes, Anthony Eden, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987), 
439. 
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practical use to the navy. Moreover, with one exception,21 they also concluded that the 
island was virtually worthless for securing the oil installations of the Middle East.22
 
 
Despite the significant conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff, the British Government stood 
firm in its view that retention of the island was a “stabilizing factor” in the Middle East. 
If this was to be the case, then the Chiefs of Staff held firm in its belief that Turkey 
needed to come along “in any change that might be contemplated” as it was an essential 
ally in both NATO and the Baghdad Pact.23  Moreover, there were some Foreign Office 
officials who assumed that “‘the Turkish-political’ objectives might well take precedence 
over the British Government’s requirement for a base in Cyprus.” 24
 
 
To a certain extent, the Americans shared the same views. An NSC meeting on May 17 
indicates that the US was rethinking its traditional Cold War containment policy and 
moving towards substituting its military strategy with an economic approach: 
 
[W]hatever the nature of the changes going on in the USSR, we could at least safely conclude that these 
changes require us to do more by way of building economic strength around the periphery of the Soviet 
Union, rather than continue our present scale to build military strength around the periphery. The older 
policy which we have continued to pursue was obviously justifiable when it was undertaken some five 
years ago in the light of Soviet aggressive moves against Greece, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. 
Now, however, the time has come to reverse this policy.25
 
 
 
The ‘June Plan‘ 
 
                                                 
21 Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Gerald Templar was the dissenting voice. 
22 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 69. 
23 Quoted here in Ibid. 
24 J.G. Ward to J.S.H.Shattock, Letter, May 5, 1956: FO 371/123882, doc. RG 1081/724G, PRO, 2, quoted 
here in Nicolet, ibid. 80; Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 68. 
25 Memorandum: Discussion at the 285th NSC Meeting, May 17, 1956: Declassified Documents, doc. 1988 
2269, 13. 
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In June 1956, Britain introduced a new constitutional plan based partly upon Harding’s 
proposals, contingent upon the elimination of terrorism and the full restoration of law and 
order. The plan was to be formulated by the newly appointed Constitutional 
Commissioner, Lord Radcliffe, the prominent British jurist whose past accomplishments 
included arbitrating the border between India and Pakistan in 1947. Although the plan did 
not provide for an immediate guarantee for self-determination, it did allow for the 
possibility after ten years.26
 
 This, however, would be conditional upon a joint security 
treaty between the UK, Turkey, and Greece as well as full protection of minority rights: 
 
It shall be a condition of any change in the international status of Cyprus, that a treaty shall be concluded 
between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, regulating their common interest the use of Cyprus for 
military purposes. Such a treaty would be terminable only by an agreement between the parties, would 
provide that the United Kingdom should continue to be responsible for the external defence of Cyprus and 
to enjoy facilities in the island as may be necessary for this purpose and for that of discharging British 
Treaty obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East […]It shall similarly be a condition 
that the implementation of a decision to change the international status of Cyprus would be made 
dependent upon a special treaty arrangement by which the interests of minority racial groups were fully 
safeguarded.27
 
 
 One of the most salient features of the ‘June Plan’ was that the “question of self-
determination” [could] not be raised internationally by the three governments, or be 
discussed between them, during the intervening period of ten years.”28
                                                 
26 “Text of Statement to Be Made by Her Majesty’s Government on the Cyprus Question,” June 19, 1956: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 370. 
 But from a tactical 
standpoint, the most striking feature was that while it was to be withheld from the 
Greeks, Turkey was to be informed of the plan and pressured into accepting it. This 
would be no easy task since the British Government had previewed it to the Turkish 
Government and that it had received a “rough reception.” The Turkish Foreign Minister 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, 371. 
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believed that it was “dangerous,” in that it was”apt to make the Greeks more 
intransigent.” 29
 
  
From the beginning, it was understood that any real success for the British plan was 
dependent upon the support of its “friend,” the US.30  While Ambassador Makins in 
Washington believed that Dulles needed to be pressured, he also anticipated the 
objections that the Secretary of State might entertain, highlighting them in a letter to the 
Foreign Office on June 13.  First, Dulles would have difficulty with a constitution that 
was to be imposed rather than negotiated, as had been the case in a similar situation in 
1954— and there was no reason to think that the Secretary had changed his views. 
Second, he would object to the ambiguous structure of the “elected majority” Finally, it 
could not be excluded that Dulles still held the hope that negotiations with Makarios 
might resume. Makins attributed these possible objections to the fact that the Americans 
have “never given due weight to the strength of Turkish feeling.”31
 
 
Request for official US support came in a June 19 letter from Foreign Secretary Selwyn 
Lloyd, prior to Dulles receiving the actual plan. In it, Lloyd defended the British 
government’s reasons for informing the Turks beforehand, saying that since a “sharp 
reaction” was to be anticipated, “we feel bound to put the draft statement of policy before 
the Turkish Government in advance.”32
                                                 
29 Memcon between Coulson and Dulles, June 19, 1956: ibid., 368. 
  Similarly, in a message attached to the proposal 
statement, also dated June 19, Lloyd provides the following observations: the “main 
problem in handling Cyprus was the Turks […] the new British proposal provided 
30 Holland, ibid., 138. 
31 Makins, Washington to FO 1347, June 13, 1956. 
32 Letter from Lloyd to Dulles, FO to Washington, (undated):PREM11/1251. 
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reasonable safeguards for the Turkish position, but the Turks would need ‘a lot of 
persuading if they were to accept this.’”33
 
 This view was undoubtedly shared by many in 
London.  
Dulles was unimpressed by the explanation and annoyed at being presented with an 
obvious fait accompli.34 In a memorandum to the British chargé d'affaires, John Coulson, 
he lamented that the US had “no voice in this question except as the British Government 
desired us to have one.”35 He emphasized that there was little chance that the US would 
cooperate with the initiative. His reasons, however, were very different from the ones 
which Makins had anticipated.  Dulles’s main concern regarded the overarching security 
safeguards granted to Turkey: “the Secretary then asked if the treaty provisions of the 
plan did not give the Turks in effect a veto, since if they did not adhere, the plan could 
not commence. Mr. Coulson agreed that this was so.”36
 
 In a meeting between Makins and 
Dulles a few days later, Dulles elaborated on this point: 
The Secretary observed the principal objection to the British proposal…was the provision that settlement of 
the question of self-determination would depend upon a British-Greek-Turkish Treaty even in advance of 
NATO consideration of the problem…at present the Turks would have no legal basis to obstruct a 
settlement, but under the terms of the proposals…they would know that they would have the legal power to 
stall the implementation of the self-determination feature. Thus the British would be depriving themselves 
of their sole legal responsibility in the matter and would bring about a divided authority that might cause 
trouble in future years.37
 
  
                                                 
33 Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: lot 66 D. 204, “UK Officials Correspondence with 
Secretary Dulles/Herter, 7/54 thru 3/57, “Vol. I. 
34 Moreover, it did not help matters that a few days previously, EOKA had bombed a restaurant in Nicosia, 
killing U.S. Vice Consul William P. Boteler and wounding three other American members of the consular 
staff as they sat at dinner, see Holland, ibid., 138.  
35Memcon between  John E. Coulson,  chargé d’affaires of the British Embassy, and Dulles, June 19, 1956: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 369. 
36 Memcon between Coulson and Dulles, June 19, 1956, ibid., 368; Holland, ibid., 138; Hatzivassiliou, ibid, 
72. 
37 Memcon between Dulles and Makins, June 22, 1956: Ibid, 372. 
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Makins countered by saying that this was unlikely to occur since even if the Turks or the 
Greeks could effectively block the implementation of the plan after a ten year period, 
they could not withstand the international pressure.  And at any rate, should this happen, 
NATO could surely step in to pressure Greece and Turkey into negotiating a more 
equitable solution. Dulles, however, remained unconvinced, since in his view “neither the 
Greeks nor the Turks were nearly as sensitive to international pressures as the United 
States and Great Britain.”38  Dulles went on to say that based upon his understanding of 
the proposals, NATO would have no jurisdiction in “absence of the Treaty itself,” and he 
could not “envisage” a scenario in which NATO could successfully compel the Greeks 
and Turks to reach a settlement. Consequently, Dulles had serious reservations about the 
merits of the proposals.39 Moreover, the Secretary believed that under the plan, the 
Greeks and Turks would be granted extraordinary rights that they did not at present 
possess which would significantly limit the flexibility the British had in “disposing of the 
problem.” Dulles also worried that the US would find itself in the difficult position of 
supporting the plan and hesitated to do so “unless there were some reasonable chance of 
acceptance by Greece.”  The Secretary concluded that this was unlikely to happen 
without first privately discussing the matter with the Greek and Turkish Governments. 40
 
  
All that remained was for President Eisenhower to convey these misgivings to Prime 
Minister Eden. Aware of the President’s limited understanding of the Cyprus situation, 
Dulles communicated his assessment in the simplest terms:  “let us suppose the UK 
                                                 
38 Ibid, 373. 
39 Ibid, 373. 
40 Ibid, 374. 
 107 
wanted to make Cyprus independent, Greece would have the veto power over that. If they 
[British] did this thing [the plan], then their hands would be tied theoretically in 
perpetuity.”41  Accordingly, Eisenhower communicated this idea in a letter to the British 
Prime Minister on June 23. “Is it wise,” the President asked somewhat rhetorically, “for 
you to dilute your own authority by giving both Greece and Turkey what amounts to an 
indefinite veto power over any future change in the International status of Cyprus? […]It 
seems to me important,” he continued, that the United Kingdom should retain a sufficient 
initiative and flexibility in its own hands[….]” He concluded by asking if there was not 
some way that Britain might avoid granting a veto power to either Turkey or Greece.42
 
  
As might be expected, the British were furious.  Harding immediately contacted the 
Colonial Office. He could scarcely believe that the Secretary “was in favor of 
maintaining indefinitely British sovereignty over Cyprus.” The alternative explanation 
could only be that the Americans were trying to press the British into “the granting of a 
constitution which would certainly be used to as a quick and easy stepping-stone to self-
determination and hence to enosis.” Harding agreed with Peake’s assessment that the US 
was hoping “to appease the Greeks in general and Karamanlis in particular.”43 Harding 
was mistaken in his appraisal. As it happened, the US, including Dulles, was in favor of 
British sovereignty all along.44
 
 
                                                 
41  Dulles to Eisenhower, Telecon, June 23, 1956: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1959, Telephone 
Conversations Series, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations-White House January 3, 1956-August 31, 
1956, DDE-Library, quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 81. 
42 Eisenhower to Eden, Letter June 23, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 375. 
43 Harding to Lennox Boyd, Nicosia to CO 1232, June 26,1956: FO 371/12902,doc.RG 108/1378,PRO, 
quoted here in Nicolet, ibid.,  82 
44 Ibid. 
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Throughout the latest Anglo-American drama over Cyprus, the State Department had 
been preparing a memorandum on the preservation of US overseas military bases, 
operating rights, and facilities. The US was experiencing an increasing opposition to its 
military presence in many of its client states and worried that increased pressure might 
make it difficult for local governments friendly to the US to continue their cooperation: 
 
 
In Iceland and Saudi Arabia, our existing base rights are in jeopardy. In Morocco, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent in the Azores, we are faced with difficult negotiations whose outcome is uncertain. In the Philippines 
and Okinawa, local opposition in some aspects of our overseas base programs has become so outspoken 
that maintenance of our existing facilities is becoming a major internal political issue. In Thailand, criticism 
is beginning to mount, led by opposition elements. Even in Spain there are signs of trouble. Our British 
allies have already suffered from the general change in attitude and are faced with the loss of their existing 
bases and military rights in Ceylon and with major complications in Cyprus and Singapore.45
 
 
It was against this volatile backdrop and in relation to the looming Suez crisis that 
Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the following 
observation, underlining the importance of preserving British sovereignty in Cyprus:   
 
[…] the British would be completely out of the picture in the Middle East if they lost Cyprus and its bases. 
While the American military have not counted on using Cyprus bases in the event of hostilities, 
nevertheless the fact remains that if we were barred from a Cyprus base we would have to go in and seize 
some other base or else induce the Turks to provide us with one.46
 
 
 
The above assessment clearly refers to Operation Stockpile, an initiative that was under 
consideration at the State Department in May 1956. The idea of using Cyprus as a 
location for a “pool” of US aircraft and military equipment came from Dulles, who was 
                                                 
45 Dulles to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson , Letter including Memorandum: “Preservation of US 
Overseas Military Bases, Operating Rights, and Facilities,” June 28, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XIX, 334  
46  Gleason, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the NSC,” June 28, 1956: FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXI, 309. 
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looking for a way to meet Israel’s demands for arms without supplying them directly.47 It 
was also intended to deter attacks by both the Arabs and Israelis. Both parties would be 
aware of the pool, and in the event of an attack, the victim of the aggression would 
receive the aircraft.48  The idea was eventually shelved, however, after it was concluded 
that although Cyprus would be the only possible place for stockpiling military equipment, 
“the island itself” would present the US with “very serious complications.”  Moreover, 
Admiral Radford expressed reservations about having a pool of military equipment in the 
region “to be turned over to someone who is aggressed against after aggression has 
occurred” was not “realistic” and “did not serve the purpose for which it was intended.”49  
Radford  was also concerned that that the airfield facilities in Cyprus were not very good  
and would not be adequate for a turn-over point for Israeli pilots.50
 
  
Up to this point, the US position regarding a solution for the Cyprus problem still 
remained uncertain. While the Americans were at a loss as to find a specific resolution 
for the island’s troubles, they were perfectly clear in what they wanted with regard to 
their own interests.  The US believed that Cyprus should be available for military use in 
the event of a regional conflict or another emergency.  Given this, it stood to reason that 
the island needed to be under the control of a dependable ally, which at present could 
only have been the UK. From the American perspective, the June Plan jeopardized the 
                                                 
47  Mac Arthur, Counselor of the Department of State to Dulles, Memorandum: “Proposal for Stockpiling 
Weapons for the Benefit of Victim of Aggression in Middle East, April 14, 1956: “FRUS, 1954-1956, XV, 
532-534; Operation Stockpile was replaced by “Whiplash” in late June, see: Michael Joseph Cohen, 
Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954-1960, Defending the Northern Tier, (New York: Frank Cass, 
2005), 151.   
48 Memcon between Dulles, McArthur and Radford, April 9, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XV,497 
49 MacArthur to Dulles, Memorandum: April 9, 1956, SDCDF, S/S-NEA, Lot 61, D 417, Omega #1, 2, 
NARA. 
50 Memcon “Operation Stockpile,” May 16, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XV, 639. 
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stability of Cyprus and thus threatened the military installations there. In light of 
increasing opposition against Western bases throughout the rest of the world, Cyprus was 
now more important than ever to the alliance. Consequently, there were no tears in 
Washington when the Turkish Government officially rejected the proposals on June 30, 
1956.  
 111 
 
Chapter VIII 
 
 Lost Opportunities-EOKA Ceasefire 
 
On July 12 Eden announced in the House of Commons the appointment of Lord Radcliffe 
as Constitutional Commissioner. Radcliffe was tasked with arranging a set of proposals 
aimed at granting a measure of liberal self-government to Cyprus under British 
sovereignty and safeguarding both Turkish Cypriot rights and British strategic interests.   
President Eisenhower issued a brief announcement stating that “the US welcomes the 
intention of the British Government […] to proceed with the development of self-
government on the island of Cyprus.” 1  The creation of a Constitutional Commission 
was also regarded as a step forward by Governor Harding since it reflected his views on 
the relationship between violence and constitutional questions which had softened since 
his dealings with Makarios.2   It appeared that Governor Harding was backing away from 
his original position to first establish order on Cyprus and "let the murderers make the 
first move if there is to be a stopping of violence"3 before seeking a political solution. But 
he defended the Radcliffe appointment with claims that the “terrorists were beginning to 
crack,” and it was only a matter of time before Security Forces would “break” EOKA.4
                                                 
1 Dulles, Deptel Athens 171July 14, 1956: SDCDF, 747C.00/7-1456, NARA. 
  
2 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 142. 
3 Quote by Harding in “The First Move,” Time, August 27, 1956. 
4 Governor Harding’s Broadcast on Cyprus, July 12, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-1356, NARA. 
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The source of Harding’s confidence was not only the victories against EOKA in June, but 
also the nearly successful apprehension of its leader, Colonel George Grivas.5
 
 
On August 19, in a move that took everyone by surprise, leaflets presumably written by 
Grivas, were scattered throughout Cyprus ordering the "suspension of operations by all 
forces under [his] authority," in return for a ceasefire. In response, the Greek government 
promptly drew up a communiqué characterizing the EOKA offer as a "noble decision." 
But at the last minute, fearing that the leaflets might not be authentic, decided to hold the 
communiqué for twenty-four hours. Britain’s first reaction was equally cautious saying, 
"you must remember, that this is only one man's offer, and it came from pieces of paper 
scattered in the street."6
 
    
Working on the assumption that the offer was legitimate, the British were quick to seize 
upon this development as evidence that the organization was losing strength as a result of 
the Governor’s “get tough” policy. Although publicly terming the ceasefire offer "a 
chance for a fresh start,"7 Harding confided to Consul Courtney that he believed that the 
“EOKA truce resulted from the organization’s own recognition of its weakness [and that] 
British operations waged against it had harassed and disrupted EOKA’s campaign of 
terror.”8
                                                 
5 The Memoirs of General George Grivas, ed. Charles Foley, (New York and Washington, D.C.: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1965), 75-81. 
  He also believed that the truce was merely a ploy by EOKA “to rest and reshape 
the weapon to be ready to strike again.” With this in mind, Harding decided to relax the 
restrictions against the public and exploit the growing disenchantment of the Greek 
6 “The First Move,” Time, August 27, 1956. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Courtney to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 55, August 20, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8 2056, NARA.  
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Cypriot populace toward EOKA. He was hoping to use this opportunity to eradicate 
EOKA once and for all. 9 On August 22, Governor Harding announced that EOKA had 
three weeks to surrender with its arms; they then would be given the choice of 
deportation to Greece or standing trial in Cyprus. This was a step too far for EOKA 
which responded by warning that it would resume its activities at midnight on August 27 
unless the order to lay down arms was withdrawn.10
 
 
Harding had underestimated Greek Cypriot sympathy for the terrorist organization and 
misjudged the underlying reasons for the truce in the first place. EOKA”s offer was not a 
breathing spell aimed at helping the organization “reshape to strike again,” but a means to 
provide the conditions favorable to Makarios’ release so that negotiations could resume.11
 
  
Moreover, the belief that Britain’s resolve in fighting the terrorists was the main reason 
for EOKA’s stand down was misguided and gave it a false sense of superiority. Rather 
than exploit the opportunity to engage in meaningful negotiations, Harding chose to 
continue to promote a hard-line position, even going so far as to publish the terms of 
EOKA’s surrender.  
The State Department and US embassy officials both knew a lost opportunity when they 
saw one. The US believed the Greek Government would now be amenable since it had 
concluded that the Cyprus conflict was only serving to strengthen Turkey’s hand.12
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
  The 
Americans had in fact, advised the Greek Government to use its influence with Grivas to 
10 Memorandum, “Cyprus, “August 29, 1956, DEA/50141-40: Canada, Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade (DFAIT). Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1954-1957, vol.  20. 
11 Holland, ibid., 175. 
12 Thurston to Dulles, Embtel Athens 674, August 23, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-2356, NARA.  
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call for a truce, indicating that they might coerce Turkey and the UK into adopting a 
more conciliatory position for a new political arrangement.13
 
 While the British policy had 
been to refuse all negotiations with EOKA until the violence had ceased, the State 
Department lamented that the UK’s response to the cessation of violence was to layer on 
a new set of crushing demands rather than initiate a constructive political course. This 
sense of loss and frustration with London’s position is underlined in a telegram from the 
State Department to the UK Embassy on August 24: 
In Department view recent events [in] Cyprus will result [in a] slipping away [of] unexpected opportunity 
by some rapid UK move designed [to] appear as [a] positive response [to] EOKA truce without appearing 
as concession to violence. British surrender terms alone seem likely to lead to renewed violence and 
increased Greek and Cypriot distrust…UK position has been no further negotiating possible until violence 
ended. Violence has ended but main UK response has been what amounts to, in the eyes of EOKA, 
additional demand for complete surrender, resulting in confirmation Greek distrust British motives…If no 
positive UK response soon, EOKA may indeed resume violence regardless present strength.14
 
 
 
The American assessment of the situation was proving to be far more accurate than that 
of London. Grivas’ response to Harding’s terms for a cease-fire was to issue a pamphlet 
entitled, “Victors do not Surrender.”15 In fact, the only “Cypriot” to take up Harding’s 
offer was “a forlorn donkey, dragging a bunch of wooden rifles strapped to his rump 
through the streets of Nicosia, bearing a sign around its neck, declaring ‘I surrender, my 
Field Marshall.’”16
 
  
Abandoned Attempts   
 
                                                 
13 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 75. 
14 Hoover, Embtel London 1325, August 28, 1956:  FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 393. 
15 Grivas, Memoirs, 86. 
16 Holland, ibid., 150. 
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Throughout the summer of 1956 the British held firm to the conviction that their hard-
line stance towards EOKA would ultimately result in the complete eradication of the 
organization.  They also continued to resist negotiations for a political solution. There 
were two reasons for London’s intransigence: first, the capture of portions of Grivas’ 
diaries in June and August indicated that Makarios was complicit with EOKA (which if 
true, justified the Archbishop’s continual exile).17 Secondly, Makarios’ absence from the 
island meant that there was no other Greek Cypriot of any stature willing to take up 
negotiations. This was evident by the refusal of anyone to come forward and meet with 
Lord Radcliffe while he was in Cyprus.18
 
 
The UK defended its position by arguing that the increasing instability of Suez made 
Cyprus even more strategically important to Western interests. Although the US agreed, 
this did not necessarily mean that that the political process should be entirely shelved. In 
fact, in July, Cannon sent a cable to Washington saying that Foreign Minister Averoff 
might be willing to use his considerable sway with the Ethnarchy in support of a cease-
fire on the island, provided he had ample guarantees of a forthcoming satisfactory 
settlement.19
 
  
During the spring of 1956, the Americans, frustrated by the UK’s lack of progress with 
regard to Cyprus, made a number of mediation attempts of their own. Spyros Skouras, 
                                                 
 17 British Colonial Secretary, Allan Lennox-Boyd, presented the Parliament with some selected quotes 
from the documents intended to demonstrate the involvement of the Archbishop with EOKA. These 
included its founding, operations, and even the selection of victims. Although many observers called for the 
full and unexpurgated publication of the diaries, the British Government refused, see Parliamentary 
Debates,  
(House of Commons), 1955-56, vol. 558, September 14, 1956, 383; Holland, ibid., 52.   
18 Courtney to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 10, July 16, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.007-1656, NARA. 
19 Cannon to Dulles, Embtel Athens 324, July 26, 1956: ibid, doc. 747C.00/7-2656, 2. 
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President Eisenhower’s close friend and diplomatic gadfly, resurfaced almost two years 
after his first mediation attempt in 1954. His new plan was to persuade the Turks that 
relations between Turkey and Greece were “infinitely more important than the Cyprus 
question” and to urge the two countries to try to resolve the problem between them. 
Furthermore, he was convinced that the only way the Cyprus problem could be settled 
was to grant the island “Commonwealth status,” a proposal he believed that would be 
acceptable to the Greeks and the Cypriots, and one to which the Turks could not 
“reasonably object.”20
 
 Needless to say, neither Ankara nor Washington was impressed 
with this plan, and not surprisingly, little came of it.  
A second proposal that was suggested called for the possible intervention of Canada 
aided by the US. This proposal involved a mission to the UK by Foreign Minister Lester 
B. Pearson. The plan was scuttled, however, because it was thought that Pearson might 
not be impartial when it came to Greece.21 Moreover, the Canadians, who had no direct 
interest in Cyprus, were not wholly convinced anything substantial could be achieved by 
their intervention at this point.22
 
 
A third scheme for resolving the Cyprus issue was conveyed to the State Department by 
the President of the Pan-European Union, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.  His plan 
                                                 
20 Skouras to Dulles, Memcon, Washington, September 10, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 405-406. 
21 Wood, Memcon, “Cyprus: Possible Canadian Intervention,” May 21, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/5-
2156, NARA.  
22 “[…] although Canada was not directly concerned in the Cyprus issue and we were not anxious to accept 
any special responsibility, we were interested in seeing a solution arrived at both as members of the 
Commonwealth as well as of NATO. If there was anything we could do usefully through NATO or 
privately with the U.K., we would be glad to consider it though it was difficult to see what even the most 
well intentioned intervention from outside could accomplish at the moment: “Conversation with Mr. 
Theotoky, Greek Foreign Minister, Secretary of State to High Commissioner in United Kingdom,” May 7, 
1956, 603, Telegram DL-749, DEA/50141-40: DFAIT. 
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called for Cyprus to have independence via a constitutional monarchy under King Paul of 
Greece.  The plan also included a bi-cameral Parliament composed of a 50/50 Christian 
and Muslim representation, while the UK would take responsibility for the island’s 
defense.23 Although the Count insisted that Greece and Turkey had responded favorably 
to the scheme, it was never pursued. The Americans thought it too ambitious and 
unrealistic, and besides, Washington had what it believed was a much more concrete 
proposal in the works, one that it believed had a chance of leading to a solution for 
Cyprus. The plan included both immediate and eventual goals aimed at the well-being 
and aspirations of all interested parties. 24
 
 The person chosen to bring it together was 
Julius C. Holmes, Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles. 
The Holmes Mission 
 
While still the Consul General at Tangier, Julius C. Holmes wrote a letter to Secretary 
Dulles detailing a ten-year plan for self-government during which time, there would be 
no change in the international status of the island. Although the plan called for retention 
of the Governor, his veto-power would be limited.  At the end of ten years, a NATO-
supervised plebiscite would be held which would afford the population the opportunity to 
vote for any of the following; enosis, local autonomy under the auspices of the Greek 
monarchy, complete autonomy, or self government under British sovereignty. All of 
these options would be accompanied by guarantees for minority rights. Regardless of the 
outcome, British military rights would be assured. The full settlement would be 
                                                 
23 Robert P. Joyce, Paris, “Proposal of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi for Settling Cyprus Issue,” June 4, 1956: 
SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-456, including plan dated May 19, 1956, NARA. 
24 Dulles, Department of State Instruction CA-1170, August 7, 1956, SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-756, NARA. 
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guaranteed by NATO and “made to appear a collective action as far as possible.”25 
Although the US was reluctant to involve the alliance, the procedural aspects of the plan, 
“resorting to a quiet Trieste-type mediation effort,” were enough to alleviate American 
fears. Simply stated, this meant that there would be a common ground for compromise 
should the interests of any concerned party be in jeopardy. 26 Near the end of July, 
Ambassador Cannon suggested that the US pressure the British into allowing Cyprus the 
“opportunity to enjoy [the] possibility of peaceful evolution […] of full independence 
within the Commonwealth […] for the security and prosperity of the island.”27
 
  
Chalmers Wood, of the Bureau for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs became involved 
with the issue and suggested that the proposal include a promise for the return of 
Makarios in advance of the Constituent Assembly elections in exchange for a statement 
by him denouncing violence. The Turkish Cypriots also had to be assured of substantial 
minority rights in return for their cooperation in Assembly elections that would likely 
result in a Greek majority.28
 
  
Following White House approval for the plan, William M. Rountree of the State 
Department prepared a paper detailing the US goals in the Cyprus dispute and the steps 
necessary to achieve them. First on the list of “immediate goals” was “to have talks 
                                                 
25  Holmes to Dulles, Letter, June 6, 1956:SDCDF, doc.747C.00/6-2056, NARA; Memorandum from 
Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Holmes) to the Secretary of State, attached to William M. Rountree, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to Dulles,  July 30, 1956: 
FRUS, XXIV, 1955-1957, 388-392.  
26 Palmer to Lister, Memorandum: “Julius Holmes’ Suggestions on Cyprus,” June 20, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 
747C.00/6-2056, NARA. 
27 Cannon to Dulles, Embtel Athens, 324, July 26, 1956: ibid, doc.747C.00/7-2656, NARA. 
28 Wood to Baxter, Memorandum: “Preliminary Comments on Mr. Holmes’ Memo of July 26 on Cyprus,” 
July 31, 1956: ibid, doc. 747C.00/7-2656; Williams, Wood and Laingen: Draft “Goals in the Cyprus 
Dispute,” Washington, undated: FRUS, 1955-1957,  XXIV, 85-386. 
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between the parties resumed and in such a state of progress before the November United 
nations General Assembly that acrimonious conflict […] can be avoided.” The “eventual 
goals” included a guarantee that “bases in Cyprus” would be at the permanent disposal of 
Great Britain […]” This follows an idea popular in the Labour Party whereby Britain 
might eventually reduce its strategic requirement for the island by having “bases in 
Cyprus” instead of “Cyprus as a base.” 29 Another eventual goal was guarantees of “the 
rights of the island’ populace, including “full protection for minorities.” The final goal 
was an assurance “that Cyprus would not be considered by the Government of Turkey as 
a threat to its security.”30  The last point suggests that the US was very aware of Turkish 
interests in Cyprus and was hoping to ward off any objections that Turkey might have to 
its proposals. Indeed, Vice-President Nixon, in his visit to Ankara in July, described 
Turkey’s “positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem,” adding that the 
Turkish Prime Minister “had gone so far to suggest that if Cyprus were joined to Greece, 
the Turks would go to war to prevent it.” The reason for this fear, the Vice-President 
explained, was the proximity of Cyprus to the Turkish mainland.31
 
 
                                                 
29  The original source for “bases in Cyprus” instead of “Cyprus as a base” formulation first appeared in a   
speech by Aneurin Bevan, the prominent Labour MP. The full context of the quote is as follows: “It is hard 
to discover whether the government wants Cyprus as a base, or whether they want a base in Cyprus. If the 
former is the case, then the discussions with Archbishop Makarios have been dishonest from the beginning. 
I can see no real conflict between Britain's strategic interests and the Cypriot desire for self-government. 
There is no justification for the Archbishop's deportation; it is essential to remember that persons whom we 
look on here as terrorists are looked on by their fellow nationals as patriots. Why does the Tory party keep 
deceiving itself? It is no use refusing to negotiate because they have been associated with violence - it is 
absurd when we consider the history of Ireland, “Gold Coast and India:”Parliamentary Debates, (House of 
Commons), March 14, 1956, col. 393. 
30  “Goals in the Cyprus Dispute,” undated, attached to Rountree to Dulles, Memorandum: FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXIV, 385. 
31 Nixon, quoted here in: Editorial Note: “290th N, Memorandum SC Meeting: Nixon Briefing on 
Discussion in Turkey,” July 12, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 378-379. 
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With respect to the procedural aspect of the proposals, the State Department thought the 
first step should be to have its “representative sound out the British” beginning with 
Ambassador Makins in Washington. If in his view, the British Government saw “merit in 
the plan,” an envoy should then proceed to London. If that meeting proved successful, he 
should then go to Athens. On August 22, the State Department suggested that Secretary 
Dulles’ visit to London might provide the occasion to “test Britain’s receptivity “to the 
Holmes plan. Department officials worried that the EOKA truce had lulled the British 
into believing that they could solve the problem without US help, and thus London might 
be in “no mood” to consider the American initiative. 32
 
     
Because the most vigorous opposition to the plan was likely to come from the Turks, the 
envoy needed to “line up his strongest arguments” for his meeting in Ankara.33 The State 
Department had anticipated Turkey would have strong apprehensions regarding the plan 
due to domestic political pressures. Consequently, it would be necessary to convince the 
Turks that Cyprus would not fall under the control of a “military hostile to Turkey” and 
also persuade them that because union with Greece was economically unsound, a 
plebiscite would not inevitably lead to such a decision.  Moreover, a guarantee for 
minority rights and the “ten-year cooling off period” prior to any decision in favor of 
enosis might also appeal to the Turks. Finally, the plan echoed Skouras’ earlier argument 
that Turkey needed to recognize that it was in the interest of the Western alliance to find 
a settlement for Cyprus.34
                                                 
32 Dulles, Tedul 19, August 22, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 8-2256, NARA.  
   Success for swaying the Turks lay in the belief that they were 
“realists” who would be inclined to accept the inevitability of a changing situation, as 
33 “Goals in Cyprus, “attached to Rountree to Dulles Memorandum: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXI, 387. 
34 Ibid., 388. 
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they had the previous winter when it looked as if the Harding-Makarios talks might 
actually succeed. According to the British Ambassador at Ankara, the Turkish attitude at 
that time was one of “grudging acceptance of a fait accompli.” 35
 
 The plan also included 
a provision for a US official to travel to the Seychelles to obtain the approval of the 
exiled Archbishop.   
On August 28 Greek Foreign Minister Averoff sent a telegram to Ambassador Thurston 
asking whether the US had plans to mediate between Greece and the UK in light of the 
EOKA ceasefire.  Although unable to go into the specifics of the impending plan, on 
September 3, Under Secretary Hoover wrote a personal letter to the Foreign Minister 
assuring him that the State Department was “considering the Cyprus question urgently.”36  
The following day, Assistant Secretary Rountree wrote a terse letter to Dulles stating that 
“experience has demonstrated that the mere dispatch of messages to the several parties in 
the dispute is not an effective means of dealing with the matter.” And that it would be 
more productive if “the United States should designate an experienced officer to go to 
London, Athens and Ankara to have talks quietly and informally […] and seek to find 
and widen such common ground as may form the basis for a solution” Simply stated, in 
light of increasing Turkish intransigence, Greek disillusionment, and Britain’s 
shortsightedness, the time was now right to introduce the Holmes Plan. At Rountree’s 
recommendation, Dulles designated Mr. Julius C. Holmes to be the officer in charge of 
the mission.37
 
   
                                                 
35 Memorandum from Holmes to Dulles, July 30, 1956, attached to ibid., 391. 
36 Hoover, Deptel Athens 855, etc., containing his letter to Averoff, September 3, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXIV, 396-397. 
37 Rountree to Dulles, Memorandum, September 4, 1956:ibid., 400. 
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The Secretary of State realized the urgency in acting quickly in order to not alienate 
Greece and to prevent, what could only be, an acrimonious third round at the UN. 
Although Ambassador Barbour noted that that Cyprus may not be as important as the 
Suez situation, he warned that the growing crisis in Suez “made progress in [the] Cyprus 
issue all the more necessary.”38 Two days later, President Eisenhower approved Holmes 
for the mission. Although he was instructed to “explore [the] Cyprus Problem secretly 
and at the highest level with Governments concerned,” he was cautioned not to attempt 
any formal mediation and to consider his task only an exploratory mission.39 Dulles’ 
cautionary note to Holmes that he would find progress on Cyprus “hindered more by lack 
of private communication than by lack of common ground” was wishful thinking.40
 
 As 
Holmes would soon discover, privacy would be the least of his problems. 
The British Embassy in Washington regarded the initiative favorably. The attitude of 
most officials in London, on the other hand, was generally non-committal. Although 
Lloyd assured Holmes that he would discuss the matter with other officials, it was clear 
that the British were far more concerned with what, if anything, the US would do to keep 
the Cyprus issue off the provisional UN agenda and support the proposed British 
inscription against Greece. 41
 
  
Officials in Washington were quick to grasp the advantage of linking the UN issue with 
the Holmes mission. Rountree proposed that the British should delay their inscription 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 403. 
39 Dulles to Holmes Deptel Paris 907, September 8, 1956: ibid., 403.    
40 Ibid., 404. 
41 Wood, Memcon, “British Request for Information regarding United States Position on Cyprus in the 
General Assembly”, September 26, 1956:  Ibid., 409. 
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against the Greeks and Dulles approved. In 1956, mostly as a result of the continual 
violence, world opinion was no longer favorable towards Cyprus. The British sought to 
use this to their advantage by launching their own UN appeal, arguing that Greece’s 
intervention in Cyprus was tantamount to supporting terrorism against HMG on the 
island.  
 
Rountree argued that Britain should delay its inscription and consider the benefits that 
might be derived if Holmes were to meet with the Greeks prior to the General Assembly 
meeting. The US feared that a showdown between Greece and the UK could only push 
the Cyprus issue further into the background and give the Soviet Union an opportunity to 
capitalize on disunity within the alliance.42
 
  
On October 1,  Sir Anthony Nutting, the British Minister of State for Foreign affairs, met 
with Holmes and approved his mission: “[…]as long as discussions were confined to self-
government on the basis of a liberal constitution with the issue of self determination 
‘indefinitely postponed’ although the principle itself [would be] reaffirmed.” Although 
London had taken the decision to present its inscription at the UN before October 2, 
Holmes was promised that no action would be taken before he had the opportunity to 
meet with the Greek Government and relay his findings to the London Embassy. 43
 
  
Holmes arrived in Athens on October 5 where he was warmly met by Karamanlis and 
Averoff. Although the Turkish position had toughened over the past year since the 
London Conference, the Greeks, on the other hand, seemed to be in a more conciliatory 
                                                 
42 Nicolet, United States Policy in Cyprus, 89. 
43 Aldrich to Dulles, Embtel London 1776, October 1, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 120.1540/10-156, NARA.  
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frame of mind. They appeared to be willing not only to grant the British more rights but 
also to delay the issue of self-determination “for a long time” and press Makarios into an 
agreement.44  The outcome of the meeting in Athens produced a document from the 
Greek to the British Government which stated that “regardless of the outcome [of the] 
plebiscite, UK military facilities” would be “guaranteed into perpetuity.” Moreover, 
Greece would grant NATO control of the “militarization” of the island and “accord 
Turkey and Britain generous economic privileges.” 45
 
  Of course Greece gave these 
guarantees confident that the plebiscite would be in its favor. 
Upon his return to London, Holmes found a “bewildered” Prime Minister Eden. Clearly 
irritated by American meddling, the Prime Minister refused to meet with Eisenhower’s 
emissary.46 Holmes’ meeting with Nutting and Kirkpatrick though less than enthusiastic 
was not entirely discouraging. It was apparent that both Greece and the UK would have 
their items inscribed on the agenda. But Holmes requested that the two countries place 
their items at the end. This would leave a window of two to three months which might 
just be enough time to find a way out if his mission proved successful.47
                                                 
44 Thurston to Dulles, Embtel Athens 1158: October 5, 1956:ibid., doc 120. 1540/10-556. There is also a 
portion of this document in: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 412-415.  
 It was evident by 
Britain’s delayed response to Holmes’s request that the Cyprus problem dwarfed in 
comparison to the looming crisis over the Suez Canal. When the British finally did 
respond a month later, the Greek proposals were rejected on the grounds that they “were 
less favorable” than the Britain’s June plan the previous year and that they did not 
contain “security pacts.” Holmes countered that he saw no reason why the Greeks would 
45 Thurston, Embtel Athens 1181, October 7, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 417. 
46 Eden quoted here in ibid.,, 157. 
47  Aldrich Embtel London 2280 October 8, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 418-420. 
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not be willing to amend this oversight, but it soon became apparent that Britain had 
“decided   not to attempt a negotiated solution at the present time but on the contrary 
intend to proceed unilaterally [with the Radcliffe Constitution]” maintaining that it was 
“better to take one step at a time” since it was anticipated that a “truly liberal 
constitution” would be unsatisfactory to the Turks. ”48
 
  
When Holmes then attempted to secure a promise to consult the Greeks and Turks prior 
to announcement of the Radcliffe proposals, He was told by Nutting that it would 
“probably be better to promulgate the constitution unilaterally, possibly with showing the 
texts to the Greeks and Turks an hour in advance.” 49
 
 Upon hearing this, Holmes 
concluded that meeting with the Turks would be pointless since it was clear that the 
British had already made the decision to proceed unilaterally rather than attempt a 
negotiated solution.  And with that, the Holmes Mission was abandoned.  
The Holmes mission was not so much a failure, as it was a casualty of Britain’s 
reluctance to fully commit to its implementation. Clearly Britain was not prepared to give 
support to an American initiative while it had a home-grown plan in the works in the 
form of a proposed Constitution by Radcliffe and more importantly was preoccupied with 
the threat of war in the Middle East. 50
                                                 
48  It is interesting to note that the belated British response was addressed to “Mister Juliet Holmes,” 
evidence that the British did not consider the Holmes mission to be a serious initiative: Aldrich Embtel 
London 2280, October 25, 1956: Ibid, 420-421. 
 Moreover, Britain’s confidence that it was on the 
49 Ibid., 421. 
50 Holmes was thoroughly convinced that the Suez crisis was the main obstacle to progress in the 
negotiating a settlement for Cyprus: “It is now clear at the time of my first substantive discussion with the 
British the decision had already been taken to intervene with the French in Egypt, and they were unwilling 
to discuss Cyprus which was their base for military operation,” Holmes to Hoover, Memorandum: “Report 
on the Cyprus Mission,” November 19, 1956:ibid., 434. 
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verge of finally defeating EOKA was also another likely factor for its decision to reject a 
negotiated settlement.    Although no decision had been taken to move forward with the 
constitution as of Holmes’s departure in November, during the summer of 1956, while 
Holmes was actively pursuing his mission, the British Ambassador Makins contacted the 
State Department and informed Dulles that his Government had “worked out a plan it 
hoped would be acceptable to Turkey” and that it wanted US support with Turkey and 
eventually with Greece.51
 
   
 
                                                 
51Greek Ambassador (Melas) to Secretary of State Dulles, Memcon, December 26, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 
747C.00/12-2156, NARA. 
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Chapter IX 
   
He (Eden) thought perhaps they ought to take it to the Security Council [....] I said 
'Supposing Nasser doesn't take any notice?' whereupon Selwyn Lloyd said 'Well, I 
suppose in that case the old-fashioned ultimatum will be necessary.' I said that I thought 
they ought to act quickly, whatever they did, and that as far as Great Britain was 
concerned, public opinion would almost certainly be behind them. But I also added that 
they must get America into line—Hugh Gaitskell to Anthony Eden 
 
The Suez Factor 
 
“Is that you Anthony? Well, this is President Eisenhower, and I can only presume that 
you have gone out of your mind!” These were the heated words reportedly shouted by 
Eisenhower in a trans-Atlantic phone call to the Downing Street office of Prime Minister 
Eden upon learning of the Anglo-French intervention in Suez. Eisenhower thought he had 
reached Anthony Eden, but it was actually his press secretary, William Clark, who took 
the call.1
 
   
When Anthony Eden and his French and Israeli counterparts, Guy Mollet, and David 
Ben-Gurion, gathered in a secret meeting in October to make a joint agreement to attack 
Egypt, Eden hoped for US support, or at least friendly indifference.2
                                                 
  
 He did not imagine 
1 Quoted in Martin Walker, “The Cold War: A History, (London: Macmillan, 1995), 100.  
2 The secret meetings ran from October 22-24 and the agreement reached between the three leaders was 
known as the Protocols of Sèvres, the existence of which was initially denied by Anthony Eden. 
Consequently, Eden sought to have any written record of the meeting expunged. The “Dean  
Memorandum,” was written by Sir Patrick Dean in 1978 at the behest of Lord Trend, the former Cabinet 
Secretary, subsequent to the publication of Selwyn Lloyd´s book on Suez. The memorandum gives  a 
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the Americans, who had come to blows politically with Nasser over Egypt’s recognition 
of China and its acceptance of Soviet arms, to present a serious problem. What Eden and 
his co-conspirators failed to understand was that while the US would like to have seen 
Nasser gone, it was opposed to doing it through military intervention until all other 
options were exhausted. Eisenhower was likely right on the mark with regard to Eden’s 
mental condition at the time, considering that the Prime Minister “was out of his depth, 
under intense stress, and gobbling amphetamines.”3  Whatever the Prime Minister’s state 
of mind, Britain’s part in the Suez misadventure would prove costly in that it would 
damage Anglo-American relations, bringing them to their lowest point since the 1920s.4
 
   
 In July 1945 Eisenhower cancelled a promised grant of $56 million towards the 
construction of the Answan Dam. In retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The 
shareholders, the majority of whom were British and French, were promised 
compensation. Nasser, however, reneged on the promise and announced that those 
revenues would instead be applied towards the Answan Dam project. Following Nasser’s 
nationalization of the canal, Eden wrote an exploratory letter to Eisenhower in an attempt 
to gain US support for a possible military excursion into Egypt arguing, “if we take a 
                                                                                                                                                 
comprehensive account of the meeting that occurred in Sèvres on October 24, 1956 and the consequent 
visit to the Quai D´Orsay on the following day: "the sequel of the meeting [Sèvres] was even more 
remarkable. Eden was dismayed that any written documents existed, and ordered Dean and Logan to return 
to Paris on the 25th to destroy the record. They were left for several hours by themselves, inside locked 
doors, in the Quai D´Orsay while the request was being considered. They were eventually told by Pineau 
that the request had been refused and a copy was already on its way to Israel… At Eden´s insistence, the 
British copy of the ´Protocol´ was sent from the Foreign Office to 10 Downing Street, and has not survived. 
The others have:" “Dean Memorandum,” FCO 73/20, Historical Manuscripts Commission, National 
Archives, UK. 
3  Quoted in ibid., 100. Eden’s “stimulant” use was likely a consequence of his many surgeries for a liver 
ailment. Eden himself, made reference to his amphetamine dependency during the Suez crisis when he 
tendered his resignation in January 1957 saying, “I do not think I should be serving the best interests of my 
colleagues or of the country if I were to continue in my present condition:” R.R. James, Anthony Eden,  
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 397. 
4 For a comprehensive look at Anglo-American relations in the 1920s see B.J.C. McKercher, Anglo-
American Relations in the 1920s: the Struggle for Supremacy, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd. 1990). 
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firm stand over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime Powers. If we do 
not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be 
finally destroyed.”5
 
  In response, Eisenhower cautioned against using military force and 
expressed the conviction that the region could be secured by more peaceful means:  
We recognize the transcendent worth of the Canal to the free world and the possibility that eventually the 
use of force might become necessary in order to protect international rights. But we have been hopeful that 
through a Conference in which would be represented the signatories to the Convention of 1888, as well as 
other maritime nations, there would be brought about such pressures on the Egyptian Government that the 
efficient operation of the Canal could be assured for the future. For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the 
strength of my conviction that some such method must be attempted before action such as you contemplate 
should be undertaken. If unfortunately the situation can finally be resolved only by drastic means, there 
should be no grounds for belief anywhere that corrective measures were undertaken merely to protect 
national or individual investors, or the legal rights of a sovereign nation were ruthlessly flouted. A 
conference, at the very least, should have a great education effort throughout the world. Public opinion 
here, and I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such 
efforts. Moreover, initial military successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become far too 
heavy.6
 
 
Despite Eisenhower’s words of caution, the British Government had made the “firm 
decision” to drive Nasser out of Egypt, and that military intervention was necessary to 
achieve this aim. Eisenhower was simply not prepared to link the seizure of the Canal 
with the threat from the Soviet Union.  While they hoped for US assistance, it was 
apparent that Britain was prepared to proceed with this objective with or without 
Washington’s support. 7
  
   
                                                 
5  Eden to  Eisenhower , Letter July 27, 1956: in Peter G. Boyle ed., The Eden-Eisenhower 
Correspondence, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 146; Guy Millard, Eden’s private 
secretary and author of a detailed history of the period, believed that it was a mistake for Britain to tackle 
both the question of the Canal and the Nasser regime at the same time. This was also the conclusion of the 
US: “Memorandum on Relations between the United Kingdom, the United States and France in the months 
following Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956:”CAB, 21/3314, October 21, 1957. 
6 Eisenhower to Eden, Letter, August 1, 1956: Ibid., 148. 
7 In private meetings with Murphy and Barbour, Eden and Macmillan went so far as to draw a parallel 
between the US’s reluctance to enter WWII and its absence of support for the British plans for the Suez. 
According to Barbour, Eden and Macmillan maintained that if the US “had been with them from the 
beginning, chances of WWII would [have been] far less than if [the US] had not delayed:” Barbour, Embtel 
London 550, July 31, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XVI, 61. 
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Although the Americans had not been completely oblivious to the deployment of forces 
in Valetta and Cyprus, they were still shocked by Britain’s participation in the reckless 
excursion in the Suez.8 In the aftermath, France moved towards challenging US 
supremacy whenever and wherever it could. Britain on the other hand, was anxious to 
rebuild its tattered relations with the Americans. But the damage was profound enough to 
poison the atmosphere between Britain and the US, and relations between them would 
not improve until Nutting, Kirkpatrick, and Eden himself were eventually replaced within 
the British administration.9
 
 The Suez excursion marked the end of Britain’s hegemony in 
the Middle East. Anthony Eden’s January 1977 obituary in the Times put it best: “Eden 
was the last Prime Minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront 
a crisis that proved it was not.”  
With regard to Cyprus, the island provided a staging point for the Anglo-French initiative 
known as “Operation Musketeer,” the British the invasion of Egypt. This operation was 
organized in tandem with “Operation Kadesh,” the Israeli move into the Sinai. The Israeli 
maneuver consisted of a large-scale attack on Egyptian forces following a move towards 
the Canal Zone. On Cyprus, large forces were deployed in support of the invasion. This 
military buildup had unintended consequences for the British, however, in that it 
                                                 
8 For a fuller explanation of the US position with regard to Britain’s planned excursion see, Appendix 5. 
9 The Suez debacle resulted in the US suspension of aid to Israel in protest against the invasion of Egypt on 
October 30. The following day, Dulles criticized Britain and France for its attempt to take the Suez Canal 
by force. On the domestic front, Eden was the target of sharp criticism as well. On November 1, William 
Yates, a Conservative MP interrupted a point of order saying, "I have come to the conclusion that Her 
Majesty's Government has been involved in an international conspiracy." The same day, representatives 
from the US and the Soviet Union at the United Nations jointly issued a demand for a cease-fire. The 
British and French vetoed a cease-fire in the Security Council but the General Assembly passed it by a vote 
of 64-5 vote. Faced with a united front, the governments of Britain, France, and Israel agreed to a 
withdrawal and were replaced by UN peacekeepers: Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 84-87, 144.  
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provided EOKA with plentiful new targets, evident by a drastic increase in casualties 
among British personnel between September and the end of 1956. 10
 
  
The Shadow of Partition 
 
If the time had not been right for the American-sponsored Holmes mission, prospects 
were not much better for Lord Radcliffe’s proposals.11
 
  The announcement that the 
proposals would be made public had been issued weeks in advance, and it was 
anticipated that emotions would be running high regarding the Greek and British items 
inscribed at upcoming UN debate. The British, eager to dial down tensions with the US 
following the Suez fiasco, realized they could no longer delay presenting the proposals to 
the interested parties.  Hence, at the urging of the State Department, they reluctantly 
agreed to give copies of the proposed Constitution to Greece, Turkey, and the US in 
advance of the official publication.  
State Department reaction to the Radcliffe proposals was ambivalent. While officials 
noted they contained some “good features,” 12 it was apparent that they were little more 
than an attempt to maintain what the British in India used to call their paramountcy. 13
                                                 
10  Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The Suez Crisis, Cyprus and Greek Foreign Policy, 1956: a View from the 
British Archives,” Balkan Studies 30 (1989), 107-129; 122-126.  
 
The proposals, which were officially submitted in December, granted broad discretionary 
powers to the Governor, including control of defense, foreign affairs, and internal 
security, giving him an irrevocable veto over all legislation. The power to amend the 
Constitution was vested in the Crown rather than in the Legislative Assembly. It also 
11 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 92. 
12 Melas to Dulles, Memcon, December 26, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 340. 
13 “Proposed Constitution,” Time, December 31, 1956. 
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made a provision that ten members of the Legislative Assembly could constitute a 
quorum. This granted the twelve Turkish Cypriot members the power to legislate should 
the Greek majority be absent from or boycott any proceedings. Although the proposals 
did include an option at some indeterminate time in the future for self-determination, they 
made no substantial concession to the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination, 
which in all likelihood, would translate into union with Greece.14
 
 To have done so would 
have further inflamed the hard-line Suez backbenchers in Parliament and threatened the 
Eden Government.  
There was also one final lesson to be drawn from Britain’s failed excursion in Egypt 
which concerned the utility of Cyprus as a base for military operations.  In an article in 
the London Sunday Times, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote: "unless I, as a 
soldier, am grossly at fault in my estimate of Cyprus [...] it has none or practically none 
of the requisites of an efficient military base.” Undaunted by this argument, Lennox-
Boyd doggedly held to the official government line that Cyprus remained strategically 
important and that a move towards self-determination must be postponed.  Moreover, if 
the Greek Cypriots continued to call for enosis, the “inevitable” result would be the 
partition of the island into Greek and Turkish zones. He went to say that “any exercise of 
self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot 
community […] shall be given freedom to decide for themselves their status.” 15
                                                 
14 A complete copy of the Radcliffe Constitution is found in Glafkos Clerides’s Cyprus: My Deposition, I, 
(Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989-1992), 331-384. 
 This 
statement represents a turning point for British rule in Cyprus in that it explicitly 
15 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) : “Cyprus (Lord Radcliffe’s Proposals), December 19, 
1956, 562, col.1272; Indeed, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes not only found the Radcliffe 
Constitution “logical material for negotiation,” but also termed Lennox-Boyd's  talk of partition "an 
interesting, attractive idea.” Quoted in “Proposed Constitution,” Time, December 31, 1956. 
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recognized a separate right to self-determination for Turkish Cypriots.  From this time 
foreword, Turkey would now have a say in the future of the island.  
 
The consensus of the State Department was that, not only would Greece reject the 
proposals, but also that it might be dangerous for the US to endorse them, leaving the US 
open “to accusations of supporting British colonialism.”16 Still, the acceptance or 
rejection of the proposals did not revolve around the substance of the proposed 
constitution. The crucial element lay in what Turkey believed was the promise of 
partition.  Lennox- Boyd’s statement in Parliament had raised expectations in Turkey that 
the two countries were of the same mind regarding partition. According to Holland, the 
double self-determination option was added at the last minute at the behest of the Turkish 
Government after Lennox-Boyd had indicated that the wishes of the Menderes 
Government would be given special consideration and included in the official 
announcement.17
 
  
In the interim, the British  Defence Committee had concluded, in a November 29 
meeting, that the Suez affair underlined the need to keep the island in intact saying that, 
the “association of […] other countries, particularly Turkey, with Cyprus as a military 
base would make it easier to resist the Greek claim to sovereignty over the island.” 
Similarly, on the following day, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) reviewed the situation and 
determined that there was “an overwhelming military argument against partition.” 18
                                                 
16 J.D. Iams to Wood, Memorandum, December 19, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-1956, NARA. 
 Still 
another high British official insisted that "partition could never work because [. . .] you 
17 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 166-167. 
18 Quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 92. 
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would have to shift whole villages. There is no one area where Turks predominate." 19
 
  
Although all assessments pointed to partition as running counter to British interests, they 
appeared willing to take that risk rather than compromise their colonial authority. HMG 
was determined to force Greece’s hand: either accept Britain’s sovereignty over the 
island or risk partition. The latter, of course, would forever rule out any prospect for 
enosis.  
Meanwhile, in a meeting in Paris on December 13, Menderes emphasized to Dulles the 
importance of settling the self-determination question in the immediate future, saying that 
“if left open it, would only cause trouble for future, and Turkish people would think 
Greece had received a gift.” The Prime Minister went on to say that “Turkey would 
accept the Radcliffe proposal as [a] draft, provided it understood at the same time that 
when self-determination [was] implemented it, would be through partition.” For his part, 
the Secretary did not share the Turkish and British views that partition should be included 
in an immediate solution for Cyprus. Dulles recognized the need to move forward with 
the Radcliffe proposals and he hoped that Turkey would view them favorably in the 
instant and leave the question of partition for a future time.20
 
  
The Greeks, on the other hand, were far less enthusiastic regarding the Radcliffe scheme. 
On December 14, Dulles was approached by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff, who 
expressed his government’s disappointment towards the British report for a Cyprus 
Constitution. He was especially troubled by the reserved plenary powers that would be 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Time, Ibid. 
20 Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 20, December 14, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 437. 
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vested in the Governor.21 Dulles then asked how the Greek Government viewed partition 
of the island and was told that “they [the Greeks] were giving some sympathetic study to 
that possibility.”22
 
 
 Notwithstanding Dulles’ views, the partition option, along with population transfers, had 
some currency in certain circles, not only in the UK, but also in the US.  One of the first 
to entertain the notion was none other than Eisenhower, himself. According to Dulles, on 
June 7, “in the course of a somewhat rambling discussion,” the President speculated 
“whether it was feasible to separate the Turkish population from the Greek,” by moving 
the Turkish Cypriots to the Northern part of the island. Dulles countered by telling the 
President that the idea was not practical because “they [the Turkish Cypriots] were 
working in the mines and were part of the general life of the island.” Eisenhower’s 
suggestion for a line of demarcation in the North, however, would prove to be more 
prescient than he could have realized at the time.23
 
  
At the end of June, the Foreign Office decided to undertake a closer examination of the 
feasibility of partition. Kirkpatrick, especially, became fixed with the idea, believing it to 
be the only viable course for the conflict. He proposed to have a line drawn north, east of 
Limassol, which would result in the transfer of about 60,000 persons.  In the US, the 
reaction to this proposal was generally unfavorable. Dulles, the ambassadors to London 
and Turkey, along with the consul in Cyprus pointed out the social, political, economic, 
                                                 
21 Upon reading the Radcliffe Constitution Averoff remarked to Holmes that in order for it to work “the 
governor would have to be a saint as so much power was reserved in him:” SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12 1456, 
NARA. 
22 Editorial note:  FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 438. 
23 Dulles to Eisenhower, June 7, 1956: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, “Meetings with the President,” 
White House Memoranda Series, DDE-Library; Editorial note, FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 365. 
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and strategic reasons against partition. Citing the examples of Germany, Korea, Vietnam, 
and especially Palestine, they further argued that partition, in general, had yet to yield a 
satisfactory result.24  Despite State Department reservations, some in the US Embassy in 
London were sympathetic to Britain’s stance on partition “not on its merits, but as a tactic 
to encourage support on [the] island for self-government,”25 in other words, as a means, 
to sate the Greek appetite for enosis. Dulles, however, still remained unconvinced and 
troubled by this course of action.26
 
  
It was only after it was learned that some Greek officials, namely Averoff, were willing 
to consider the idea of partition that the State Department re-evaluated its position, 27 but 
only then as “a desperate solution of last resort.”28 Although it should not be encouraged, 
officials reasoned that it might prove useful as a means to persuade Turkey and Greece to 
moderate their present positions.29
 
 
While it is true that the Greeks objected to partition as presented in the Radcliffe 
Proposals, they also indicated that they might not be entirely hostile to the idea.30
                                                 
24 Dulles, Deptel Nicosia 16, etc., July 20, 1956:SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-2056, NARA; Warren to Dulles, 
Embtel Ankara 131, July 17, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/7-1756; Foster to Dulles, Embtel London 377, July 
21, 1956; ibid., doc. 747C.00/7 2156. 
  Indeed, 
Foreign Minister Averoff had told Dulles in a meeting in December that “if the Turks 
25 Foster to Dulles, Embtel 377, July 21, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/7-2156, NARA. 
26 Aldrich to Dulles, Embtel London 1055, August 24, 1956:ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-2456, NARA. 
27  Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 20, December 14, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 437. 
28 Owen T. Jones, Director of the Office of GTI, to James Lampton Berry, Deputy Assistant  Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Memorandum: “Cyprus Partition Proposal,” 
September 18, 1956:ibid, doc. 747C.00/9-1856, NARA. 
29 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 1632, November 7, 1956:ibid., doc. 120.1540/11-756, NARA: Quoted 
here in Nicolet, ibid., 93.  
30 Despite evidence to the contrary, in his memoirs Averoff denied that he ever endorsed the idea of 
partition:  Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Lost Opportunities, The Cyprus Question, 1950–1963, translated 
from Greek by T. Cullen and S. Kyriakidis (New York: New Rochelle: 1986), 142-145. 
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wanted partition, the Greeks would be willing to consider that.”31  While it is difficult to 
imagine that the Greek offer for partition was a serious one— assuming that it was— the 
plan might go accordingly:  the Greek Cypriots would be presented with partition as one 
possible option in a plebiscite. Since the Cypriot population would vote en masse on the 
question of self-determination, it was a foregone conclusion that the partition option 
would never pass—given that the Turkish Cypriots constituted only eighteen percent and 
it would take thirty-two percent of the rest of the population to achieve a majority. 
Considering that Greece would insist in the coming years that it wanted Cyprus to decide 
its own course; if the majority “wanted partition, then partition it should be.” 32  But even 
if this came to be the only viable solution, as Nicolet noted, “the devil would be in the 
detail.”33
 
 
The Greek line of demarcation for partitioning the island, however, was significantly 
different than the one proposed by Kirkpatrick or Eisenhower. Averoff told Holmes in 
early November that he envisioned the line to be drawn from Larnaca to the northern 
coast. This would leave only a small portion of the eastern part off the island to the 
Turkish Cypriots. This division, of course, would never be acceptable to the Turks.34
  
  
Britain and Turkey, however, had another plan. Unsatisfied with mere partition, the two 
countries wanted the option of double self-determination in which the Turkish Cypriots 
would be free to decide their own course. This would pose a grave problem if the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots were allowed to vote separately in that it was possible for the 
                                                 
31  Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 20, December 14, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 437. 
32  Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 81-82. 
33 Nicolet, ibid., 92. 
34 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 81-82. 
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Turkish minority to decide the fate of the entire island. In other words, a relatively small 
part of the electorate could impose its will on the majority and partition the island against 
the will of the Greek Cypriots. Although both the Greeks and Turks seemed somewhat 
amenable to the idea of dividing the island, it was clear that the two sides would never be 
able to agree on where the line should be drawn.  35
 
  
In the end, Turkey accepted the proposals while the Greeks rejected them. Averoff 
denounced them as "illiberal and undemocratic" and followed by pressing a Greek 
demand for a U.N. debate on self-determination for Cyprus. The political class on Cyprus 
took a similar view, and even if they were so inclined, none was willing to openly support 
them. Although politically, he could afford to do so, true to form, Makarios refused to 
endorse the British initiative while still in exile.36
 
  
On December 19, the State Department informed the Embassies in Athens, Ankara, and 
London that the British Foreign Secretary had requested that the US issue a statement in 
support of the Radcliffe Proposals. The British believed that such a statement would go a 
long way in helping Greece with regard to public opinion and allow it to have a greater 
flexibility towards the proposals.  On December 27, when a statement finally came, it 
was crafted in such a manner as to appear non-committal as to avoid alienating the parties 
involved: 
 
 
The United States has noted with sympathetic interest the long and earnest labors of Lord Radcliffe to find 
a formula for self-government for Cyprus. The making by the United Kingdom of proposals for self-
government could be the first step towards an eventual, peaceful and generally acceptable final solution of 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36  Quoted in Time, “Proposed Constititution.”  
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the Cyprus problem. The formula now produced by Lord Radcliffe seems to be unacceptable in certain 
respects by some who are concerned with the matter. Nevertheless, the United States still hopes that our 
three allies who together with the people of Cyprus, are deeply concerned with this issue will strive to agree 
upon a solution which is so important to themselves and the entire free world.37
 
 
  
On December 29, Averoff, on instructions from Karamanlis, called on Ambassador Allen 
in Athens to register a “strong but friendly protest” in response to the statement on the 
grounds that the United States “had taken sides with Turkey and the United Kingdom 
against Greece.” According to the Foreign Minister, the statement had caused “great 
embarrassment” to Karamanlis. Allen responded by saying that he personally opposed the 
statement, but if every nation protested whenever they had differences, “we would spend 
all our days protesting.”38
 
 
When pressed for the reason for their opposition, the Greeks charged the statement was  
biased against them because Ambassador Melas suggested that Turkey be included as an 
interested party, a rather feeble claim given that Greece had already discussed Cyprus 
with Turkey during the Holmes mission. In a conversation with Averoff on January 18, 
Dulles expressed surprise that Greece had interpreted the statement as an endorsement of 
the Radcliffe Proposals since the US neither mentioned adherence to them nor demanded 
that they be the basis for further discussion. Dulles explained to the Foreign Minister that 
the US did not endorse the proposals and that endorsement had not been the intent of the 
statement.39
 
  
                                                 
37 “US Views on the UK Proposals for Self-Government for Cyprus: Statement Made by the Acting Chief 
of the News Division, Department of State, “January 14, 1957: Department of State Bulletin, 54. 
38  Allen, Embtel Athens 2324, December 29, 1956: SDCDF, 747C. 00/12- 2956, NARA. 
39  Editorial Note referencing Embtel Athens 2324, December 29, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 441. 
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Both Britain and Greece were disappointed with the US response. While Britain had 
sought US support in order to pressure Greece into accepting the Radcliffe proposals, 
Greece trotted out its usual litany of doom and gloom predictions should the US fail to 
support its position, not only here, but also in the upcoming UN debate.40  Clearly the big 
winner in 1956 was Turkey, which saw its position strengthened by Britain’s pledge of 
double self-determination in its December statement, though London and Ankara had a 
different understanding as to what the statement meant. Turkey believed that it had 
reached an agreement with Britain to accept self-determination in return for British 
acceptance of partition.41
 
 This difference in interpretation would come back to haunt 
Britain in future negotiation with Turkey over Cyprus. 
                                                 
40   Memcon between Dulles and Caccia, December 21, 1956:ibid., 439-440;  1956 Allen, Embtel Athens 
2632, January 28, 1957:ibid., 442;  
41 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 89. 
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Chapter X 
 
 
 
 Further UN Negotiations 
 
As the date of the forthcoming UN debate grew near, Britain remained anxious to avoid a 
debate on Cyprus in the General Assembly. Inscription of the Greek item had been 
avoided the previous year, due mainly to the support Britain had received from the 
Americans. And the British were again seeking US support this time around. If the US 
was unable to do this, Ambassador Makins suggested to Dulles that HMG might inscribe 
its own item on the Agenda demonstrating the Greek Government’s role in inciting 
violence on Cyprus.1 Although Dulles could not tell Makins exactly what the American 
position would be, he did conclude that “it was not wise to campaign against the 
inscription of the Cyprus question unless there was a chance of success.”2
 
      
 While the US also wanted to avoid having Cyprus issue aired in the UN, the State 
Department worried that this time there might be increased support for Greece due to 
changes in the composition of the General Assembly.  The US needed to walk a fine line 
so as not to be perceived as playing favorites, thus alienating not only the concerned 
parties, but other nations sympathetic to the Greek position.3
                                                 
1  Wood, Memcon, “British Request for Information regarding US Position on Cyprus in the General 
Assembly, “September 26, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 407. 
  Consequently, it was not 
surprising when the Americans rejected the suggestion by Greece to set up a committee 
2  Addendum to Wood, Memcon, October 2, 1956: SDCDF, lot 64, D 199, NARA.  
3 Wood, Memcon, “British Request for Information regarding US Position on Cyprus in the General 
Assembly, “September 26, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 408. 
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within the UN to investigate the problem. A suggestion by India for a resolution calling 
for the independence of Cyprus had similarly been opposed. The US feared that both 
suggestions would open the way for Soviet meddling which could prove even more 
detrimental to US interests than the present impasse. 4
 
   
The US was anxious to maintain control over Greek maneuvers in the UN and avert any 
proposals that might be deemed unacceptable to Britain and Turkey.  In order to 
accomplish this, the Americans decided to initiate discussions on the basis of a draft 
resolution with a view towards direct negotiations between the British and the Cypriots. 
Although the resolution called for the “renewal of direct negotiations” between the two 
parties, it did not “commit the US to any controversial ‘solutions.’” In other words, there 
would be no discussion of independence or partition. The resolution’s principal aim was 
to persuade the UK to negotiate a settlement with Cyprus without any “substantive UN 
involvement” or participation by Greece and Turkey.5
 
    
London, however, was less than enthusiastic towards the American resolution because it 
would involve the release of Makarios, thus suggesting that the British policy of the past 
several months had been seriously misguided. While sympathetic to British sensitivities, 
the State Department was growing frustrated and concerned by the lack of progress 
towards the Cyprus issue. It concluded that the situation was worsening and that no 
advancement was possible without the active participation of the Archbishop.  
                                                 
4 Marselis C. Parsons, Jr. (BNA) to C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs, Memorandum: “Situation Regarding Cyprus,” January 16, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1657, 
NARA. 
5 Dulles, Deptel London 5201, January 28, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 443. 
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Consequently, Dulles instructed the Embassy in London to convey the following message 
to HMG:  
We realize HMG does not wish [to] release Makarios from Seychelles until he condemns violence, but it is 
now 22 months since violence started, 10 months since Makarios [was] deported and many more months 
may be required [to] restore law and order. Meanwhile continuation [of] violence will inevitably cause 
furthering hardening and distrust on both sides rendering eventual achievement [of] any understanding 
increasingly difficult. We therefore urge HMG [to] seriously consider resumption [of] talks with Makarios 
and leaders of other Cypriot groups […] 6
 
 
 
In a State Department cable to the UN delegation, Dulles made his frustration with the 
matter clear while emphasizing where American priorities ultimately lay:  
 
In our view major issues of preserving NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of [the] 
Mediterranean are being subordinated to [the] lesser issue of Cyprus and more narrow interest of three 
parties concerned therewith. Unless and until all parties recognize [the] magnitude of peril involved in 
continuation of Cyprus stalemate and are prepared [to] make necessary compromises, US efforts towards 
finding a solution will continue [to] be frustrated.7
 
 
Accordingly, the State Department concluded that it could not “without jeopardy to more 
important considerations” actively support any proposals submitted by any of the parties 
involved. It was also emphasized that the US would vote against any “condemnatory 
resolution” by the British, such as criticism of the Greek Government by the British for 
meddling in Cyprus. Furthermore, given the British and Turkish opposition towards any 
resolution calling for “immediate self-determination,” the US would abstain from any 
such resolution regarding this matter and instead focus its energies on preventing further 
antagonism between Greece and the UK. From this time forward US policy would be 
“mainly governed by the continued desire to keep the debate in low key and minimize 
[its] involvement in Cyprus.” 8
                                                 
6 Ibid, 444. 
 The desire to keep the Cyprus issue manageable and 
placate the involved parties reflected the thinking expressed in the State Department 
7 Dulles, Deptel USUN 619, February 12, 1957: ibid., 451. 
8 Ibid. 
 144 
memorandum issued a few weeks earlier calling for the seemingly impossible objective 
to find a “solution on which all parties could agree.”9
  
  
Meanwhile, the Greeks refused come to terms with US objections to their proposal for 
setting up a UN committee to investigate the Cyprus issue. Aware of the effect that 
Cyprus was having on Greek domestic public opinion, a decision was taken to at least 
pay lip-service to the Greek desire for British-Cypriot negotiations.  The British, on the 
other hand, were livid when they learned that the US would vote against their resolution 
to censure Greece for its support of terrorism. In a message to Dulles in early February, 
Foreign Secretary Lloyd expressed concern about the effect the forthcoming debate 
would have upon Anglo-American relations. He also let it be known that London would 
not look kindly upon the absence of US support in this matter: 
 
The fact of Greek support for terrorism is generally acknowledged here…Therefore if the United States 
[should] vote against a Resolution calling for the cessation of Greek activities, it will be regarded here as an 
unfriendly act and will cause most unfavorable comment…I do hope that the United States Delegation will 
make it clear beyond doubt in the course of the debate that the United States Government does not condone 
the Greek behaviour and urges that it should stop.10
 
 
In a telephone conversation from Dulles to Rountree on February 10 regarding the 
possible implications of Lloyd’s message, Dulles commented that the Foreign Secretary’s 
                                                 
9 Parsons to Ebrick, Memorandum: “Situation Regarding Cyprus,” January 16, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 
747C.00/1-1657, NARA; Nicolet rightly points out that it is at this juncture where the pattern of American 
policy towards Cyprus was set. Indeed, except for some notable interruptions in the mid 60s, this 
conciliatory attitude continues to inform US policy to present day, see Nicolet, United States Policy 
Towards Cyprus, 95. 
10 Lloyd to Dulles, Message, February 8, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 445. 
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“unfriendly act” comment sounded like something that would be said “when you are 
going to war with someone.” 11
 
  
This was only one of many indications of the strained diplomacy that existed between the 
US and Britain in the post-Suez climate. The Americans realized that if they were to 
move beyond the Suez debacle and have a constructive role in the Cyprus issue, they 
needed to prevent further deterioration of the “special relationship.”  Consequently, 
Washington decided to shelve its resolution for negotiations with the Cypriots since it 
“did not want to run heads-on into the British at this point.”12  The State Department also 
considered the possibility of abstaining from all resolutions with “substantive 
implications” rather than risk making the UN a forum for airing US-Anglo differences.”13
 
   
Help came in the form of an Indian resolution presented by V.K. Krishna Menon on 
February 26, who introduced an Algeria-style compromise resolution calling vaguely for 
negotiations "in accord with the principles [...] of the UN Charter." With the exception of 
Afghanistan and Panama, both of whom abstained, every member of the General 
Assembly pounced, 76 to 0, on the opportunity to “sweep Cyprus back under the 
carpet.”14
                                                 
11 Dulles to Rountree, Telcon, February 10, 1957: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1959, Telephone 
Conversations Series, Memoranda Telephone Conversations—January 1957 to February 1957, DDE-
Library. 
 The Indian resolution pre-empted what promised to be an emotional and 
contentious showdown for all involved for which everyone was grateful.  The resolution 
12 Quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 96. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Menon was easily the most unpopular delegate at the UN. His eight hour speech defending India’s 
position on Kashmir holds the record as the longest ever delivered in the United Nations Security Council. 
He was generally regarded as patronizing and arrogant and was actively disliked by President Eisenhower.  
Menon, upon learning of Afghanistan’s abstention mused, "well, they have a somewhat similar quarrel with 
Pakistan. As for Panama, I guess I was rude to the Panamanian delegate." Quoted in “Subdued Quarrel,” 
Time, March 4, 1957. 
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included a note by the General Assembly, which expressed the hope for “a peaceful, 
democratic, and just solution” for the Cyprus issue. It also included a call for “continued 
negotiations” to achieve this end.15
 
  Devoid of particulars, the resolution satisfied 
everyone in that it left open the question as to which parties would be involved in any 
future discussions.  
The Bermuda Conference and the Return of Makarios 
 
In January 1957, Eisenhower invited Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to a meeting 
designed to restore confidence in US and Britain relations after the Suez adventure, and 
reaffirm British support for US policies where both countries had parallel interests 16 The 
Bermuda Conference, which was held between March 20-24, was intended to publicly 
demonstrate that the “special relationship” was still alive and well, and to provide an 
opportunity for the two leaders to privately air their differences over Middle East 
affairs.17
 
 Eisenhower and Macmillan were old friends who had served together in North 
Africa during World War II so, on a personal level, the prospect for a productive meeting 
was good. 
                                                 
15 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, 121-124. 
16 Harold Macmillan who became Prime Minister on January 10, 1957 had expressed his regret to Dulles as 
early as December for having to support Eden’s Suez policy and presents himself as the victim of Eden’s 
seemingly reckless actions. In his memoir, however, Macmillan paints an entirely different picture, 
describing himself as a staunch defender of Eden’s policies while attacking Dulles for not supporting 
Britain and taking the issue to the UN. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s diaries reinforce his unfavorable 
attitude toward the Secretary of State, describing him as “the most dunder-headed man alive" and charging 
that, “under his direction, the US was an "impatient, mercurial, panicky" ally:” cf, Dulles Memorandum for 
the Record, December 12, 1956: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1959, General Coresp. and Memoranda 
Series , Gen. L-M, DDE-Library; Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1971), 158;  The Macmillan Diaries,  The Cabinet Years 1950-1957 , 
Peter Catterall, ed., (London: Macmillan, 2003), 432. 
17 Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs, “Bermuda Meetings, March 21-24, 1957,” 
February 13, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 693. 
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Among other things, Eisenhower urged Macmillan to set aside Britain’s animosity toward 
Egyptian President Nasser and appreciate that restoring relations with Egypt while 
working to isolate Nasser internationally would be more conducive to Anglo-American 
interests in the region than outright hostility. Eisenhower and Dulles also pressed the 
British to consider Saudi Arabia's King Saud as a counterweight to Nasser. The British, 
however, were not ready to relinquish their claims against Egypt, but they did express 
their willingness to support the Saudi King, as well as an understanding on security 
issues.18 Regarding Cyprus, the Bermuda Conference was important in that it was the 
occasion for the decision to return Makarios from exile.19
 
 
It is not clear how big a role Eisenhower played in convincing the British to release the 
Archbishop, but there are strong indications that American pressure was a key factor in 
London making a major gesture of conciliation towards Makarios by agreeing ”to  put the 
most charitable interpretation on [Makarios’ statement] and to let him free.” 20
                                                 
18 Ibid., 714. 
 Following 
the offer from EOKA for a ceasefire in Mid-March, Makarios was invited to issue a 
statement calling for an end to violence. The Archbishop obliged after a fashion: "I 
appeal to EOKA to declare the cessation of all operations, provided that the British 
government show a spirit of understanding by simultaneously abolishing the present state 
19 President Eisenhower commented that he had “received many representations[…]emphasizing that if 
Makarios were returned to Cyprus, real progress towards a solution of the present problem could start:” 
Memcon, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, between the Delegations of the US and the UK, March 21, 1957: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, 465; Lennox-Boyd indicated that the British “were prepared to release Makarios 
if he agreed to renounce the use of terrorism:” ”Colonial Secretary’s Statements”, RIIA, 1957, 411-412. 
20 In a cabinet meeting on March 29, Dulles made the observation that the Archbishop’s release “may have 
resulted finally from the presentation the President made to Prime Minister Macmillan:” L.Arthur Minnich 
Jr., Assistant Staff Secretary to the President, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 29, 1957: Ann Whitman 
File Cabinet Series, Cabinet Meeting of March 29, 1957, DDE-Library; Dulles, Memorandum for the 
Record, March 23, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 467. 
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of emergency [in Cyprus]." He also insisted that negotiations regarding the island's future 
should be between Britain and "the Cyprus people."21
 
  
When Macmillan returned to London on March 27, the primary concern was how to 
induce parliament into supporting the release of Makarios despite his refusal to explicitly 
renounce violence.  The Archbishop’s response threatened to split Parliament, where the 
Conservatives were less apt to support the decision on these terms. Edward Heath, 
Government Chief Whip in the House of Commons, warned the Cabinet that he could not 
guarantee Conservative support if Makarios were released under these circumstances.  
Lord Salisbury, argued that Makarios had "deliberately refrained" from meeting Britain's 
conditions for his release.22
 
 
In a statement to the House of Commons a few days later, Lennox-Boyd explained "while 
Her Majesty's Government cannot regard [Makarios' statement] as the clear appeal for 
which they asked, nevertheless they consider that in the present circumstances it is no 
longer necessary to continue the Archbishop's detention." Lennox-Boyd added that 
although the Government would not allow for the return of the Archbishop to Cyprus 
itself, nor would it abide by his demand for immediate lifting of the state of emergency 
on the island, it would "obviously" allow Makarios to participate in future discussions on 
the status of Cyprus.23
                                                 
21 “Quoted in “The Hanging Sword,” Time, April 8, 1957. 
 Although the Archbishop’s statement could not be interpreted as 
unambiguous, it satisfied the British enough to grant Makarios a conditional release to 
Athens. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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For its part, the US had never approved of Makarios’ deportation. From the start, the 
State Department had tried to persuade the British to release him and renew negotiations. 
State Department officials remained steadfast in their view that the path to a solution 
could not be achieved without the Archbishop.24  As early as September 1956, Lennox-
Boyd had confided to Holmes that Makarios’ exile “was never intended to be 
permanent.” And even if he “failed to denounce terrorism,” he would still be free to go 
wherever he chose—except for Cyprus of course.25
 
  
Elsewhere and in Cyprus, news of the decision to release Makarios was welcomed 
enthusiastically. The island’s church bells tolled in celebration, spelling out "Makarios" 
in an old Greek code, and dancing crowds poured into the streets. To the British 
authorities, who had long maintained that most Greek Cypriots were tired of EOKA's 
bloody campaign, the waving Greek flags, photographs of dead EOKA guerrillas, and  
the voices of thousands of Cypriots shouting "EOKA!" and "we have won" was a 
disturbing revelation. 26
  
 
In London, however, the mood among some was much more somber. Following Lennox-
Boyd’s statement in the House of Commons on February 19 expressing the hope that 
Makarios would “at least give some indication that he proposes quite definitely to say 
[that the violence on Cyprus should cease] in the very near future,”27
                                                 
24 Wood, Memcon between Delegations of Greece and the US, November 15, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXIV, 431. 
  Lord Salisbury 
resigned from the Cabinet. It was apparent he had little faith in the leadership or motives 
25 Aldrich Embtel London, 1692, September 26, 1956: ibid., 409. 
26 “Hanging Sword.”  
27 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons):”Cyprus,” February 19, 1957, 563, col. 346. 
 150 
of the Archbishop. In his letter of resignation, Salisbury wrote that by freeing Makarios, 
Britain had handed the initiative to the Archbishop, "and he will be able to edge us along 
from point to point. We shall have a sword of Damocles hanging over our heads."28
 
  
 
                                                 
28  Quoted in “The Hanging Sword,” ibid. 
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Chapter XI 
 
The Push for a NATO Initiative 
 
The celebrations in the streets of Nicosia provided a rare occasion on which Greek public 
opinion was at least momentarily favorable to the actions of the HMG and Macmillan 
was determined to make the most of this opportunity to move forward on Cyprus. For this 
to happen, however, the US would have to hold up its end of the bargain struck in 
Bermuda.   
 
On March 20, Britain and Turkey agreed to accept the offer by NATO to establish a 
committee to find fresh strategies for dealing with the Cyrus problem. This development 
marked the first time, with the exception of the Holmes mission, that the UK had allowed 
outside interference in what it considered to be a domestic issue. The main reason for 
Britain’s acceptance of NATO involvement was to keep the discussions among the three 
alliance members concerned with Cyprus. The Greeks, of course, preferred that the 
discussions be kept between the Cypriots and the British so as not to be outflanked by 
Turkey and Britain.  
 
In the past, it was the Greeks who had tried to internationalize the problem with their 
continuous attempts to bring it to the UN, while Britain had vigorously fought against 
any such move. In this instance, the roles were reversed, and it was Britain that was 
trying to internationalize the problem while the Greeks wanted discussions restricted to 
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the island itself.1
 
 Since Britain and Turkey had accepted the NATO offer, it was 
necessary that Greece be pressured to follow suit. 
A memorandum of conversation between the delegations of the US and the UK suggests 
that Macmillan and Eisenhower had come to mutually advantageous agreement: the 
Prime Minister would do all he could to press for the release of Makarios, while the 
American President would pressure Greece into accepting NATO Secretary-General Lord 
Ismay’s plan for forming a “three-man commission” to search for a solution to the 
Cyprus problem.2  According to Nicolet, Britain’s interest in involving NATO revealed 
more than a desire to continue the tripartite negotiations within the alliance since it was 
improbable that NATO would serve merely as a “reasonable atmosphere for discussion of 
the Radcliffe proposals in which the future of the international status of Cyprus would be 
taboo.”   Thus the acceptance of NATO had to involve a shift in the “strategic premises” 
of the island.3
 
 
Change in the Strategic Value of Cyprus 
 
After meeting with Prime Ministers Eden and Karamanlis in July, 1956, Spyros Skouras 
reported that Eden believed successful settlement was contingent upon the permanent 
retention of “British sovereignty over base areas following self-determination” 
                                                 
1 Message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, March 31, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXIV, 470; for the entire text of this message see, Appendix 6. 
2 In Polto 2135, dated March 12, George W. Perkins, the US Permanent Representative to NAC, reported 
from Paris that during a conversation with Ismay, he was told that the Secretary-General intended to write 
three letters to the three Permanent Representatives to the NAC from Greece, Turkey and the UK to 
implement measures for settling the Cyprus problem. According to Perkins, Ismay intended to propose 
appointing three “outstanding citizens” to perform “good offices,” Ibid, 747C.00/3-1257, FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXIV, 461; Dulles, Memorandum for the Record, March 23, 1957:ibid., 1955-1957, XXIV, 383. 
3 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 99. 
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[emphasis added]. 4 Here it must be pointed out that the emphasis on “base areas” 
represents a critical departure from Eden’s earlier conviction of the strategic importance 
of the island as a whole. Prior to the military excursion in Egypt, Britain had not fully 
evaluated the utility of the military installations on Cyprus. 5 In contrast to the estimation 
of the Defence Committee of November 29, the COS Committee concluded that if Britain 
had no plan to use Cyprus as a base for a strategic reserve, “it was probably not necessary 
to spend the large annual sums which would be required to maintain our position in the 
island as a whole.”6
 
   
The detonation of the first British hydrogen bomb in May, 1957, code named “Short 
Granite,” consolidated the idea that the days of conventional military power were coming 
to an end and that this new weapon was not only more efficient, but could also provide 
“more bang for the buck.7
                                                 
4 Dulles to Eisenhower, Memorandum: Skouras Talks with Eden on Cyprus,” July 20, 1956: FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXIV, 382-383. 
”   All of this was part of Secretary Duncan Sandys’ general 
defense review, designed to call attention to mobile air and sea forces and the reduction 
of manpower to the extent that it would eliminate the necessity for National Service by 
5 According to Sir Charles Knightly, Commander of Anglo-French forces, Cyprus lacked the adequate 
harbors necessary for launching an amphibious attack. Furthermore, the island was also unsuitable for any 
airborne excursion larger than two battalions since only one of the three military fields on the island was 
adequately equipped. These revelations, led C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to Eisenhower, to conclude 
that if “Cyprus as a military base cannot handle either landing craft or more than two airborne battalions is 
not much of a Middle East bastion of [the] empire:”  C.D. Jackson to Luce, Memorandum, April 11, 1957: 
Papers of C.D. Jackson, 1931-67, box 71, DDE-Library. 
6  Lord Mountbatten, quoted in COS Committee: “Military Requirements in Cyprus,” March 22, 1957: 
DEFE 11/182, doc. 887. 
7  There is some controversy as to whether Britain may have bluffed about the success of its first hydrogen 
bomb test. According to some sources, the May 15 test actually produced a blast with a force equal to only 
0.3 million tons of high explosive, far short of its thermonuclear goal. In comparison, the first American H-
bomb had a yield of 10.4 million tons, c.f., Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. 
Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons ,Vol. V, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); John Patrick Diggins; The Proud Decades: America in War and 
Peace 1941-1960, (New York: W.W. Norton & CO., 1989); Lorna Arnold and Katherine Pine, Britain and 
the H-Bomb, (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2001), 140. 
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1962.8 Accordingly, to retain the island merely to accommodate the Royal Air Force 
would be superfluous since a strategic reserve could just as easily be based in Britain. 
Cyprus was, however, still useful as a staging ground for the RAF against the Soviet 
Union and to provide air support for the Baghdad Pact, in addition to its intelligence and  
broadcasting installations 9
 
  
On March 20, in a dinner conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club in Bermuda, the Prime 
Minister, much to the surprise of Eisenhower, expressed Britain’s reservations regarding 
the tactical importance of Cyprus. Macmillan was of the opinion “that they [the British] 
were growing more and more doubtful as to the strategic value of Cyprus. With the 
increasing range of aircraft, Cyprus became less important and he did not know that it 
was worth the effort and the trouble.10
 
   Any notion that Macmillan was not serious was 
dispelled in a second conversation on March 21 when the Prime Minister stated that 
Britain was not “greatly interested in Cyprus except for the military importance of the 
island, a factor which is changing and probably now less than before.”  
Both the Prime Minister and the President agreed that although the military importance of 
the island was becoming “rather less,” it was “still useful to have a base there.”11 The 
Prime Minister was also of the mind that “perhaps partition would be the best answer “12
 
  
                                                 
8 C. J. Bartlett, A History of Postwar Britain, 1945-74 (New York: 1977), 19-195. 
9 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 96. 
10 Memorandum of Conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club in Hamilton, Bermuda between Eisenhower, 
Macmillan, Dulles, and Lloyd, March 23, 1957: FRUS, 1955-57, XXIV, 464. 
11 Memorandum of Conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXIV, 465. 
12 “Continuation of Memorandum of Dinner Conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club, “Bermuda between 
Eisenhower, Macmillan, Dulles, and Lloyd, March 20, 1957: Ann Whitman File, International Series, 
Bermuda Conference, March 20-24, 1957, DDE-Library. 
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His explanation for this opinion must have been even more surprising to the Americans. 
Macmillan revealed that “were it not for the Turks, the British probably would have gone 
much further by now towards a solution.” 13 In a journal entry a few days earlier, 
Macmillan had written that he “was not persuaded that we need more than an airfield 
[….]” and that once British military installations had been secured, “the Turks and 
Greeks could divide the rest of the island between them.”14  While the British preference 
for partition is apparent at this stage, the formal decision to pursue a change in the status 
of the island would not be reached until the summer of 1957. 15
 
 
All this discussion of partition was nothing new. The Turks had expressed an interest in it 
as a viable alternative in early January. In Turkey’s view, in the event of a change in the 
international status of Cyprus, the best course would be to cede the island to its former 
colonial possessor, the United Kingdom. If this was not an option, they would be willing 
to make the “sacrifice” and accept partition as a compromise solution.16
 
  
A few years earlier, Eisenhower, too, had expressed support for the idea of partition, as 
well as dismay over the Greek position since, in his view; the Greeks had no legal 
jurisdiction. He now stated “if we supported partition, including most of the NATO 
partners, Greece might find it difficult to oppose.”17
                                                 
13 Memorandum of Conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXIV, 465. 
 The policy of pressuring Greece 
14 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 226.  
15 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 96. 
16 Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director of GTI, Memcon with Mehmet Baydur, Counselor of the Turkish 
Embassy, January 8, 1957:SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-857, NARA. 
17 Memcon, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957: Ann Whitman File, International Series, 
Bermuda Conference, March 20-24, 1957, DDE-Library. 
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could not prevail, however, without a united front by the Western allies, which at this 
stage, was not forthcoming. 
Initially, the first task for the US was to convince the Greeks to accept the tripartite 
discussions under the auspices of NATO. Greece was careful to publicly present the 
February 26 UN resolution as a call for negotiations between the Cypriots and the British, 
as this would be the only viable move towards an equitable solution. The State 
Department wanted to encourage British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government, in 
addition to discussing a long term arrangement within NATO. The Americans hoped that 
simultaneous discussions would lead to a “clearer definition of the eventual status [of] 
Cyprus,” warning if Greece rejected the latter that the US would be “disinclined” to 
pressure Britain on the former.18
Responding to Lennox Boyd’s announcement in the House commons regarding the 
NATO offer to undertake conciliation for Cyprus, Karamanlis issued the following 
statement: 
     
 It is regrettable that the British colonial secretary has shown that, once again, his government is not 
approaching the Cyprus issue in the correct manner, but is persisting with its demand that peace is a 
condition for a solution, even though it is clear, as history has shown, that peace can only come as the result 
of a solution. Therefore, the request that Archbishop Makarios call for a cessation of violence is pointless, 
since the leader of the National Cypriot Fighters’ Organization (EOKA), in an initiative on March 14, said 
that he would call a halt to all action as soon as the archbishop was freed [...] Moreover, the liberation of 
the ethnarch is provided for in the relevant UN resolution, since it calls for a continuation of talks with him. 
Archbishop Makarios is the natural, but also the elected representative, of the Cypriots. The Greek 
government can only abide by the decision reached unanimously by the UN General Assembly and 
approved by all NATO members [...]19
 
  
 
                                                 
18  Herter, Embtel Athens 3415, March 20, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 463. 
19 “Statement by Karamanlis in response to Lennox -Boyd’s announcement in the House of Commons,” 
quoted in Kathimerini, March 20, 1957. 
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On March 21, Karamanlis rejected Ismay’s offer on procedural grounds, saying that 
because the UN resolution called for direct talks between the British and the Cypriots, his 
conciliation was essentially meaningless.  But it is important to note that by emphasizing 
the “procedure” and not the substance of the proposal, Greece avoided the charge of 
obstructionism since it did not permanently rule out the possibility for a NATO initiative 
in the future. 20
 
   
Karamanlis was aware of the fact that Greece had the support of the Americans for 
bilateral negotiations, though not for a strict interpretation of the resolution. Since the UN 
resolution did not “specify the shape that negotiations should take,” the State Department 
maintained that NATO involvement would not run contrary to requirements for a UN 
resolution.  Karamanlis, however, was not to be swayed by this argument.   
 
In a telegram to Herter, the Greek Prime Minister said he believed that Britain was using 
NATO as means to “avoid carrying out [the] clear requirements of the UN,” and that 
NATO involvement would lead to negotiations which would include Turkey, while a UN 
resolution specifically called for talks between the UK and the Cypriots. 21  An American 
resolution calling for bilateral discussions needed to be scuttled as a result of British 
pressure, but according to Assistant Secretary Rountree, this analysis was the one favored 
by the US since it “called for renewed efforts by the British government and the Cypriots 
to come to an agreement.” 22
                                                 
20 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 3170, March 21, 1957:Ibid., doc. 747C.00/3-2157 Hatzivassiliou ibid., 
103. 
 
21 Herter, Embtel Athens 3134, March 19, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1957, NARA.   
22 Hagerty and Rountree, Off the record Briefing, Bermuda, March 20, 1957: Hagerty, James C. Papers, 
1953-61, Bermuda Conference—1957, Briefings, DDE-Library, 9. 
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The Question of Independence 
 
Following the Indian-sponsored UN resolution calling for autonomy for the island, the 
Greek Government had been “swinging for independence for Cyprus”.23  At the same 
time the US was pressuring Greece to accept a NATO initiative; the Greeks were 
similarly trying to influence the Americans to consider the possibility of independence 
for Cyprus. This might have been accepted as a good faith option by the US if it had not 
been for the fact that Foreign Minister Averoff showed his hand in a debate in the Greek 
Parliament on March 11 when he stated that independence for the island would be 
“merely a stepping-stone” on the path to enosis.24
 
   
State Department officials were “not happy” about independence as a solution for 
Cyprus. In a conversation with Karamanlis, Ambassador Allen expressed the fear that it 
would open the door for the “the Soviets would start intriguing in Cyprus at the first 
possible opportunity,” and do nothing to dampen Greek Cypriot desire for enosis. 25 
Averoff was quick to try to dispel such fears by suggesting a treaty similar to one signed 
with Austria which abrogated the “right of self-determination” would similarly guarantee 
that Cyprus would remain independent and not become a part of Greece.26
                                                 
23 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 2478, January 11, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C00 /1-1157, NARA. 
 Still, the 
24 Averoff quoted in Reddaway, 74; In a speech  before the general assembly in late February, Averoff 
declared that Greece was not demanding Cyprus for herself, and would even be willing to see the island 
become an independent state, saying that it would be  "as a tribute to liberty" for the Assembly to pass a 
Greek resolution demanding self-determination for Cyprus: “Subdued Quarrel,”Time, March 4, 1957; 
Ioannis Stefanidis and Giannēs D. Stephanidēs, Stirring the Greek Nation, ( Farnham Surrey, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2007),  87-88. 
25 Rountree to Dulles, Memorrandum: “Exploration of Averoff Proposal for Solution Cyprus Question,” 
February 14, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-1457, NARA; Allen, Embtel Athens 3060, March 13, 1957: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 459-460. 
26 The Austrian State Treaty, signed in May 1955, specifically denied Austria the right of self-
determination “because peace of Europe in matter of Anchluss was more important than right of self-
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Americans and British remained uneasy regarding Averoff’s statement in Parliament, 
despite the Foreign Minister’s reassurances that any demand for self-determination for 
Cyprus would be only for “home consumption.” 27
 
 
Although the Greek plan did not rule out enosis permanently, this was the first time in the 
history of the Cyprus dispute that Greece proposed the idea of guaranteed independence. 
While it is generally believed that Athens was pressured by Washington to agree to a plan 
for guaranteed independence, documentary evidence reveals that it was Averoff and 
Karamanlis, not Dulles and the State Department, who made the initial overtures for such 
a solution. As early as 1956, Greece appeared to be open to such a prospect when faced 
with the possibility of partition presented in Britain’s statement in December. 
 
The December 1956 statement by the British Colonial Secretary, naming partition as a 
viable alternative, gave encouragement to the Turks, who had joined the call for partition 
in early January. The statement, however, had the opposite effect on the Greeks, who 
viewed the prospect of independence as the lesser of the evils. Although the Greeks were 
eager to promote the independence proposal, they were careful not to propose it 
themselves since any Greek-sponsored initiative might be viewed unfavorably by the 
Turks.28
 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
determination for six million Austrians:” Butterworth, Embtel London 929, September 7, 1955: FRUS, 
1955-1957, XXIV, 280. 
27 Allen, Embtel Athens, 2487, January 14, 1957, 747C 00/ 1-1457, NARA. 
 
28  Rountree to Dulles, Memorrandum: “Exploration of Averoff Proposal for Solution Cyprus Question,” 
February 14, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-1457, NARA; Allen, Embtel Athens 3060, March 13, 1957: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 459-460; Embtel from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of 
State, May 3, 1957: FRUS,1955-1957, XXIV, 482; Hatzivassiliou,  ibid., 98-99.  
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While the Americans may have been “unhappy” about the Greek scheme for 
independence, Britain and Turkey were downright hostile to the idea. On April 27, 
Ambassador Warren commented that he was more concerned with the Cyprus issue now 
than at any time since his arrival in Ankara.29  Facing resistance from all sides, the 
Greeks felt they had nothing to gain by discussing the eventual international status of the 
Cyprus question in advance of British-Cypriot negotiations. Ambassador Allen, however, 
suggested rather than shelving the NATO offer entirely, Karamanlis take the position that 
the proposal was unsuitable “for [the] time being,” since the UN resolution called for 
direct discussions between the British and the Cypriots, as a necessary condition for 
discussions to commence.30
 
  
Under Secretary of State Herter, however, saw Allen’s deal as insufficient given that the 
UK and Turkey had not agreed to discuss the internal state of affairs ahead of resolution 
of the international status. Herter’s proposed solution was to tackle both problems at the 
same time. It was carefully crafted as to not suggest that NATO be a substitute for 
bilateral discussions on “self-government, but rather as a “complement,” since the 
question of self-government could not be settled until there was “also an understanding” 
on the international status of the island: 
 
 
Our hope is to encourage simultaneously British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government as well as [a] 
long range arrangement within NATO which will lead to [a] clearer definition of the eventual status of 
Cyprus and will allow the Cypriots proper opportunity [to] exercise eventual choice.31
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Editorial note: ibid., 482. 
30 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 3164, March 20, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3, NARA. 
31 Herter, Deptel Athens, 3415, March 20, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 463. 
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In return for Greek cooperation, a plebiscite with an option for guaranteed independence 
would be held to determine the future status of the island.32
 
  
For his part, President Eisenhower’s idea of pressuring Greece was to write a letter to 
King Paul urging him to use the opportunity “for the purpose of creating an atmosphere 
which will lead to constructive negotiations between the Cypriot communities and the 
British authorities, ” but fails to realize that Greece and Turkey might like to be included 
as well. The President ends the letter by suggesting that NATO might have a role to play 
“considering the international aspects of this question.”33
 
  
This was the state of affairs following the Bermuda Conference. For the moment, things 
had gone as far as they could and the Americans realized there was nothing to be gained 
from pressing the Greeks further. Dulles suggested that the best course of action might be 
to fall back and wait until the new NATO Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak assumed 
the office in May with the hope that a fresh approach could then be formulated. 34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Message from Eisenhower to King Paul in: Dulles, Embtel Athens 3526, March 29, 1957:ibid., 1955-
1957, XXIV, 468. 
34 Dulles, Deptel Paris Topol 1880, etc., June 4, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-657, NARA. 
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Chapter XII 
 
Pressure for Active US Involvement 
 
Greece may have resisted American pressure for accepting the NATO offer, but Athens 
continued to lobby the US in support for independence for Cyprus.  The State 
Department, however, was growing impatient with the lack of progress towards a 
solution and acutely aware of the danger that an unresolved Cyprus problem presented 
for the NATO alliance. A personal letter from Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery 
to Eisenhower earlier in November echoed the frustration of the State Department. In his 
letter, Montgomery expressed the view that the continuation of the Cyprus controversy 
posed a “danger to the Free World,” and urged the President to “bang together the heads 
of Karamanlis and Menderes in order to effect a compromise.”1
 
  
A discussion between State Department officials noted that Harding had also reached a 
similar conclusion and decided that if anyone could press the Greeks and Turks to reach a 
settlement Eisenhower was “the man to do it—” 2
                                                 
1  Montgomery to Eisenhower, Letter, November 1957: Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, 
DD-E Library. 
 a generous estimation of the 
President’s powers of persuasion given that Eisenhower’s finest diplomatic achievement 
regarding Cyprus thus far was to congratulate himself for encouraging the British to 
release Makarios.   
2 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 
(Rountree) to the Secretary of State, December 9, 1957:FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 517. 
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Still, the President assured the Field Marshall that he and Dulles shared his concern 
regarding the negative affect that the Cyprus problem was having on the Alliance and on 
Greek -Turkish relations. He also agreed that a way needed to be found in order to draw 
the Greeks and Turks closer. For Eisenhower this meant persuading both parties to 
“restrain themselves” in the debates at the UN so as not to “further interfere” with the 
main priority of the US, the working of the NATO alliance.3
 
 
Towards Guaranteed Independence 
 
Although the US did not officially endorse the idea of guaranteed independence for 
Cyprus, the Americans, anxious for an alternative to enosis and partition, began to 
explore other venues. The US briefly considered a second Holmes mission but shelved 
the idea until it was clear what Britain’s next move would be.4  A plan for more direct 
involvement by the Americans was offered by the US Ambassador to Britain John Hay 
Whitney. In a telegram on March 15, the Ambassador wondered whether progress could 
be made toward a solution by working “procedurally” for an improved “atmosphere” as a 
way to buy time until the US could decide which substantive solution it preferred.  But 
whatever solution the Americans decided, it needed to be acceptable to all three parties in 
order to be effective. 5
                                                 
3 Eisenhower to Montgomery, Letter, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, December 11, 1957, doc.   
488, Vol. XVIII, December 11, 1957. This is a reference to the July 12 request by Greece to include the 
Cyprus question on the agenda of the Twelfth session of the General Assembly. Although the United States 
agreed to support any resolution acceptable to the three interested parties, it continued to emphasize that the 
only way to resolve the problem was through “quiet diplomacy”: FRUS, 1955 - 1957, XXIV, 514 - 17, 519 
– 20. 
  Given the volatile history of the negotiations thus far, herding cats 
might have been easier. 
4  Dulles, Deptel, March 2, 1957: ibid., 458. 
5 Whitney, Embtel London 4891, March 15, 1957: ibid., 462. 
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In April, Chalmers Wood suggested to the GTI director that as the leader of NATO, the 
US should use its clout “to try and steer this problem towards a reasonable outcome,” 
since it appeared that a solution from Britain, Greece, and Turkey would not be 
forthcoming.6 Wood’s proposal included the elimination of both enosis and partition as 
part of any solution, since there was no possibility of ever reconciling these two positions 
between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, Britain’s insistence upon retaining full 
sovereignty was becoming less convincing in light of Macmillan’s revelation in Bermuda 
that Cyprus no longer held the same strategic importance. Consequently, the only 
remaining reasonable course was to endorse the prospect of guaranteed independence 
consistent with the Greek proposals.7
 
   
Athens was sensitive to the fact that the Americans did not want to appear to be 
endorsing any particular solution, but it still hoped that the US might propose the idea of 
independence. Although officially the American position was one of neutrality, the US 
realized that the Greco-Turkish relations were in the balance and that an alternative was 
necessary to counter any moves towards enosis and partition.8
 
  
On February 13, Averoff had called on Dulles and told him that he understood the 
“delicacy of the problem for the United States,” and asked if the US could not lend its 
support, that it would at least maintain its neutrality. The Foreign Minister also said that 
                                                 
6 Wood to Jones, Memorandum: “Possible Effect on Turkey of US Policy Favoring Independence for 
Cyprus, “April 13, 1957, doc. 747C. /4-1357, NARA. 
7 Ibid. 
8  Williams, Gadel 137, February 8, 1957: SDCDF, 747C.00/2-6-57, NARA. In this message the State 
Department instructed the United Nations Mission clarify to Britain, Greece, and Turkey that with regard to 
the Cyprus debate the “US planned to take no further initiative at this time.” 
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in his view the immediate predicament in the United Nations was “to get out of the 
debate without damage to the settlement and with some help towards it. “We want,” he 
said “to have a discussion without insulting each other too much.” 9
 
  
Formulating a Decisive US Policy 
 
On April 16, Under Secretary of State Herter contacted the embassies and regional 
consulates, indicating that the US “now seriously [has] doubts whether either enosis or 
partition would prove to be peaceful or practical solutions […] the US now believes that 
either independence within the Commonwealth or independence outside the 
Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy [of] 
serious consideration.”10
 
 
The proposed approach emphasized that any change in the status of the island would have 
to be gradual, since the Cypriots had relatively little experience in self-government. A 
period of self-government, the terms of which would be negotiated between the two 
communities and the British, would provide an opportunity for the two communities to 
assume responsibility for their own affairs.  Not only would enosis be prohibited, but also 
Cyprus would not be permitted to join any other state without the full consent of the three 
interested parties.  
 
Moreover, any solution should accept British sovereignty over bases on the island. The 
telegram ended with the suggestion that the British Government consider inviting Cypriot 
leaders to London for negotiations and to urge Makarios to attend and participate, as well. 
                                                 
9   Drafted by Williams, Memcon, February 13, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 453. 
10 Herter, Deptel London 7312, etc., April 16, 1957: ibid., 473. 
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The document is important in that it represents the first time the US departed from its 
usual “neutral” course and endorsed a concrete policy regarding the Cyprus dispute.11
 
 
 The reactions to the new policy from the embassies in Athens and London were 
generally favorable. The London Embassy informed the State Department that the 
Foreign Office had no “objections to Ambassador Warren presenting to the Turkish 
Government the views contained in Telegram 7312.” The Foreign Office, however, did 
caution that it might be better to tell Turkey that the US had “informed” rather than 
“discussed” its views with the British Government.12 The Athens Embassy response was 
even stronger in that it told the State Department that it “fully agreed” with the views in 
the London telegram. The Embassy did, however, recommend that a “distinction” be 
made between the “eventual status of Cyprus” and “self-determination.”13
 
  
The April 20 interim reply from Ankara to London, however, was less optimistic, noting 
that “unless there is some drastic change in [the] political atmosphere, it is no more 
possible that [the] Turks would sit down at the same negation table with Makarios than 
that [the] Pope should sit down with the devil.” 14
                                                 
11 Ibid, 474. 
  Whether this was the case, it would 
never be known. On April 27, the Turkish Government signaled that it would oppose any 
form of independence. Turkey was in the midst of an election, and the Menderes 
12 Editorial note: ibid., 474. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid: This sentiment is supported by a note transmitted by the Turkish Government to Greece regarding 
Cyprus. The note accused the Greek Government of having “enotist designs” […]’”aimed directly at 
Turkey’” and of being in ‘”close collaboration with Makarios.’” The note also pointed to the tendency by 
the Greek Government to ‘”make declarations in international organizations and then to deny them before 
its proper public opinion” as ‘”a manifest proof of its ill intentions:’”Editorial note, ibid., 471. 
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government could not be involved in any solution that placed any great degree of 
confidence in Greek intentions. Britain readily agreed with the Turkish objections.15
 
    
Meanwhile, Greece, with support from the US, was willing to allow NATO Secretary-
General Paul-Henri Spaak to investigate the matter. It was urgent that the US apply 
decisive pressure since it was evident that Britain was also growing increasingly 
impatient with the lack of progress. There was a great fear in Washington that the British 
might “pull a Palestine.”  In other words, retreat quickly and leave the mess for others to 
deal with.16
 
 After careful consideration, Spaak informed Ambassador George W. Perkins 
that he had come to the many of the same conclusions as the Americans, including a 
guaranteed independence option but without the interim period of self-government.  
The British were not pleased with the fact that Spaak’s proposals mirrored those of the 
US and instructed the British Ambassador to NATO to “shoot this proposal down as soon 
as possible.”17 They were angry and disappointed by what they perceived was American 
sympathy toward Greece. Foreign Office officials even went so far as to make a personal 
attack against Ambassador George Allen saying, “the State Department are not well 
served by their Ambassador in Athens” because ‘he swallows whatever Averoff tells 
him.’”18
 
   
The American push for guaranteed independence finally persuaded London that it was on 
shaky ground. Britain realized that both the US and Spaak stood firmly against its 
                                                 
15 Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 6387, May 22, 1957: SDCDF. doc, 747C.00/5-2257, NARA. 
16 Quoted here in Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 248. 
17 Quoted here in Holland, ibid., 197. 
18 Quoted here in Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 99. 
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preference for partition; an option it felt committed to uphold owing to Lennox-Boyd’s 
December 19 statement.19
 
 While urging the US not to completely take the partition 
option off the table, the British withdrew to formulate a new approach to the problem. 
Turkey had suggested a new tripartite conference, and Britain decided to accept the plan.   
An oral communication dated July 24 proposed a plan calling for Greek and Turkish 
representatives to meet in London for conference in September. The plan included an 
invitation to Spaak and US representatives to observe but not to participate. The 
conference would have no set agenda, but rather discuss “without prejudice every 
solution so far mooted.”  The only “fixed requirement[s]” were that any proposed 
solution had to be predicated upon securing “essential military facilities under British 
control,” preventing communist penetration, and guaranteeing the peace of the island.20
 
  
Although Dulles was supportive of the British initiative, he was skeptical about whether 
the Greeks could be persuaded to attend the conference, recalling the attitude of the 
Greeks toward such meetings in the past.21
                                                 
19 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 113. 
 Dulles knew that it would be difficult to 
prevail upon the Greeks to participate without assurances of support that the US was not 
ready to offer for fear of alienating Turkey. Still, Ambassador Caccia underlined the 
importance of American participation and was hopeful that the US presence would not 
only persuade the parties to attend, but also have them approach the meeting with a 
20  Note in Memcon Between the British Ambassador (Caccia) and Dulles Washington, July 25, 1957: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 483. 
21 Roger Allen had been reporting since late June that the Greeks would not participate in the conference 
because of the lingering hard feelings stemming from the 1955 conference. Allen believed that “much of 
the venom which has since embittered our relations with Greece dates from that time:” Allen to Young 
June 28, 1957, FO 286/1415. 
 169 
“spirit of compromise.”22
 
 Just convincing the Greeks to agree to attend the conference 
would be enormously difficult—to hope that they would do so in “the spirit of 
compromise” was magical thinking. 
On August 3, the British extended an invitation to Greece to attend the conference in 
London to which Averoff did not immediately respond. On August 7, the Greek Foreign 
Minister gave his reply. Greece would not take part until they were reasonably confident 
that there was “at least the serious hope that a solution be found.”23 Despite continual 
pressure by the US, the Greeks remained firm in their conviction that a plan needed to be 
in place before they would agree to participate in a tripartite conference. It became 
academic, however, when the Turkish Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel informed the 
British that no conference would be held prior to the mid-October general elections for 
the Grand National Assembly.24
                                                 
22 Ibid, 484. 
 
23Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 114.  
24 The elections in Turkey were held on October 27 with Menderes’ Grand National Party the clear winner, 
taking 421 seats.  
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Chapter XIII 
 
Second Tripartite Conference Initiative 
 
In May 1957 Macmillan suggested that an agreement based on the Radcliffe proposals 
should be discussed with the Greeks, Turks, and the Cypriots but that the idea of self-
determination be shelved “for a period of, say, ten years.” It was the only rational 
outcome seeing as it was impossible to reconcile Britain’s penchant for partition with the 
US’s preference for independence.1
 
 
A memorandum by Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd following a meeting of the CPC on 
May 29 emphasized the importance of Turkish compliance with any eventual British 
solution, while using the threat of partition as leverage against the Greeks if they decided 
to move forward on the question of self-determination.  Furthermore, the memorandum 
called for soliciting support from both Spaak and the US in order to pressure Greece and 
Turkey.2 This new hard line policy was a clear indication that the British were growing 
increasingly impatient with finding a search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. It also 
signaled a readiness to implement the Radcliffe Constitution by the end of the year if 
none of the concerned parties stepped forward to negotiate it, although it must be pointed 
out that it had been rejected by both Makarios and the Greek Government.3
 
  
                                                 
1 Quoted in Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 106. 
2 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus,  110 
3 Nancy Crawshaw, “The Uneasy Truce in Cyprus,” The World Today 13, no.10 (1957) 423; 
Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 110. 
 171 
The CPC meeting concluded with support for following Turkey’s suggestion for a new 
tripartite conference.  Anticipating the probable outcome, Macmillan sketched a possible 
course of action: if the conference broke down, which was the most likely scenario, 
Britain would inject the idea for self-determination based on the Radcliffe proposals. If 
this proved unsuccessful, Britain would then hold a plebiscite which offered a choice 
between partition or continued British rule.4
 
 Needless to say, neither of these options 
would be palatable to the Greeks. 
Prior to making any rash move they might later regret, the British decided to first consult  
the new Secretary-General Spaak,  the US, and Turkey. The State Department agreed to 
meet with the British and discuss the possible course of action but, at the same time, 
warned them not to make the same error that they made in December 1956 when they 
decided to exclude Greece.5
 
  The Foreign Office, however, had good reason why it did 
not want to inform the Greeks in advance. If the past was any indication, Greece would 
sabotage the whole initiative by rejecting any proposed plan out-of-hand and leaking it to 
the press.  
The British were hoping for the full endorsement by Dulles and Spaak. It was especially 
important that they both be on board since it would not be easy to persuade the Greeks to 
accept an initiative for which they would likely have no enthusiasm.6
                                                 
4, Ibid., 110. 
 To further pressure 
the Greeks, a plan was proposed in which Britain would invite Spaak and a US official as 
5 Dulles, Deptel London 542, July 18, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-1657, NARA. 
6 Ibid. 
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observers. In early August, Spaak met with Ambassador Allen and urged that the US 
attend the conference in just such a capacity.7
 
 
Upon learning about the conference, Dulles’s initial reaction was to ask Ambassador 
Caccia what he knew to be a rhetorical question, if there was “any reason to hope that the 
Greeks would attend?” The Secretary recalled the difficulty in persuading the Greeks to 
join in the 1955 conference and commented that “it would probably be very difficult for 
the US to prevail upon Greece to participate without assurances of support,” which the 
US was in no position to extend due to the sensitivities of its “other ally, Turkey.”8  At 
this stage, the US decided against sending an observer because “it would involve [the 
US] too deeply in [the] Cyprus dispute and might serve to detract from the role Spaak 
would play in bringing the parties together.”9
 
   
Although the Americans supported Spaak’s participation as an observer, they were still 
skeptical with regard to British objectives and suspected that the initiative was only a 
“tactical move” to forestall another UN debate. They were also worried that the UK 
would not approach the conference with an open mind. Furthermore, there was legitimate 
concern that Turkey would insist upon interpreting the December 1956 statement by 
Britain as an endorsement for partition and hold to its present “uncompromising position” 
due to pressure from the forthcoming Turkish elections.  Thus, the Americans believed 
the best course of action was to engage the UK in the interim since it might prejudice its 
                                                 
7  Perkins, Embtel Paris Polto 342, August 8, 1957: ibid, doc. 747C.00/8-857. 
8 Memcon between Dulles and Caccia, July 25, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 484. 
9 Herter to Dulles, Tosec 7 Secto 2 Deptel 856 London, July 30, 1957:ibid., 485. 
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position with Greece. On the other hand, it was noted that not to do so would open the US 
to criticism from Britain that it had again let them down.10
 
 
The State Department still had reservations about US participation in the proposed 
conference.  In an August 6 meeting between Dulles, Rountree, and Coulson, the 
Secretary of State expressed his doubts whether it would be “useful” or “advisable” for 
the US to participate. Dulles’s qualms stemmed from the fact that the US had no 
authority, responsibility, or “new ideas” to contribute.11  After much deliberation, the US 
relented and agreed that it would send an observer “without prior commitment for or 
against any particular proposal.”12
 
  Spaak would also participate. It was hoped that the 
presence of the US and Spaak might assuage Greek fears about being outflanked in the 
negotiations. 
Reassurances, however, would not be enough. Following earlier consultations with 
Menderes, Ambassador Fletcher Warren confirmed that Turkey would insist upon 
partition. This, of course, would be a deal-breaker for Greece, which would accept no 
invitation unless partition was categorically ruled out.13
 
 
Meanwhile, an invitation was extended to Greece on August 3, to which Averoff did not 
immediately respond. On August 5, Roger Allen reported that Greece would decline, 
citing a recent leak about the conference as the reason for its refusal. Greece’s official 
answer came two days later. Regardless of American encouragement, Greece refused to 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Meeting Between Dulles, Rountree and Minister of the British Embassy (Coulson), Memcon, August 6, 
1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-657, NARA. 
12Dulles, Embtel Athens 465, August 7, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-75, NARA. 
13 Nicolet, ibid., 107. 
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participate in the conference until there was good reason to believe that “at least the 
serious hope that a solution could be found.”14 Averoff believed that Greece had more 
than demonstrated its willingness to cooperate. First, they had informed Spaak in early 
June that they were now definitely in agreement with his paper on a solution for Cyprus 
and, in a meeting with Perkins on August 6, Averoff had revealed that he was ready to 
deal with Turkey in a more direct manner.15 Furthermore, Averoff now had Makarios on 
his side, having finally succeeded in persuading the Archbishop to accept Spaak’s plan 
for independence.16  While Makarios may have been persuaded to take up the cause of 
independence, much to the dismay of the Greek Government, he remained opposed to the 
idea of a new tripartite conference. In a statement to the opposition newspaper Eleftheria, 
the Archbishop expressed the view that “the problem [did] not concern the three parties” 
and could only be “settled through negotiations between Great Britain and [the] people of 
Cyprus.”17
 
   
On August 8, the London Embassy informed the FO that the State Department would be 
willing to attend the Cyprus conference as an observer.18  Having finally convinced a 
reluctant State Department to participate, Ambassador Allen was saddled with the 
unenviable task of informing an already skeptical Dulles that the Greeks would be a no 
show. 19
 
   
                                                 
14 Dulles, Deptel London 1130, August 8, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-857, NARA. 
15 Perkins to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 98, July 10, 1957: SDCDF, doc 747C.00/8-657. 
16 Hatzivassiliou, ibid, 117. 
17 Quoted in Allen, Embtel Athens 439, August 8, 1957:ibid., 747C.00/-857, NARA. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 426, August 7, 1957: ibid, doc. 747C.00/8-757. 
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On August 8, Greece issued an official refusal to participate in the tripartite conference, 
citing a host of other concerns including lack of time for preparation and the fear that 
Turkey would be willing only to consider partition as a solution.20  While Greece 
reaffirmed its position that any solution would need to involve the Cypriots, Averoff 
implied that if “certain other conditions” were met, Cypriot participation might not be 
necessary after all. 21  Since Greece did leave open the possibility of exploring the 
question further through diplomatic channels, the Foreign Office’s immediate reaction 
was “not one of discouragement,” but, rather, “when the lady says no, she means 
maybe”22
 
      
The Greeks were coming to appreciate the predicament summarized by Dulles to the 
British, and confirmed by an FO official that the December 19, 1956, statement involving 
partition was indeed still applicable. Even if the British had had the will, the Turks were 
not about to release them from what they perceived was a “pledge” enshrined in the 1956 
statement. This made Britain‘s assertion that it would come to the conference with an 
open mind appear all the more cynical.23
a) Independence with [a] guarantee for a period of 20 years 
  Accordingly, Averoff countered with three 
types of solutions which would be acceptable to the Greek Government, one of which 
involved guaranteed independence under the aegis of NATO:  
b) Independence with[a] guarantee against change except by consent [of] majority of 
UN or NATO.  
                                                 
20 Barbour to Dulles, Embtel London 995, August 8, 1957: ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-857. 
21 Barbour to Dulles, Embtel London 995, August 8, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-857, NARA. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Fred L. Hadsel, First Secretary of the Embassy in London, FS Despatch London 399, August 14, 1957: 
Ibid, doc. 747C.00/8-1457. 
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c) British sovereignty with plebiscite after ten years.24
 
  
As an added incentive, Averoff promised that Greece would participate in the conference 
if Britain would accept any of the three solutions. He also expressed a willingness to 
examine any other solutions that might be proposed. 25  As expected, the Foreign 
Minister’s initiative was rejected by Britain and everyone else. On October 10, Assistant 
Under Secretary Archibald Ross of the FO told Barbour that Britain considered an 
interim solution to have all the “disadvantages and none of the advantages of real 
progress,” and would do nothing to resolve the problem. While Britain had not 
completely given up on the conference idea, at this stage it was, “if not dead, lying totally 
unconscious.”26
 
 
Bilateral Discussions and the Tridominium Plan 
 
Meanwhile, Britain informed the Embassy in London that Charles Wiggin had contacted 
the State Department to convey Britain’s interest in beginning secret discussions with the 
US, regardless of whether the Greeks would attend the conference.27
                                                 
24 Dulles, Deptel London 1130, August 8, 1957: ibid., 747C.00/8-857. 
 The Embassy in 
London regarded this overture as a constructive sign that the British were serious about 
finding a solution for Cyprus. The Embassy added that, although the US should 
“welcome the opportunity for discussions,” it should take care that they be “viewed as a 
continuation of regular diplomatic discussions rather than constituting any new 
procedure.” The State Department was anxious to avoid any high–level talks for fear of 
25  Embtel London 1123, August 14, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-1457; Dulles, Deptel London 1130, August 
8, 1957: ibid., 747C.00/8-857. 
26 As told by Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 2352, October 10, 1957: ibid., doc. 747C.00/10-1057. 
27 Embtel London 1379, August 17, 1957: ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-1757.  
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feeding Greek or Turkish paranoia that there was a conspiracy afoot to present them with 
an Anglo-American resolution fait accompli. 28  Consequently, Ambassador Barbour, 
with the blessing of the State Department, insisted on informal talks on the Embassy 
level.29
 
 The sensitivity of the situation was not lost on Macmillan, as evident by the 
following message from the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State:  
I am very glad to hear that you have agreed to informal, secret and exploratory talks with us about 
Cyprus…But this is of course, a matter of the greatest delicacy for us. I know you will understand that 
secrecy is vital, but I should be grateful if you would ensure that knowledge of our conversations is kept to 
the smallest possible circle as it will be on our side.30
 
 
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the British, Dulles was quietly encouraging Athens and 
Ankara to negotiate directly with each other on the diplomatic, but not the PM, level. 
Dulles reasoned that pressure from the possible London Conference, combined with the 
upcoming Turkish elections, might exert undue pressure on Karamanlis and Menderes 
and that discussions between diplomats might be more “fruitful.” 31
 
 
The discussions between Britain and the US got underway between September 10 and 18. 
Dulles outlined the strategy to be used in a telegram to Walworth Barbour, the US 
representative in the bilateral talks.32
                                                 
28 Dulles, Deptel London 1707, August 29, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 496; Embtel London August 
19, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1957.  
 Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar was the UK principal. 
First, Dulles wanted to clarify Britain’s intentions concerning its defense plans for 
Cyprus specifically, the types of installations, the location of enclaves, and an estimated 
rate of military expenditures. Barbour was also charged with exploring the question of 
29  Dulles Deptel London 1707, August 29, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 496. 
30 Presidential Correspondence: “Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence,” 1955-1959: SCSDF, 747C.00/8-
57, Lot 66 D, 204.   
31 Dulles, Deptel Athens 748, August 29, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 495. 
32 Dulles to Barbour, Deptel London 1860, September 5, 1957:ibid., 489-499. 
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“interim arrangements” vs. “ultimate status.”  But given the tensions among the interested 
parties, Dulles doubted that an agreement on ultimate status could be reached.   
Furthermore, Barbour should take care to emphasize that the US would not endorse any 
particular solution with respect to interim arrangements or ultimate status but, instead, 
consider the three conditions provided in the British oral communication issued in late 
July as “a useful point of departure:”  
 
a) Retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty 
b) Protection of the island from communist infiltration; 
c) Establishment [of] peace and tranquility in [the] island as a whole 33
 
 
These conditions should also include “the preservation of NATO unity,” the “desirability 
of avoiding an international financial burden,” and “enlisting the support and 
cooperation” of the Ethnarchy in a quest for a solution.34
 
 This last point serves as a 
reminder that the Church still had enough influence to pose a threat to a guaranteed 
independence solution, and needed to be checked. 
Surprisingly, the bilateral discussions yielded some useful results.  The British believed 
that the best solution for the island might be a condominium in which Britain, Greece, 
and Turkey would be in charge of the part of Cyprus not retained for British military 
installations. According to the provisional plan, administration of the island would be in 
the hands of a governor chosen by the three parties and self-government would be based 
                                                 
33 British Embassy in Washington D.C., Oral Communication, July 24, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-
2457, NARA. 
34 Dulles to Barbour, Deptel London 1860, September 5, 1057: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 499. 
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chiefly on the Radcliffe Constitution.  Remarkably, the Americans were intrigued and 
granted that the British plan had “merit” that warranted further consideration. Both 
parties agreed that the next stage would be to submit the proposal to Spaak, who should 
be encouraged to present it to Ankara and Athens as his own initiative.35 Despite the 
State Department’s enthusiasm, not everyone was convinced that the condominium, or as 
it would be later named, the tridominium, was a particularly practical one. Ambassador 
Allen’s view was that “there would not be [the] slightest chance of acceptance by 
Greece.”  Belcher, the US Consul in Nicosia, was likewise unimpressed and predicted 
that the plan would be “completely unacceptable to [the] Cypriots.” 36  It is difficult to 
understand why seasoned officials and diplomats believed that the Greeks would accept 
any proposal which included only items it had so vigorously rejected in the past. And, 
even more importantly, why it was realistically believed that Greece would suddenly 
willingly grant Turkey an equal stake in Cyprus.37
 
 
No sooner had the talks ended when the US began to take a more sober look at the 
feasibility of the British tridominium idea. The first misgivings were conveyed to 
Barbour on September 23, citing Allen’s opposition as a reason for not proceeding with 
the plan.38
                                                 
35 Jones to Rountree, Memorandum: “Cyprus: U.S.-U.K Talks in London,” September 16, 1957:SDCDF, 
doc. 747C.00/8-1257. 
   When Allen recommended the alternative idea of an Anglo-Greek 
condominium like the one put forward in the London Times by a former Minister of State 
36 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens, 824, September 16, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-1657, NARA; 
Belcher to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 73, September 16, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/9-1957. 
37 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 872, September 19, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/ 9-1957 
38 Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 2018, September 23, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/9-2357. 
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at the Colonial Office, Warren’s countered that this would of course “very likely be 
rejected out of hand by Turkey.”39
 
  
In a telegram to London on October 7, Dulles advised the Embassy that it should inform 
the British that “after further consideration of [the] condominium proposal, we feel it 
would be unwise [to] seek to persuade Spaak to advocate a particular solution before 
exploratory talks on his part [...] we believe that [the] condominium plan as outlined to us 
presents serious problems, of which the greatest would be the question of where ultimate 
authority lies in [the] event [of a ] dispute between co-domini or crisis on the island.” 40
 
 
The US was turning back to its original plan for diplomatic talks through Spaak. The 
Americans believed it would be more useful, not to mention safer, to focus on “collecting 
the views” of the concerned parties in separate talks and steer clear of any particular 
solution which might alienate the parties.41  In the end, the principal objection to the 
British plan lay in its practical application. Dulles did not think that the Greeks could 
accept it because it “gave Turks a legal status on Cyprus.” 42
 
 
Needless to say, Britain was disappointed. The US was now leaning towards an interim 
solution since it was obvious that by October, Turkey and Greece were unlikely to agree 
to any foreseeable compromise. Britain, however, rejected the idea for an interim 
solution, citing the present  “precarious situation” on Cyprus with the possibility that 
                                                 
39 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 916, September 25, 1957: ibid., doc. 747C.00/92557; Warren to Dulles, 
Embtel Ankara 928, September 28, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/ 9-2857, NARA. 
40 Dulles Deptel London 2592, October 7, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 508-509. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Memcon drafted by Dale, Department of State, 266, October 22, 1957, ibid., 511. 
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terrorism could start again at any moment and the fact that Britain could no longer in 
terms of “money or manpower” hold the island indefinitely.43
 
   
It had been clear since Makarios’ release that Turkey‘s position would harden and remain 
that way at least until after their elections on October 27. Meanwhile, Greece was trying 
to delay any move until the forthcoming UN debate.  Moreover, Greece had become 
more obdurate since MP Barbara Castle’s statement at Brighton reaffirming the Labour 
Party’s belief in self-determination and the “resolution” adopted stating its intention to 
resolve the Cyprus problem by granting it to the island:44 “Cyprus should be given the 
right of self-determination and after a set period may opt for Greece: but it is fully 
possible that the Cypriots, once the right of self-determination has been conceded, may 
decide to stay within the Commonwealth, ” adding that “if given five years in office,” 
Labour would “endeavor to complete the freedom operation” within that time frame. 45
 
    
While the Greek Government, Greek Cypriots, and most of the press voiced unanimous 
approval for Mrs. Castle’s statement, an editorial in the Cyprus Mail was quick to point 
out that it was not a resolution, but “merely a statement of intentions in rather equivocal 
terms by one of the Party[‘s] executive[s].”46  The editorial warned that if Labour was not 
clearly committed to the five year period for self-determination, then they were “playing 
a dangerous game.” 47
 
  
                                                 
43Ibid.  
44 Ibid, 510. 
45 Transmitted in Telegram 2328 from London, October 9, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-957, NARA; 
“The Five Year Itch,” Cyprus Mail, October 7, 1957. 
46 For a summary of press reaction to the Brighton statement see:  FS Despatch Athens 244, October 10, 
1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/10-1057; FS Despatch Nicosia 32, October 10, 1957: ibid., 747C.00/10-1057. 
47 “The Five Year Itch,” Cyprus Mail, October 7, 1957. 
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Consul Belcher worried that the statement might cause EOKA to rebuild its strength as a 
counter to what would likely be an uptick in Turkish efforts to combat enosis. The 
American Consul was not wrong. On October 9, the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazil Küçük 
summed up the Turkish position towards the Labour statement: “the Labour Party action 
will force the Turkish community so far obedient to laws and serving the cause of justice 
to defend its rights by the use of force.”48
 
 This was an ominous threat.  
Belcher agreed with Deputy Governor Sinclair’s opinion that the Labour statement had 
greatly complicated efforts to achieve a solution. He recommended that rather than sit 
idly by and wait for a Labour takeover of the Government of the United Kingdom, the 
US should continue its efforts with the Greek and Turkish Governments to achieve a 
solution as soon as possible.49
 
 
American Neutrality in the UN Twelfth Session 
 
On July 12, 1957, Greece submitted for the fourth time the “Question of Cyprus” for 
inclusion in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly. The US chose to play 
referee and try to “exercise a moderating influence” in order to keep the British and 
Greeks from each other’s throats in this, the latest excursion into the international 
forum.50
                                                 
48 Küçük quoted in Belcher, FS Despatch 32, “Cypriot reaction to Labour Party Statement on Cyprus, 
“October 10, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-1057, NARA. 
  On September 17, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to discuss the current state 
49 Ibid., 2. 
50 Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State: “The Question of Cyprus,” September 14, 1957: 
FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 503-506. 
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affairs with regard to the Cyprus. The President had little to add except to repeat his usual 
tin-eared comment that “Cyprus never belonged to Greece.” 51
 
   
The run-up to the Twelfth Session followed a familiar pattern, with the US unable to 
persuade Greece to refrain from submitting their resolution and with Greece attempting to 
press the Americans to support their claim for self-determination by citing internal 
stability issues. Anxiety about a communist overthrow of the Karamanlis Government, 
however, was not as urgent an issue for the US as it had been in previous years. Hence, 
Greece could no longer summon the specter of the communist threat in order to extract 
support from the State Department for its claim at the UN.52
 
  
Ambassador Lodge, one of the US officials most sympathetic to the Greek case, asked to 
be allowed to support a Greek compromise which the British might deem acceptable.53 
Britain, however, was not prepared to act without first sounding out the Turks and would 
therefore not consent to any compromise, except for an anemic proposal to which Greece 
would never agree.54
 
  
                                                 
51 “The Sec. said the Greek-Turkey thing is a mess. The Pres. said the Greeks are demanding unless we take 
their side, they will be tough. The Sec. said we probably won’t favor putting it on the UN Agenda because 
if it comes up, it will be shambles, but we need more definite commitments from the British. They dragged 
the Turks in and got them excited so the issue is considered to be Greek-Turkish and not Greek-British. The 
Pres. said Cyprus never belonged to Greece,” Editorial Note: Telcon between President Eisenhower and 
Dulles, September 17, 1957:ibid., 506. 
52 An OCB report in December later confirms this view stating that “currently there is no communist threat 
to Greek internal security. For the past five years there has been political stability and reasonable economic 
growth:” OCB Report: “Operations Plan for Greece: Objectives and Special Operating Guidance, 
“December 11, 1957: ibid., 606. 
53 Lodge to Dulles, Embtel New York Delegation 489, November 28, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-
2857, NARA. 
54 Lodge to Dulles, Embtel New York Delga. 550, December 5, 1957:ibid., 747C.00/12-557. 
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On December 9, Averoff approached Lodge following the First Committee adjournment 
and “urged in the strongest terms the US remain neutral and abstain from voting on 
Greek self-determination resolution.” When Lodge asked Averoff whether there was 
reason to hope that Greece and Britain would agree on a resolution, the Foreign Minister 
replied affirmatively, but made it clear that Greece could never agree to any resolution 
“stipulating parties to [the] dispute since this would give Turkey veto power over any 
solution.” On the basis of Averoff’s statement, Lodge suggested that he be authorized to 
assume a neutral position on the Greek resolution should it come to a vote, at the same 
time, recognizing that it would be preferable if this did not happen.55
 
 
At this stage, the consensus at the bureau of European Affairs (EUR) was that Greece 
should no longer be permitted to try to blackmail the US into supporting its claim by 
voting against their item at the UN. The Americans, however, were not quite prepared to 
go that far and ultimately opted to abstain on the vote of self-determination for the 
Cypriots.56
 
  
At the last minute, Greece agreed to an amendment expressing its willingness to engage 
in further negotiations and discussions with all concerned parties. The amended Greek 
resolution was adopted by the First Committee. It failed, however, to obtain the two-
thirds majority necessary for final approval in a vote at a plenary meeting of the 
Assembly on December 14. The final tally was 31 for and 23 against, with the 24 
                                                 
55 Lodge to Dulles, Embtel New York Delga. 571, December 9, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 516. 
56 Nicolet, ibid., 110. 
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abstentions, among them the US.57
                                                 
57 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, 75. 
  As a result, the biggest Greek success at the UN thus 
far had also been a failure. 
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Chapter XIV 
 
 
Derailing the Spaak Initiative  
 
While Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the US were occupied at the UN, NATO Secretary-
General Spaak was actively seeking a resolution to the simmering Cyprus conflict. The 
US and, less enthusiastically, Britain had earlier agreed that the Secretary-General should 
“adopt a general method of collecting views” of Greece, Turkey, and Britain and look for 
a “common understanding on an interim arrangement” while taking care to avoid 
advocating any particular solution. Spaak, however, had other ideas and appeared to be 
deviating from this script. According to Dulles, the Secretary-General had “already 
attempted [to] persuade [the] parties of [the] merits of […] guaranteed independence, 
without success.” The Secretary-General decided to take the upper hand because none of 
the parties involved was inclined to accept a proposal put forward by another. 1
 
  
At a time when Greece and Turkey were certain to rebuff any proposal the other country 
endorsed, the Americans had warned Spaak that NATO’s role as a mediator could 
become seriously compromised and that it would be best to engage in quiet diplomacy 
and avoid promoting any particular course of action.2
                                                     
1 Dulles, Deptel London 2592, October 7, 1957:FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV,  509. 
  Eager to move forward and 
confident in his ability, Spaak disregarded the State Department warning and instead 
proceeded to explore specific solutions. These included a plan for a combined guaranteed 
2 Ibid. 
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independence and dominion status with the Greeks, or a NATO guarantee for military 
assurances and minority guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots.3
 
  
Spaak’s self-assurance was not shared by State Department officials, however. After 
reporting that he had been in touch with all of the principally interested parties, he said he 
believed that his discussions had been useful in clarifying the problem. He also said he 
was confident that in a few months he might be able to propose a solution.4  The State 
Department feared that Spaak might “run with the ball in the wrong direction” by 
committing US support for a solution to which there was no general agreement.5
 
  
When Spaak proposed the idea for a NATO conference, Dulles knew it was time to rein 
him in by reaffirming his original mandate.6  Convinced that he would be able to make a 
breakthrough before the UN debate in mid-November, the Secretary-General devised a 
framework for a settlement based upon ideas assembled from meetings with the British 
and Greeks that might also be acceptable to the Turks.7 At this point, there appeared to be 
a revelation on the part of the Greeks regarding Turkey’s attitude, signaling a major shift 
in Anglo-Greek relations. This is confirmed by Averoff who cited the “intransigence” of 
Turkey and the “prospects of renewed fighting” because of it.8
                                                     
3 Frederick E. Noting Jr., Deputy Head of the Mission to NATO, to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 837, 
October 7, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-757, NARA. 
  The Greek Foreign 
4  Memcon between delegations of the US and NATO, October 24, 1957:FRUS, 1955-1957, IV, 174 
5 As told by Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 2352, October 10, 1957: ibid., doc. 747C.00/10-1057, 2. 
6 Dulles, Deptel Paris Topol 1287, October 30, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-2257, NARA. 
7  Paris Polto 1333, November 18, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-1857, NARA. 
8 The Security situation had indeed begun to deteriorate in October 1957, with Grivas making bombing 
attacks on the island, riots had erupted the week of the UN debate, see Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the 
International Status of Cyprus, 121; “Riots and Resolution,” Time, December 23, 1957. 
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Minister said that “the Greek people now “realize that not the United Kingdom, but 
Turkey stood in the way of a solution of the Cyprus problem.”9
  
 
The Spaak initiative consisted of a formula for a settlement that included guaranteed 
independence for Cyprus, a NATO base under British control, and an international statute 
safeguarding minority rights.10   The US was unconvinced and feared that it would be 
counterproductive to “engage the prestige” of the Secretary-General with such a solution 
at this time, reaffirming the general American inclination for more restrained 
explorations.11
 
 Spaak continued to work behind the scenes throughout the fall of 1957, 
but it was apparent that a solution would not be found that year. In the absence of clear 
American support, the Spaak initiative became one more abandoned and failed attempt to 
resolve the Cyprus problem.  
At this stage, the US understood that no new departures would be undertaken until after 
the installation of the new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, who first had to have the 
opportunity to review the situation and make recommendations. The Americans hoped 
that the change in governorship might provide a new opportunity for the continuation of 
quiet diplomacy with the possibility of wringing concessions from both the Greeks and 
the Turks. 12
                                                     
9 Quoted in Memcon, Department of State Washington, December 2, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 514. 
  While Spaak proposals may have failed to win the support of the interested 
parties, as a result of his efforts, Britain now showed itself open to the possibility of 
finding a solution through NATO.  
10  Burgess to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 1333, November 18, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-1857, 
NARA. 
11 Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 3302, November 11, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/11-2257. 
12 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) 
to Dulles Washington, December 9, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXI, 518. 
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Changing of the Guard 
 
In December 1957, HMG announced that Harding would be replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, 
the Governor of Jamaica. As governor, Harding had become identified with operations 
against EOKA by instituting a number of hard-line measures including executions, 
curfews, school closures, communal fines, and 20,000-soldier man hunts. He banished 
Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles for inflaming Greek Cypriot desire for enosis and 
publicly stated that the British Government should never negotiate with him, although he 
had earlier attempted to do so. Clearly, if Britain hoped to have any chance for a political 
settlement, Harding needed to go.13
 
   
Holland, however, cites two other reasons for his removal. The first was the loss of 
substantial support of his security forces for rescuing “photojournalist” and EOKA 
member Nicos Sampson from the gallows,14 a man he had called a “dedicated killer if 
there ever was one.”15
 
 The second reason was the Castle statement which encouraged the 
Greeks to retire to the trenches rather than continue political discussion. 
Although released from exile in March 1957, Makarios had still not yet been allowed to 
return to Cyprus. Despite his absence, not to mention his obstinacy, it was clear that that 
no other Greek Cypriot leader had the authority to move negotiations forward. With this 
in mind, Belcher, with the support of James K. Penfield, Counselor of the Embassy in 
Athens seized the occasion of the change in the governorship to put forward the 
                                                     
13 “Time for a Change,” Time, November 4, 1957. 
14 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 206. 
15 Quote attributed to Harding in “Autobiographical Notes,” (no pub.)1974. 2. 
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suggestion that the Archbishop be allowed to return to the island. In a letter to Bruce 
Laingen at the Bureau of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Consul Belcher argued that 
it was the only way to restore normality to the island.16 Belcher, however, was not 
optimistic that this would happen given that Harding on his way out had urged the delay of 
the Archbishop’s return until after an international agreement had been reached so as not to 
further antagonize the Turks. 17
 
 
Then again, Harding did agree with Belcher’s view that the US needed to more forcefully 
engage with regard to Cyprus. According to Holland, this view represents “[…] a unique 
instance […] of a British colonial governor calling for American interference in the affairs 
of his own territory.”18 Indeed, Eisenhower, himself, during the fall of 1957 was told, most 
notably by Montgomery, that” it was "high time we got the Cyprus problem settled"” even 
if that meant “bang[ing] together the heads of Karamanlis and Menderes."19
 
  
Even more telling was Karamanlis’s observation following the UN debate in December 
that the US “must intervene decisively”— after which Averoff added that “the US was the 
only power which could bring about a solution.” Secretary Dulles responded by pointing 
out that while the US sympathized with Greece, it had no “mandate to settle the Cyprus 
problem,” and therefore, could only hope to “appeal to reason on both sides.” 20
                                                     
16 Belcher to Laingen, Letter Lot 60D39, Entry 1315, NEA, GTI, files relating to Greece and Cyprus, 1955-
1958, NARA. 
  In reality, 
the State Department was growing weary of the wrangling and wanted to buy time until Sir 
17  Belcher to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 113, November 11, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-257, NARA. 
18 Holland, ibid., 209. 
19 Montgomery to Eisenhower, Letter, November 1957: Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, 
DD-E Library. 
20 Memcon between delegations of the US and Greece Paris: Cyprus,” December 19, 1957: FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXIV, 525-526. 
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Hugh Foot assumed office, with the hope that he might bring new ideas in the search for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem. 
 
Sir Hugh Foot arrived in Cyprus on December 3, 1957, and almost immediately began to 
prepare ground for new negotiations. Cyprus would soon discover that it had a new kind 
of governor. Unarmed and unescorted, Foot toured the streets of Nicosia, mingling with 
the locals and, in a gesture of good faith, granted clemency to hundreds of detainees. Five 
days before Christmas, he triggered celebrations in Nicosia by releasing 89 men and 11 
women from detention camps who were accused of supporting EOKA. All of this was in 
marked contrast to his predecessor, who never ventured out unless heavily escorted. 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike were favorably impressed, calling him "a governor with 
guts."21
 
  
The view from Ankara, however, was angry consternation that Sir John Harding, the 
military man, had been replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, the colonial civil servant with a 
reputation for having a liberal predisposition. Ankara’s apprehension that Britain might 
no longer be relied upon to hold Cyprus was aggravated by the Labour Party resolution 
calling for self-determination following an interim period of self-government.22
 
   
At this point, however, Britain was open to any solution that might be acceptable to both 
Greece and Turkey, provided that it would not further compromise its position in the 
                                                     
21 “Riots and Resolution,” Time, December 23, 1957. 
22 Memcon Dulles Washington, October 22, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 513. 
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Middle East.  Clearly, Britain desperately wanted to be rid of Cyprus, but did not want to 
throw out the colonial bathwater with the baby.23
 
 
The Foot Plan 
 
In January 1958, the Americans, impressed by Sir Hugh Foot’s performance in changing 
the general atmosphere on the island, decided to have another go at making progress in 
Cyprus.24 In the month since he became governor, Foot had strived to build what he 
called "bridges of trust" between his administration and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities. Foot journeyed to London to meet with Macmillan and the Colonial Office 
to work out the details of his plan.  While indulging his fondness for Biblical analogy, he 
was careful not to be overly optimistic saying, “on our journey to the Promised Land, we 
are not yet at the Jordan. We are just about at the Red Sea. Our task must be to find a 
good road toward an eventual settlement."25
 
  
The Foot Plan called for a seven-year period of self-government for Cyprus under 
Britain, prior to self-determination and on equal terms for both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. In other words, double self-determination. It also called for the preservation of 
bases under British sovereignty, along with the possibility of a Turkish base, which the 
Turks had indicated that they might accept in lieu of partition. Foreign Secretary Lloyd 
defended the idea of double self-determination by maintaining that Britain could not 
                                                     
23 Memcon between delegations of the US and NATO, October 24, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, IV, 180. 
24 Letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles London, January 9, 1958: FRUS, 1958-
1960, X, Part I, 567. 
25 “The Bridge Builder,” Time, January 13, 1958; journalists such as Ömer Sami Coşar wrote scathingly 
about the Foot Plan, but all Turkish newspapers of the time expressed suspicion to one degree or another 
about  Foot and his proposals see, Ömer Sami Coşar, “Kıbrıs İçin Plan mı?” (“New Plan for Cyprus?”), 
Cumhurryiet, January 9, 1958.  
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abandon the principle since it had already committed itself to the idea. To do so would 
compromise any hope of cooperation from the Turkish Cypriots. Although the British 
expressed doubts that the scheme would work, they agreed to accept any solution that had 
the acceptance of Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities. Regarding 
procedure, the Turkish Government was to be informed of the plan in advance of Greece 
who, everyone agreed, would be a tougher sell. 26
 
    
Counselor Penfield warned the State Department that Greece would likely interpret the 
self-determination formula as partition and, hence, would categorically reject it. Roger 
Allen was equally “pessimistic” about Greek acceptance and the likelihood of developing 
any formula that would be agreed to by the parties concerned. Notwithstanding this, 
Penfield concluded that since there was no better alternative on the horizon every effort 
should be taken to help the Foot plan succeed, and Washington and London agreed. 27
 
    
Foot, however, seemed to have the utmost confidence that his plan would succeed. 
Indeed, the consensus among the bureaucrats of London and Cyprus was that the new 
governor was being "a little bright-eyed about it all."28  Still, Foot was convinced that the 
plan would be embraced by the large majority who were “increasingly fed up with the 
current uncertain conditions on the island.” He believed that after the Cypriots accepted 
the proposal, Greece would follow suit. 29
 
 It must have therefore come as quite a shock 
when his plan was spurned by Ankara.   
                                                     
26 Lloyd to Dulles, Letter, January 9, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. I, 567. 
27 Penfield, Embtel Athens 1936, January 14: ibid., 570-571. 
28 “The Bridge Builder,” Time, January 13, 1958. 
29 Barbour, Embtel London 4121, January 14, 1958:ibid., 572. 
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On January 14, the Turkish Government rejected the Foot Plan and, instead of an 
intervening period of self-determination, suggested that Cyprus be partitioned at the end 
of one year and simultaneously invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to a meeting 
to discuss “final disposition of the island.” If Greece refused to attend such a meeting, it 
was suggested that the British and Turkish Governments settle the Cyprus issue between 
themselves.30
 
 The vision of the Promised Land was slipping away, and the Foot Plan was 
beginning to look like forty more years in the desert. 
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Averoff, who had heard only whispers of the British plan, 
proposed the idea that perhaps direct talks between Greece and Turkey might be more 
productive. On January 22, Averoff met with Penfield for a discussion on Cyprus. 
Among other things, he told the American Counselor that he was convinced 
“emphatically and categorically,” after meeting with the Turkish Ambassador to Greece 
Vergin, that Turkey was preparing to offer to settle the dispute on the basis of Greek 
acceptance of two essential points: “1.) Turkish troops in Cyprus [and] 2.) special 
minority arrangements which could remove Turks from Greek domination.” The 
Ambassador purportedly closed the discussion by adding "whenever you have anything 
to tell me, I am authorized immediately to take [a] plane to Ankara to report." Later the 
Counselor reported that he found it difficult to believe that Vergin would have said these 
things to Averoff unless he was indeed authorized to” hint at a new Turkish offer” on a 
footing acceptable to Greece. Taking into account that there was little else on the table, 
Penfield believed that the offer might be worthy of consideration by the Greeks. 31
                                                     
30 Embtel 1910 Ankara, January 16, 1958: SDCDF, 747C.00/1-1658, NARA. 
   
31 Penfield Embtel Athens 2015, January 22, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.I, 579. 
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The suggestion for a Turkish base in Cyprus re-emerged in talks between Lloyd and 
Foreign Minister Zorlu in Ankara during the Baghdad Pact meeting, in which Dulles was 
present.  Governor Foot initially took part, as well, but left after five days. Zorlu, who  
was notorious for his intractable and abrasive manner and characterized by Governor 
Foot as “the rudest man I ever met,”32
 
 insisted upon three points as the minimum 
conditions for Turkey’s acceptance of the British plan, the most important being the 
availability of a base.  
Lloyd asked Dulles if there was any chance that Greece would go along with such the 
plan considering these conditions, Dulles thought an arrangement for a base might be 
possible if conditions did not also include any action which would likely lead to partition. 
The discussions broke down, however, when Zorlu added too many unacceptable 
requirements. As Charles Foley, editor of the Times of Cyprus put it; Lloyd had been 
“pounded solidly” for five days.33  Disappointed and undoubtedly exhausted, he 
eventually told Menderes that he wished thereafter to deal only with him.34
 
 
Meanwhile, Dulles met with Menderes in Ankara and informed him that he thought 
Turkey was entitled to “strategic security” that amounted to more than “mere paper 
guarantees that Cyprus would ever fall into hands hostile to Turkey.” In order to receive 
these guarantees, however, Turkey needed to be “flexible with respect to all other aspects 
of the settlement,” an obvious reference to the idea of a Turkish base— and one which 
                                                     
32  Sir Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom, (New York: Harper & Row), 1964, 159; Prime Minister Macmillan 
apparently shared this opinion of the Turkish Foreign Minister, saying he was “one of the stupidest – 
except for low cunning—rudest, and most cassant men I have ever met, Horne, Macmillan, ii, 102. 
33  Charles Foley, Times of Cyprus, February 1, 1958 quoted here in Holland, ibid., 230. 
34Dulles, Embtel Ankara Secto 29, January 29, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.1, 582.  
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was beginning to have some appeal. 35
The Secretary said that he thought the Turks had a good case regarding Cyprus when they put it on a basis 
of security and said he thought the Turks had to be satisfied on this aspect of their claims regarding Cyprus. 
As he saw it, the idea of such a base made some sense. This satisfaction should be provided by something 
more than a paper guarantee. He thought that it might conceivably be provided by a Turkish base on the 
Island […]
 This point is further confirmed in a discussion on 
February 11 between the Secretary and Ambassador James W. Riddleberger: 
36
 
  
Dulles’ statement to Menderes, along with the knowledge of Britain’s desire to be rid of 
the island— even if it meant partition— could only have served to encourage Turkish 
intransigence.  Indeed, the Turkish position towards Cyprus had recently begun to 
harden, touching off a new wave of attacks on the island.  At the NSC meeting on 
January 30, CIA Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell reported that “Cyprus had 
been the scene of repeated violence.” And what was even more alarming was that the 
Turkish Cypriots were beginning to attack the British for the first time in an effort to 
force partition of the island.37 Meanwhile, the Ethnarchy Council warned EOKA leader 
Grivas that a recommencement of violence might prove harmful to their cause and only 
squander the sympathy won at the UN. In fact, in early April, Foot offered to secretly 
meet with Grivas “alone and unarmed any place at any time” in an effort to convince the 
EOKA leader to restrain from resuming hostilities.38
In March, Lloyd expressed the opinion that the Greeks might be more likely to settle now 
than they had in the past since they seemed finally to understand the strength of Turkish 
feeling and realized that time was not working in their favor. The Turks, on the other 
 
                                                     
35 Dulles Memcon with Menderes, January 29, 1958:ibid., 583. 
36 Editorial note: February 11, 1958: ibid, 591.  
37 Editorial note:”Summary of the Cyprus Situation at 353rd NSC Meeting,” January 30, 1958:ibid., 584. 
38 Quoted in “Out of the Box,” Time, July 7, 1958. 
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hand, were growing more intransigent.39 Nowhere was this more apparent than in an 
incident that took place at a Turkish Party at a restaurant where the announcement of new 
bombings brought “Turk toasts to EOKA.”40
Recognition of the dilemma confronting Britain was revealed in a conversation between 
Belcher and Governor Foot in early February. According to Belcher, Britain’s ability to 
make further progress was hamstrung not only by the hard bargaining of the Turks, but 
also by the willingness of both Greeks and Turks to use violence to advance their 
respective cases.  
  
The British were now facing the question of “how to disengage without giving either or 
both Greeks and Turks [an] excuse for further resort to violence.” Furthermore, Britain 
was now considering the Cyprus problem as one whereby the entire future of NATO and 
the Baghdad Pact were in the balance, and it might be forced to choose between Greece 
and Turkey. If this were the case, it was clear Britain would choose the latter. While the 
British seemed prepared to confront EOKA if necessary, they did not want to 
compromise British-Turkish relations by having to put down Turkish Cypriot violence as 
well.  
While Greece expressed a qualified approval of the Foot plan, it opposed the idea of 
double self-determination and objected to the prospect of a Turkish base on the island.41
                                                     
39 Embtel from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, March 29, 
1958:ibid., 598. 
 
Greece did, however, promise to consider any plan, including a provision for a Turkish 
base, if provided with the full details.  Greece’s new spirit of cooperation was termed by 
40 Belcher Contel Nicosia 304, April 16, 1958, ibid., 599. 
41 Editorial note, February 11, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 591. 
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Penfield as the “most hopeful situation here since [the] Makarios-Harding talks [had] 
failed.”42  Greece’s new conciliatory attitude needed to be used to its best advantage. 
While the British were occupied with trying to “wean the Turks away from partition” 
with the possible option for a base, 43
 
 Governor Foot was engaged in outlining a new plan 
for a Constitution. 
Bases for Partition  
 
In March of 1958, a governmental crisis erupted in Athens which left the Foreign Office 
not “unduly” disturbed. Believing it might be some time before the Greek Government 
would be able and willing to deal with problem, the search for a solution to the Cyprus 
problem shifted to the British Government and, to a lesser extent, the State Department.44
 
  
The two most pressing concerns were the question of internal government and the 
question of international status. The most pressing concern for the US was the latter.  
Acting Secretary Herter feared that the British were being overly optimistic about the 
parties’ readiness to compromise in this regard. He was especially worried about the 
Turks.45
                                                     
42 Penfield Embtel Athens 2243, February 14 1958: ibid., 593. 
  Ambassador Whitney had informed the State Department that the Turkish 
Government was prepared to accept the idea of a base provided that there were three of 
them and that they be located mostly in urban areas, a condition viewed by the Foreign 
Office to be “not very realistic.”   Furthermore, Turkey expected to receive these bases 
43 Dulles Deptel Washington, February 22, 1958: ibid., 594. 
44 Karamanlis resigned in early March after fifteen deputies and two ministers voted against a bill to change 
the Greek electoral system. He was voted back into power in mid-May, Whitney Embtel London 5368, 
March 11, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt 1, 595; Before he resigned, Karamanlis took steps to insure that 
the caretaker government had the power to continue negotiations on Cyprus, Hatzivassiliou, ibid.,  131. 
45 Herter Deptel Ankara 2850, March 12, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1158, NARA. 
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immediately—or at least in very near future. It also expected any constitution for the 
island to be federal in nature, i.e., grant broad autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. 46
 
  
These provisions would never be acceptable to the Greeks who, in effect, would consider 
them a disguised form of partition. Dulles, however, was not ready to scuttle the idea of a 
base for Turkey as an acceptable trade off for self-determination for the rest of the island, 
believing it to be “a hopeful avenue to [a] compromise solution.”47 It was, of course, 
necessary to make it clear to the Turks that a base would have to be a substitute for 
partition and not merely a “stepping stone thereof.”48
 
   
Belcher’s chief concern, however, was that the base idea had the same drawback as 
another popular American idea, guaranteed independence. But while independence could 
potentially be a move towards enosis, a Turkish base on Cyprus could similarly be 
regarded as a move towards partition.49
 
 The former would never be acceptable to the 
Turks any more than the latter would be acceptable to the Greeks. 
                                                     
46 Whitney Embtel London 5368, March 11, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt 1, 595. 
47 Dulles, Deptel Athens 2979, April 3, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-2758, NARA. 
48 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 178 March 11, 1958: SDCDF, doc.747C.00/3 – 1758, NARA. 
49 Belcher FS Despatch Nicosia, 78: “Two Alternatives to Enosis or Partition,” April 11, 1958: ibid, doc. 
747C.00/4-1158, NARA. 
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Chapter XV 
 
The Cyprus problem has always been this simple choice of evils[…] It is not until we 
have closed the door on Enosis by physically and irreversibly readmitting the presence of 
Turkey into Cyprus, that we could ever get the Greek and Greek Cypriots to accept the 
principles of partnership. —John Reddaway, Minute, May 6, 1958 
 
 
The Macmillan Plan 
 
In late February, Governor Foot submitted proposals for a seven-year partnership plan to 
the Colonial Office. History would remember it as the Macmillan Plan, although it was 
largely the invention of Governor Foot’s starkly pragmatic aide John Reddaway.  Its 
central features included a three-man commission composed of the British Governor plus 
one Greek and one Turkish representative, (in addition to six elected members, four 
Greeks and two Turks) with the Governor exercising a veto in foreign affairs, defense, 
and internal security; an option for Greek or Turkish nationality while retaining British 
citizenship; and complete autonomy in communal affairs under two independent 
assemblies elected by Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively.1
 
  
If Greece and Turkey agreed to this “adventure in partnership,” Britain would be willing, 
when the time was right, to “share sovereignty” of the island with them.2
                                                 
1 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 236. 
  The plan, 
which was publicly introduced on June 19, 1958, fundamentally envisioned an enterprise 
between Greece, Turkey, the UK, and the two Cypriot communities. The scheme was 
especially attractive to Macmillan who had earlier promoted a similar idea. But it was not 
2  Quoted in “Romans, 5:3-4,” Time, June 30, 1958 
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until early May that the State Department was informed about this forthcoming joint 
venture. At a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, British 
Foreign Minister Lloyd told Secretary Dulles that Britain’s “agonizing reappraisal of the 
whole Cyprus business” had led to the development of a new plan.3
 
  
Since the Turks were proving to be “unapproachable” on the subject of dropping partition 
in return for a base,4 the British Government was now prepared to move forward with the 
“tridominium” idea following the Greek elections. While aware of the “practical 
difficulties,” Lloyd stressed that Prime Minister Macmillan himself was prepared to go to 
Athens and Ankara “for three months if necessary” in order to gain acceptance. 
Moreover, Lloyd let it be known that the Prime Minister was not above begging if need 
be— and if that failed—exploring “some kind of partition.”5
Although Lloyd realized that Dulles was hostile to the idea of partition, at least in 
principle, he asked the Secretary to consider it as a potential option. Dulles told the 
Foreign Minister that the US was not opposed to any plan that seemed likely to work, but 
he warned, as he did previously, that the Greek Government would never accept any 
solutions that gave Turkey official jurisdiction over the island: “today the Turks have 
only a moral position because Cyprus is close to Turkey, but they have no juridical status 
there.”  Dulles believed that the Greeks would never acquiesce in “granting them such a 
status.”  
  
                                                 
3 Memcon between delegations of the U.S. and the U.K. to the 21st Ministerial Meeting of NAC, 
Copenhagen: “Cyprus,” May 4, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.1, 605. 
4 On May 5 Lloyd met with Zorlu at the same meeting in Copenhagen where it became clear that Turkey 
was not willing to abandon the partition-for-base idea, rendering it for all practical purposes dead.  
5 Ibid. 
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The Secretary still seemed to favor the idea of offering the Turks a base, an idea he 
believed that Britain could promote on its own. Dulles argued that the British could just 
tell the Turks “this is the way it will be,” and if they chose not to take the offer, that 
would be their own decision. He believed that that plan might be easier to advance 
compared to trying to convince the Greeks and Turks into accepting a tridominium 
solution which he thought had little chance of success. But still he promised that the US 
would help in any way possible. The Foreign Minister was also concerned that the 
Greeks, who were uncertain as to where Ankara really stood on Cyprus, were becoming 
frightened regarding Turkish intentions. Lloyd assured Dulles that they would not make 
the same error as they had in the past by refusing to make public all offers on the Cyprus 
question. This time Britain would inform both the Greeks and Turks of the plan ahead of 
the announcement but that “Mr. Macmillan would not drop this idea simply because 
somebody says no to it at the outset.”6
At this stage it should be pointed out that December 1956 pledge was, if not officially, 
implicitly part of the plan. The Macmillan plan offered a number of scenarios: 
continuation of British rule along with limited participation of Turkish and Greek 
officials, but potentially also independence; self-administration for the Turkish Cypriots; 
or the continuation of British rule. In essence, the plan gave the Greek Cypriots two 
choices, parity with the Turkish Cypriots or partition. As Hatzivassiliou points out, 
contained within the Macmillan plan was the “element of blackmail because it could be 
implemented with the cooperation of one community and one state.”
     
7
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
  
7 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 137-138. 
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Macmillan’s enthusiasm for his self-named plan made it difficult for the Americans to 
convince the British of the infeasibility of a tridominium solution for Cyprus. Acting 
Secretary Herter suggested to Dulles that he might try to persuade the British to further 
test the possibility of a proposal granting the Turks a base on island in place of partition. 
The Americans believed the plan to be fundamentally flawed since it left open the 
question of who had the “ultimate authority in the event of a dispute between the co-
domini or in case of an emergency on island.”8  But even more so, the US believed that 
the condominium would never be accepted by the Greeks and was bound to stir violent 
reactions in both Greece and Cyprus. 9
On May 17, an outline of the Macmillan plan, along with its tentative application, was 
published in the London Times. Since the Americans were anxious that elements of the 
plan not be disclosed prematurely, they were dismayed to find that it had been leaked to 
the press. The US was surprised to learn that the plan did not involve partition, nor did it 
include provisions for a Turkish base on the island. Furthermore, emphasis had shifted 
from the tridominium idea to the establishment of communal assemblies and a ministerial 
council, with the “eventual goal” of a probable future shared responsibility or 
tridominium.
  
10
Needless to say, US officials were bewildered. At the State Department, Dulles was at 
pains to understand the shift in strategy, and in a telegram to London he asked 
Ambassador Whitney to explain “the major factors that led to [the] evolution of British 
thinking away from the base idea, to [the] tridominium idea momentarily and finally to 
    
                                                 
8 Herter to Dulles, Deptel Paris Tosec 82, May 9, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 607. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Whitney Embtel London 6634, May 17, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 610. 
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[the] communal assembly/ministerial council formula […].”11  Moreover, the Secretary 
wanted to know if it was only Turkish opposition to the base idea that convinced the 
British to abandon it without first taking advantage of the assistance the US had offered 
in Copenhagen. Whitney’s response was that the base idea was abandoned “at least 
temporarily” due to Turkish opposition, and that the British felt that no assistance from 
the US could change their mind.  As to the tridominium, it was “shelved” due to US 
misgivings about the practicality of its implementation.12
In a message on May 23, Lloyd informed Dulles that Lennox-Boyd told the House of 
Commons that the new plan would be announced no later than June 17 and that it 
outlined the broad terms of the proposed plan. With respect to the abandonment of the 
tridominium idea, the Foreign Secretary explained that the Government had concluded 
that “serious obstacles” prevented its immediate implementation—the most serious 
obstacle being its unacceptability to the Greeks. Likewise, the proposals for a Turkish 
base were also abandoned despite support from Spaak and the US for this solution. And 
since no final plan, at least one which would satisfy all parties, was at hand, the best 
course would be an interim solution.  Although the Embassy had been given a rough 
outline of the plan, Dulles had yet to receive an actual copy.
  
13
No Support for the Macmillan Plan 
   
Dulles’ reply to Lloyd left no question that he was even more incredulous about this 
solution than he had been about the tridominium idea. Not only would the plan be 
                                                 
11 Dulles Deptel London 8280 May 21, 1958: SDCDF, doc. &4&C.00/5-1758, NARA. 
12 Whitney Embtel London 6819, May 23, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 612-613. 
13 Lloyd to Dulles, Message, May 23, 1958: ibid, 614-615; Dulles finally received his copy on June 3: 
Caccia to Dulles, Letter including Macmillan Plan, June 3, ibid., 617-621. 
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rejected by Greece and the Greek Cypriots because it would clearly establish the Turkish 
Government as a participant in the affairs of Cyrus but also because it contained no 
provision for an eventual offer following Britain’s relinquishment of sovereignty over the 
island. Dulles urged the Foreign Secretary to reconsider the plan and determine if 
adjustments could be made in order to make it more palatable to the Greeks, or at least 
leave enough time for consultation with the Greeks and Turks in advance of a public 
announcement. The Secretary ended the letter with a tentative offer of US support, not for 
the plan itself, but an assurance that it would at least be given some consideration. 14
 In what Deputy Governor Sinclair called “their all-out bid for partition,”
  
15 on June 7 the 
TMT exploded a bomb outside of the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia. The explosion 
triggered rioting by Turkish Cypriots followed by counter-attacks from the Greek 
Cypriots.16
Gangs of angry Turks overran the Greek quarters of the city, burning buildings and 
attacking Greek Cypriots. The British were now in the midst of a “virtual Palestinian 
situation,” in other words, quitting the island to leave the communities to fight it out 
  
                                                 
14 Dulles to Lloyd, Letter May 27, 1958: Ibid, 616. 
15 Sinclair quoted in Belcher, Contel Nicosia 389, June 9, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 622. 
16The fact that this attack was Turkish in origin was confirmed by Rauf Denktaş in an interview for British 
television in 1984: "there was an explosion at the information bureau of the Turkish Consulate. A crowd 
has already gathered there, a crowd of the Turkish Cypriot community. And they almost immediately 
decided that Greeks had done it and they were swearing vengeance against the Greeks and so on. The 
explosion started a night of riots in Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots burned and looted Greek shops and homes. 
Soon came counter-attacks... Later on, a friend of mine, whose name must be kept secret, was to confess to 
me that he had put this little bomb in their doorway in order to create an atmosphere of tension so that 
people would know that Turkish Cypriots mattered:” End of Empire: Cyprus, Britain’s Grim Legacy- 
ITV, June 26, 1984; an earlier similar account was also provided by Emin Dirvana, then Turkish 
Ambassador to Cyprus in a letter to the in the Turkish newspaper, Milliyet on May 15, 1964: "I was told 
that on June the 7th 1958, a bomb was placed in the Turkish Information Office in Nicosia by people who, 
as it was later ascertained had no connection at all with the Greek Cypriots. The Turks of Nicosia were 
filled with so-called "sacred-indignation" and committed incidents similar to those on September the 6th 
and 7th [1955] in Istanbul:” “Former Turkish Ambassador in Cyprus unmasks Denktash and reveals the 
plot” reprinted in, Cyprus Today, Supplements 1-5, 3rd series, 22nd April-5th June, 1964. 
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between themselves. 17  The following day, the riots spread throughout the island. On 
June 9 Consul Belcher reported that a 24-hour curfew had been imposed in Nicosia to 
prevent further deterioration of the situation, and Foot was attempting to quiet the 
situation by meeting with the leaders of the two communities.18  While the Governor was 
occupied with making friendly overtures to the Cypriots, the army which was calling for 
tougher measures on the island took to calling the beleaguered Governor, “Sir Hugh 
Pussyfoot.” One disgruntled officer put it plainly: “this trouble can be quieted down. 
We’ve had tougher ones, you know. From the Bronze Age through to us, these people 
have had their affairs run for them. That’s their way.”19
In July, the Governor visited the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to try to persuade the Turkish 
Cypriots to restrain from further violence. . He also wrote a conciliatory letter to the 
Archbishop Makarios, offering to allow him to return to the island once the violence had 
subsided. Foot then flew to London to meet with Macmillan and other Conservative 
cabinet members, and to plead with Labour MPs not to “rock the boat” with regard to the 
Macmillan plan. Barbara Castle, however, was unconvinced and made an appeal to her 
Party to stand by its earlier pledge to grant the Cypriots the right to determine their own 
future. In other words, allow the Greek Cypriots to vote for enosis.  
 
Later, in a debate in the House of Commons, Aneurin Bevan, the “terror of the Tories,” 
summed up Labour’s position with regard to the Macmillan plan:  “we do not commend 
these proposals […] but we advise the Greeks and Turks not to reject them out of hand.” 
Labour did have one serious misgiving regarding the separate municipalities and worried 
                                                 
17 Sinclair quoted in Contel Nicosia 389, June 9, 1958, 622. 
18 Belcher ,Contel 388 Nicosia, June 9, 1958:SDCDF, 747C.00/6 - 958  
19 Quoted in “Bitter Breakdown,” Time, November 10, 1958. 
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that this feature would only solidify differences between the two communities rather than 
compel them to work to resolve them.20 Back in Cyprus, Grivas, in a gesture of defiance, 
issued a leaflet describing Governor Foot as a “Trojan Horse, “ and the Macmillan plan 
as a “new monster.” The Governor’s earlier offer to reach out to the EOKA leader had 
been rebuffed and instead he was told to “chew your plan and swallow it.”21
In a conversation with Ambassador Riddleberger in Athens, Vergin, the Turkish 
Ambassador, shared his personal observation about the contagious situation on Cyprus 
saying that “any fool who may break a window of his embassy in Athens can set off riots 
in Istanbul.”  This statement prompted the American Ambassador to observe that the 
Turkish Ambassador went as far as a representative can go in suggesting that nothing 
would be accomplished until the US decided to intervene and have a serious dialogue 
with both Ankara and Athens.
 Despite  
22
Meanwhile, as Cyprus was descending into chaos, Macmillan was en route to 
Washington to outline the British plan for Cyprus and try to sell it to a skeptical State 
Department. Although not confident, the Prime Minister was hopeful about the plan, 
calling it “perhaps the last chance” for a solution for the island.  Macmillan was also 
determined, once and for all, to put to rest the feasibility of Turkish demands for bases on 
Cyprus as a condition for acceptance of a final solution, an idea favored by Dulles. The 
Prime Minister said he foresaw one problem with this solution, (there were actually two 
  
                                                 
20 It was envisaged that Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be allowed to establish separate communal 
municipalities in the five largest towns on the island. This was especially troubling because the 
municipalities had been the one forum where all Cypriots could engage the political process. The separate 
municipalities issue  would become a major source of friction between the two communities following 
independence, see Diana Markides, The Issue of Separate Municipalities and the Birth of the New Republic 
of Cyprus: 1957-1963, (London: University of London press, 1998).    
21 Quoted here in “Out of the Box,” Time, July 7, 1958. 
22 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 3509: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 644. 
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problems, the other being that the Greeks could never be made to accept it) namely, when 
Britain finally did relinquish sovereignty (as far as security of the Island is concerned), it 
would leave “’practically a civil war”’ in its wake.”  
This solution, which Macmillan described as “partition minus,” would give the Turks 
leave to install troops throughout their base area, leaving the Greeks to respond in kind 
thus creating a situation tantamount to telling the communities to “go fight each other.” 
This situation would place Britain in the middle of a conflict it could not control, and one 
which would make the Palestinian recourse look inviting.23
Given the urgent situation on Cyprus, the State Department feared that Britain might be 
tempted to present the plan as a fait accompli to the Greeks and Turks, both of whom had 
received advance copies of the final draft. In a memorandum of conversation between 
Dulles and Macmillan, the Prime Minister assured his colleague that this was not the 
intention, and Britain would merely request that the Greek and Turkish Governments 
give serious study to it and use it as the basis for personal discussions with him.
   
24
Describing the plan as a “noble effort,” Dulles promised the US would lend “such 
support as we feel we can,” but that it would likely not support the plan publicly, since 
America would not wish to “engage her prestige in this way,” especially given that it had 
not even been consulted.
   
25
                                                 
23 Memcon between delegations of the US and UK: “Macmillan Talks, Cyprus” Washington, June 9-11, 
1958: ibid., 1, 625. 
  He did, however, promise private support from the US, but 
this was far less of a commitment than Macmillan had hoped for. 
24 ibid., 625-627. 
25 ibid., 627. 
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The emergency on Cyprus delayed the public announcement of the plan. Greece called 
the North Atlantic Council to lodge a formal protest against the events on the island. 
Athens was even considering breaking off diplomatic relations with Turkey. The Greek 
Government had already evacuated its NATO personnel from Izmir, a move that Zorlu 
called “childish,” adding that if Greece wanted to get out of NATO, “let her go, we 
would be better off without her.” This was exactly the sort of tense atmosphere the 
Americans were trying to avoid, and the last thing it wanted was to have “Greeks and 
Turks killing each other.”26 What was truly remarkable was Zorlu’s brazen complaint to 
the British that the riots were the responsibility of the British Government for attempting 
to force the Greek and Turkish Cypriots into “undesired cooperation.”27
On June 13, Herter contacted Eisenhower to tell him that the State Department thought 
that the US should do whatever it could to get the Greek and Turkish Governments “to 
keep their shirts on.”
   
28  Herter believed that the most effective way to do that was for the 
President to send personal messages to Karamanlis and Menderes. From his farm in 
Gettysburg, President Eisenhower was again in fine form with his response to the crisis, 
blaming the situation on the British whose “proposals haven’t helped but have made both 
sides mad.” 29 Adding insult to injury, Eisenhower sent nearly identical messages to both 
Prime Ministers, further infuriating the Greeks for failing to distinguish between the 
perpetrators and the victims.30
                                                 
26 Warren to Dulles, Embtel Ankara, 3079, June 15, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 647. 
 This was a charge the US would hear time and again. The 
President was also puzzled by the anti-American demonstrations taking place in Athens, 
27 Ministry of Turkey Communique quoted in FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 632. 
28 Herter, Telcon with President Eisenhower, June 13, 1958:FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt 1, 642 
29Ibid.,  641-642 
30  The Greeks were likely offended by the statement, "the great sacrifices your people and ours have made 
for peace must not be lost". Ibid., 642 
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and could not understand the “Greeks getting mad at us”— adding that “everywhere in 
the world everyone thinks we can fix everything. They don't realize we don't run the 
whole world.”  
Demonstrating an unsettling lack of awareness of the particulars, why he asked Dulles, 
since “Turkey is thinly populated,” was it not possible to relocate the 5,000 Turkish 
Cypriots to some place where they would be “in a better position.” The Secretary 
responded that “we would never get them out of there,” adding that the number of Turks 
was actually 160, 000— twenty percent of the island’s population. To that Eisenhower 
commented that “knocks out any resettlement” and “all we can do is pray.”31
 
 It was 
quickly becoming apparent to both the British and the Americans that the Cyprus dispute 
had the potential to become a greater threat to the western alliance than ever before, and 
it was imperative that Greece and Turkey be made to restrain their actions before it was 
too late to turn back.  
A Greek petition at the NAC led to discussions in Paris, during which the Americans 
along with Spaak, without endorsing the proposals, tried to urge the Greeks and Turks to 
seriously consider them, but to no avail. Both Greece and Turkey rejected the proposals 
at the NAC meeting on June 13, even before the British could publicly announce them. 
For its part, Greece wholly rejected the plan. In a conversation with Riddleberger, 
Averoff cited the “most serious defect” was that it created a Turkish legal right over 
Cyprus, and that even if the remainder of the plan were acceptable, no Greek Government 
could agree to a change in the effectual status of the island.  Launching into an emotional 
                                                 
31 Dulles, Telecon with President Eisenhower, June 14, 1958: ibid., 645. 
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diatribe, the Foreign Minister complained that the British had clearly allowed Turkey to 
blackmail them with threats of “unpleasant consequences” should they not provide 
“certain clarifications.” He added il ne manquait plus que ça – threatening to escalate the 
situation—
Neither was the US spared his indictment, complaining that the Greeks were convinced 
that the Americans had abandoned them in favor of backing a British pro-Turkish 
position. The fact that the Turks were also dissatisfied seemed not to register. In the end, 
Averoff thought it best that the British simply make an announcement that both Greece 
and Turkey had rejected the proposals. 
 should Britain again surrender to Turkish intransigence.  
32
Ambassador Melas was also quick to convey his displeasure with the Americans,  
“assert[ing] flatly that it was up to the United States to decide,” whether it did or did not 
“want Greece,” and pointing out once more that, “should the Karamanlis Government fall 
as a result of the British proposals, there was no alternative but the Communists.”
 
33
                                                 
32  Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 3481, June 12, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 631-633. 
  The 
State Department, however, was not buying it and had long ago stopped taking such 
hysterical declarations by the Ambassador seriously.  But the possibility of a military 
coup, as well as further unrest in Greece and Cyprus, was not as easily dismissed. On 
June 17, in a conversation with Riddleberger, Foreign Minister Averoff  “emphasized in 
strongest possible terms” the dangerous situation in Greece repeatedly stating "we are 
facing chaos," claiming that “even a military dictatorship would be ineffective.”  As 
33 Archer K. Blood (GTI), Memcon : “Cyprus, “ June 12, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1258, 1.  
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proof of this he pointed to the recent disaffection among lower ranking army officers in 
Greece and Cyprus.34
Macmillan expected that the Turks would also reject the proposals since they fell short of 
partition and, true to form they did. The Turkish government, which had so effectively 
stirred up mainland demonstrations in addition to the riots it had provoked on the island, 
knew it had the leverage to make Britain yield to its demands. It was only a matter of 
time when it would happen, and experience had taught them that if they waited long 
enough, the British would modify any plan that did not meet Turkey’s approval.
  
35
 
   
Foreign Minister Zorlu, of course, saw things differently. In a telegram to Eisenhower via 
the Department of State, he recycled the fatuous assertion of partition being a “sacrifice” 
Turkey was willing to make in the spirit of compromise. He also made the implausible 
claim that the idea of partition originated with Averoff and the Greeks:  
As you are already aware, Mr. President, the question was first created by Greece and all the efforts made 
by Turkey to find a peaceful solution have remained fruitless. Even when Turkey, with the object of 
reaching a compromise in this matter and at great sacrifice, accepted the idea of partition, which had first 
been put forward by Mr. Averoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and later recommended by the 
United Kingdom, Greece adopted a more pretentions (sic) attitude towards this concession and further 
intensified its encouragement of the campaign of terrorism which it had undertaken with the purpose of 
securing the annexation of the Island; I think that it would also be useful if I informed you in this 
connection, Mr. President, that Turks in villages where they are not as numerous as the Greeks have been 
subjected to a constant propaganda of terrorism for the last two years, and have been forced to migrate to 
places where the Turks are in majority. 36
 
 
While it is true that Greece was somewhat sympathetic to the possibility of partition, it 
did so based upon the assumption that the principle would be only one possible option in 
                                                 
34  Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 3557, June 17, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.1, 662.  
35 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 120. 
36 Embtel Ankara 3084, June 15, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 653. 
 213 
a plebiscite in determining the island’s future.37  There is no known evidence that 
supports the claim that partition was originally a Greek invention.38
The Americans were optimistic that the NAC discussions were going well.  On June 15, 
Spaak had drafted a resolution calling for talks between the governments concerned, 
“taking fully into account the proposals presented to this Council by the U.K., along with 
the continued readiness of the Secretary General to tender his good offices.”
    
39  Fearful 
that a public statement could intensify the situation, Eisenhower, at Dulles’s suggestion, 
urged Macmillan to delay the parliamentary announcement of the proposals pending 
further NAC discussions.40 Macmillan agreed to delay the announcement for 48 hours 
and only after prompting from Spaak.41 When Dulles suggested a plan of procedure at 
NAC, the British reacted unfavorably because they felt that the US proposals did not give 
enough weight to their arrangement for Cyprus, and to go beyond it would like “opening 
a Pandora’s box.“42
Nevertheless, HMG would proceed full ahead with what Nolting called a “partnership 
plan with no partners” or, as Holland puts it, “no admirers except its inventors.”
 
43
                                                 
37 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 81-82. 
  On 
June 18, Ambassador Whitney reported that the “United Kingdom intends  to proceed 
38 No reference to a Greek proposal for partition has been found. In his December 19, 1956, statement to 
Parliament, Lennox-Boyd indicated that the British Government would consider partition as a “last resort:” 
note in Embtel Ankara 3084, June 15, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 653.   
39 Nolting to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 4180, June 15, 1958: June 15, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-
1558, NARA. 
40 Memcon between President Eisenhower and Members of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, and  the White 
House, June 15, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 652.  
41 Dulles’s plan included bilateral and trilateral talks between Britain, Turkey, and Greece; the 
establishment of an NAC advisory board; and the involvement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in some of 
the discussions, Dulles to Nolting, Deptel Paris Topol 4693, June 17, 1958:ibid., 660-661. 
42 Nicolet, ibid., 121. 
43 Nolting to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 4180, June 15, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1558, NARA, pt. 3; 
Holland, ibid., 269. 
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insofar as possible with [the] implementation of [the] Cyprus proposals, regardless of 
whether Greek and Turkish acceptance could be obtained.” 44
 
  The NAC meeting was 
inconclusive in that neither Greece nor Turkey flat out rejected nor accepted the plan.  
Despite the clear lack of enthusiasm, Macmillan was not deterred. The Prime Minister 
was determined to see his plan through even if it meant that Britain would go it alone. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Whitney, Embtel London 6058, and April 18, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 603: By the end of June, 
Greece, Turkey as well as both communities had rejected the proposals.  Makarios also found them 
unacceptable describing the idea of 'partnership' as the imposition of a “triple condominium.” 
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Chapter XVI 
 
Everything happens twice in Cyprus, It's like watching a really terrible film around for 
the second time—Charles Foley, September 15, 1958. 
 
Macmillan Revisited 
 
 On June 21 Greece publicly rejected the Macmillan plan. As for the Turks, although they 
rejected the plan, they did not consider it wholly irreconcilable with their demands for 
partition. The underwhelming response by both governments, however, prompted the 
State Department to reassess its own position with respect to the British proposals.  
 
On June 20, GTI Jones wrote to Assistant Secretary Rountree to ask if there might be a 
way to modify the plan so that it might be implemented in a manner that would reduce 
the need for formal Greek and Turkish participation, and to make it a “truly interim 
arrangement.” Prior to Macmillan’s visit to Washington a few weeks earlier, the State 
Department had contemplated suggesting two particular amendments to the plan that had 
not been put forward to the Prime Minister at the time, but warranted some consideration 
now.  The first of these amendments eliminated the representation of the Greek and 
Turkish Governments in the Ministerial Council— a point on which the “Greeks were 
choking” because it did in fact give the Turks jurisdiction on the island. The second of 
these amendments removed the right to dual citizenship from consideration. As to 
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procedure, it was recommended that it should follow Spaak’s suggestion for NAC 
bilateral talks between Greek, Turkey, and Britain.1
 
   
In order to keep the talks on center, it was important that the plan serve as a basis for 
discussion and not merely a point of departure.  The American’s role would be to remain 
in the background. It would step forward only when it became apparent that Britain was 
faltering in its resolve to advance their proposals; the outcome looked like it might lead to 
a dangerous situation; or if Britain asked for American assistance.2
 
 The US, while not 
wholly on board with the plan, was determined to support the British in this endeavor. 
Near the end of June, the Turkish Government’s implacable policy towards Cyprus began 
to soften, however. The shift in the Turkish position was likely prompted by the 
developing Middle East crisis of 1958, following Egypt’s integration with Syria to form 
the United Arab Republic.3  There was a growing fear among Pact members, not only 
Turkey, that Nasser was making a territorial bid for the Middle East, and no one was 
quite sure as to the extent of communist involvement.4
                                                 
1 Jones to Rountree, Memorandum: “Next Steps on the Cyprus Problem, “June 20, 1958: FRUS, 1958-
1960, X, pt.1, 672-673.  
 This situation, combined with 
serious economic and political pressures in Turkey, gave Opposition leader Ismet İnönü 
2 Ibid., 675. 
3  In January 1958, during the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Meeting in Ankara, participants had apparently 
voiced concerns regarding the projected Egyptian-Syrian merger. Dulles, who was in attendance as an 
observer, told Eisenhower that the Middle East Pact members regarded the proposed merger as "an 
unhappy development which can presage much trouble." Pact members expressed uncertainty regarding the 
possible degree of communist involvement, but the Secretary believed that Jordan and Lebanon would also 
feel pressure to join and that Saudi Arabia and Iraq would follow in kind: Dulles to Eisenhower, Jan. 29, 
1958: AWF/D-H Series, Ann Whitman File, DDE-Library; Herter to Eisenhower, Jan. 30, 1958:AWF/I: 
International Series: Saudi Arabia, DDE-Library; Telcon, Eisenhower and Dulles, February 1, 1958: Dulles 
Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Telephone Conv—DDE-Library. 
4 A British Cabinet discussion in May  reached conclusions similar to those of  Dulles: “If Lebanon was 
compelled to accede to the  United Arab Republic, Iraq and Jordan might not be able to retain their 
independence:”  Cabinet Conclusions (58) 43, May 15, 1958, CAB 128/32, pt. 1.  
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the occasion to publicly criticize Menderes and Zorlu for failing to solve the country’s 
internal problems and for behaving recklessly in the midst of troubling events in the 
region.5
 
  
While author Christopher Hitchens attributes Turkey’s new more conciliatory attitude to 
the substantial loan provided to Ankara in the midst of the Middle East crisis, no known 
documentary evidence supports this assertion. As is the case with so many of his other 
allegations regarding Cyprus, Hitchens is mistaken. In fact, evidence suggests the 
opposite may be true. On August 4, 1958, King Paul reported that Karamanlis was 
“embittered” over the fact that the US had contributed $234 million of the $359 million 
aid package given to Turkey with no “apparent attempt” on the part of the US to 
“influence” the Government of Turkey. The King also expressed his own disapproval at 
the failure of the US to “make an effort with the Turks before pushing [the] package aid 
deal.”6
 Whatever the reasons for the Turkish change of heart, by mid-summer momentum for 
the plan had subsided. Foreign Minister Averoff therefore tried to solicit US support for 
two proposals modifying the British plan:  Greek and Turkish advisors to the Governor 
should be chosen by the two Cypriot communities rather than by the Greek and Turkish 
 If the US was instrumental in modifying Turkey’s position, the Greeks certainly 
did not seem to think so. 
                                                 
5 Holland offers two explanations for the Turkish shift in policy: the first being that the Iraqi coup in July 
”provided a convenient screen behind which Menderes and Zorlu could give up their exaggerated posture 
of aggression, “  and the second assessment that , Turkey was a genuinely “frightened country, ” which 
caused it to amend its stance, Britain and the  Revolt in Cyprus,  269;   National Intelligence Estimate, 
“Prospects for Turkey, “December, 30, 1958, NIE 33-58: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 785. 
6 Cf. Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 365, August 4, 1958:ibid., 691-692; Christopher Hitchens, Détente and 
Destabilization: Report from Cyprus,” New Left Review 94, 1975:61-73, 67; Hitchens, who is generally a 
fine writer, seems to be unduly influenced by the nationalist/ Leftist view with regard to Cyprus.  This 
unfounded assertion is also made in Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, America, 
Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 65. 
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Governments, and that enosis and partition be excluded as plebiscite choices. While both 
items were primarily designed to prevent Turkey from acquiring jurisdiction in Cyprus, 
the US believed that only the former would have a chance of being accepted in Ankara. 
Since all the solutions proposed in the last year offered Turkey some immediate or future 
stake in the island, it was doubtful that Turkey would relinquish these apparent gains.7
On July 10, Karamanlis met with Riddleberger to again make a plea for immediate US 
intervention on the Cyprus issue. Characterizing the British plan for Cyprus “as the worst 
yet,” he threatened to “adopt a more intransigent position,” obviously a veiled reference 
to the UN. The Prime Minister bitterly complained that the US had abandoned Greece. 
He also expressed his disappointment that the State Department had not yet commented 
on the substance of Averoff’s proposals, and tried to press the Ambassador on this point.  
Fearing that it would be drawn into bilateral discussions, the US had deliberately made a 
point of sidestepping this issue. While the Americans were willing to act in an advisory 
capacity, it was deemed inappropriate to take an active role. Moreover, Washington 
recognized that the British and Greeks needed to meet for their own bilateral talks, during 
which Averoff’s proposals could provide an impetus for constructive discussion. 
Otherwise, the introduction of new proposals from all sides would detour the British line 
of procedure.
   
8
 
 
On July 15, Averoff spoke to the US Ambassador in Athens and explained that Greece 
could not agree to NATO arbitration due to the domestic unpopularity of the organization 
at the present time. This decision not only excluded Greek participation in any NAC 
                                                 
7 Herter, Deptel Athens 124, July 15, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.1, 683. 
8 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 100: ibid., 684-685. 
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discussions, but also prevented Greece from engaging in bilateral discussions with 
Britain.  This decision, however, did not exclude possible informal discussions with 
Spaak.9
 
 There were several reasons that finally persuaded Greece to reconsider and agree 
to discussions with the British: mass arrests of EOKA members in Cyprus; a round of 
proposals by Spaak acceptable to Greece; Macmillan’s readiness to go to Athens; and, 
most importantly, the evolving Middle East crisis.    
For Britain and the US, the events in the spring and summer of 1958 posed almost as 
much of a threat to Middle East stability as the Suez Crisis two years earlier. By mid-
July, the situation in the region had grown even more urgent. On July 14, a group of army 
officers staged a bloody coup in Iraq and toppled the pro-western monarchy, Britain’s 
most important regional ally. Fearful of a similar fate, King Hussein of Jordan, who had 
been forced to expel British troops two years earlier, appealed to Britain and the US for 
help against pro-Nasserite subversives in the kingdom.  In response, the US instituted an 
airlift of petroleum, while Britain flew a contingent of 2000 paratroopers from Cyprus 
into Amman to stabilize the regime. Meanwhile, the political crisis in Lebanon prompted 
the Americans to dispatch Marines into that country to fortify the pro-western 
government of Camille Chamoun against internal opposition and threats from Syria and 
the UAR.10
 
 The outcome was a synchronized British-American enterprise, with the 
British navy opening its bases in Cyprus to the US Navy and the US transporting British 
supplies for its air force personnel in Jordan.  
                                                 
9 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 137, July 15, 1958: ibid., 686-687. 
10 William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: the Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company Inc., 2007), 788-789. 
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For the Cyprus question, the Middle East Crisis served to consolidate the Turkish 
position.  The Iraqi coup represented a severe blow to the Menderes Government, which 
was facing internal opposition not only for its domestic policies, but for its policies 
towards the Middle East. The Government saw the hand of international communism in 
the coup and feared that the threat would also spread to Turkey. The Western allies were 
duly worried about the threat to Turkey’s security. In addition to its persistently tense 
borders with Syria and the Soviet Union, it now faced a potentially hostile Iraq.11
 
  
Moreover, Turkey had demonstrated it importance to the Americans by permitting the US 
to use Incirlik air base during the American intervention in Lebanon, a concession that 
was outside the scope of its NATO obligations. On July 17, Turkey joined with other 
Baghdad Pact members in issuing a joint communiqué welcoming the “initiative by the 
U.S. for upholding the integrity and independence of free and peace loving countries 
[…]”12
 
 
Not only had the crisis given new life to the “special relationship” between Britain and 
the U.S., but it also served to underline Turkey’s importance to the US and to NATO. 
That Greece had cause to worry was confirmed by Consul Belcher a few days after the 
Iraqi coup when he suggested that the events in the Middle East had tilted the outcome of 
the Cyprus issue in favor of Turkey: “if they wish [to] salvage anything from [the] 
wreckage [of] their case they had best give very close re-consideration to [the] limited 
                                                 
11 Menderes’ position is in sharp contrast to that of İnönü who perceived the Iraqi coup as an act of national 
liberation and Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact as an opportunity to strengthen the alliance by 
removing Arab opposition to the Pact: Emer O. Kürkcüoğlu, Turkiye’nin Arap Orta Doğusuna Karşi 
Politikasi, 1945-1970. (Turkey’s Policy Towards the Arab Middle East) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1972), 133-134. 
12  Documents on International Affairs, 1958: Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford: Oxford 
Press, 1958), 295. 
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benefits from [the] Foot [Macmillan] plan. “13 A special NIE issued on July 22 noted that 
the Turks had “responded  enthusiastically to U.S. and U.K. military intervention, “ while 
Greece, “although generally supporting of  U.S. actions in the Middle East, [was] nervous 
lest the crisis should strengthen the position of Turkey on the Cyprus issue and threaten 
again to frustrate Greek hopes for Cyprus.”14
 
  
Meanwhile, the internal situation on Cyprus was deteriorating. In early July inter-
communal violence intensified with mass arrests of nearly 2000 Greek Cypriots and the 
creation of a new Turkish underground movement, the TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı), 
a pro-partition organization formed by Rauf Denktaş and Military officer Riza 
Veruşkan.15 So grim was the situation that when Spaak suggested a new interim proposal 
for Cyprus, it was received favorably by Greece.  The so-called “Frigidaire Theory” 
stated that since no definitive solution was possible at present, a provisional solution had 
to be found which would not “prejudice any final solution, neither towards partition, 
enosis, nor independence.” In other words, it would put any specific solution on ice for 
the foreseeable future. In response to Spaak’s proposal, Averoff remarked that “in one 
sense” this was a plan that Greece had already proposed, to delay a “definite solution 
indefinitely.”16
 
  
                                                 
13 Belcher to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 41, July 18, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-1858, NARA. 
14 Special NIE (SNIE 30-2-58): “The Middle East Crisis,” July 22, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, XII, 90-91. 
15 This was known as “Operation Matchbox.” According to Holland, Governor Foot made the decision to 
“take the field against EOKA” but not against TMT.  Greek suspects were arrested before any Turks were 
apprehended and Küçük and Denktaş were notified beforehand that only a handful of Turks would be taken 
into custody as a part of a larger maneuver.  By the end of the third day 1, 992 Greeks were detained but 
only 58 Turks, a disparity Charles Foley’s newspaper described as a “laughable contrast,” see Holland, 
Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 267. 
16 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 244, July 5, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 680. 
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On the one hand, the ambiguity of the Secretary-General’s proposals gave Greece 
renewed optimism that it could prevent Turkey from gaining a formal stake in the island. 
On the other hand, they created a dilemma as to which initiative to follow: Spaak’s 
proposals or Macmillan’s plan. Ambassador Riddleberger’s initial reaction was to push 
Spaak’s “Frigidaire Theory.”17 The Department of State, however, believed that the 
Macmillan plan under the auspices of NATO offered the greatest hope for a Cyprus 
solution, adding that the British Government should be encouraged to be more obliging 
with regard to Averoff’s proposed modifications.18
 
    
Meanwhile, Macmillan who was very eager to ‘have a shot at the Greeks,” announced on 
August 1 that he would  be going to Athens and then Ankara, regardless of whether or not 
Karamanlis agreed to a meeting.19  Ambassador Riddleberger later wrote that the Greek 
Prime Minister’s “rather surprising acceptance” of the meeting was probably “due to his 
being flattered and caught off guard” by [the] sudden Macmillan offer [to] come to 
Athens.20
 
 
 On August 14, Lloyd wrote to Dulles to explain that Macmillan’s talks with the Greeks 
and Turks had given Britain a clearer picture of their respective views towards Cyprus. 
The Turks were prepared to accept the plan provided it did not contain any significant 
modifications.  The Greeks, on the other hand, were less forthcoming because they 
believed that it gave Turkey a greater voice in the affairs of the island than ever before.  
                                                 
17 Ibid, 682. 
18 Herter, Embtel Athens 124, and July 10, 1958: ibid., 682; Herter Deptel London 1102, July 26, 1958: 
SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-2158, NARA. 
19 Lloyd to Dulles Message, August 1, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 691. 
20 Riddleburger to Dulles, Embtel Athens 411: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-858, NARA. 
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Mindful of Greek concerns, the British decided to make certain modifications to the plan 
to make it more accommodating to Greece, but not so much so that the Turks would back 
away. Lloyd informed Dulles that the idea of dual nationality, to which the Greeks 
objected, would be eliminated, and that the status of the government representatives 
would be changed so that they have a presence on the Governor’s Council. Macmillan 
also promised that if the violence ceased, Archbishop Makarios would be permitted to 
return.21
 
  
As a quid pro quo for Turkish acceptance of the plan, a provision was added which 
would remain a source of friction between the two communities for years to come, the 
Municipalities issue. Although the British realized the pitfalls and divisive nature of 
establishing separate municipalities, Macmillan was determined to implement his plan.  
So, in his statement on August 15, the Prime Minister declared that, “in accordance with 
the spirit of the decision whereby the communities are encouraged to order their own 
affairs, the Governor will where local circumstances make this desirable and authorize 
the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot Municipal Councils.”22 . 
Municipal Commissioner B.J. Surridge would later comment that the municipalities issue 
was, “an administrative nonsense but a political necessity”23
 
 As previously stated, the 
Labour Party had great difficulty with this item as well and argued that it would only 
further alienate the two communities rather than bring them together. 
                                                 
21 Lloyd to Dulles, Message, transmitted in Embtel USUN New York Secto 6, August 14, 1958: FRUS, 
1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 695-696. 
22 Full text of Prime Minister Macmillan August 15 statement can be found in Reddaway, 111-113. 
23 Minute, Surridge to Higham, January 19, 1959, CO926/805. 
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Turkey received the plan favorably for two reasons.  First, as stated previously, Turkey 
really was motivated by fear. The recent events in Syria and Lebanon convinced Turkey 
that that the communists had penetrated the region and she wanted to reach a settlement 
before her security became a bigger issue than Cyprus.24 Second, Menderes had extracted 
a pledge that if and when the question of self-determination arose it would be 
implemented in line with the December 1956 statement.25
Averoff called the British statement unacceptable. He especially objected to the provision 
which would create separate Greek and Turkish municipal councils, and feared its 
implications 
 Greece, on the other hand, 
opposed the revised plan because it recognized in principle the separate existence of the 
two communities, the possible future partition of the island, and the recognition of 
Turkey’s status as a party to the conflict. 
26  On August 19, the Greek Ambassador in Washington, George V. Melas, 
resigned in protest over American support for the British plan.”27 Karamanlis, in a 
personal message, expressed Greece’s disappointment with the substance of the revised 
proposals and duly informed Macmillan that the “Greek Government ‘regret that they are 
unable to cooperate in the application of your plan’” [sic.]. 28
                                                 
24 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1975), 
148-149. 
   For Karamanlis and most 
Greeks, Macmillan's modified plan represented a set of demands they could never accept. 
25 As told by Menderes to the US Ambassador in Ankara: Warren to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 659, August 
20, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-2058, NARA. 
26 Jones to Berry, Office Memorandum, August 15, 1958: ibid. 
27Melas had announced his resignation a few weeks earlier telling Dulles that he “did not wish to have 
anything to do with what would turn out to be a funeral for Greek-Turkish friendship: Mallinson, Cyprus, 
25. 
28 Text of message to the Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 
from Monsieur C. Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece, August 19, 1958, Correspondence Exchanged 
between Mr. Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece and the Right Honourable Harold 
Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, June 10, 1958-August 19, 1958: Greek Royal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Athens. 
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Fearing a renewal of violence, Sir Hugh Foot sent a personal plea to Archbishop 
Makarios in Athens: "If this chance is not at once seized, I can foresee nothing but 
continuing misery for Cyprus."29
The State Department’s reaction to the Macmillan plan of August 15 was generally 
favorable, noting that it had “appreciably narrowed the margin” of disagreement between 
Greece and Turkey. But the Americans expressed doubt that it could be carried out 
without cooperation from the Greek Cypriots, and saw Makarios as more of an obstacle 
than the Greek Government. Thus it was suggested that the British consider “bending 
their plan slightly more in favor of the Greeks” so that it might be more readily accepted.  
Specifically, it was recommended that the role of the Greek and Turkish representative be 
“clarified, and that it be emphasized that these representatives would function as advisors 
to the Governor but have no part in the administration of the island. The US also 
recommended that a single assembly be created as soon as both communal assemblies 
were operative 
 But the Archbishop would not be persuaded and, on 
August 16, Makarios flatly rejected the Macmillan plan.  
30
  
   
The U.S. Embassies in London, Ankara, and Athens all had singular reactions to the State 
Department’s counter-proposals. London expressed skepticism as to whether the U.S. 
should risk another of its own initiatives rather than just put its support behind the British 
plan.31
                                                 
29  Quoted in “Half Speed Ahead,” Time, August 25, 1958. 
 Athens generally agreed with the State Department’s suggestions, if for no other 
30 Herter, Deptel Athens 679, August 29, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 696-699. 
31 Barbour to Dulles, Embtel London 1209, August 31, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-3156, NARA. 
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reason, that it would signal to the Greek Government American willingness to take a 
more active role, thus easing some of the tension between the US and Greece.32
 
   
The least enthusiastic response came in mid-September from Ankara, where it was 
pointed out that the State Department’s assessment was “in sharp contrast as to [the] 
degree of flexibility that remains in [the] Turkish policy.” Ankara also noted that the 
“major obstacle to Greek cooperation is Greek emotion,” and if the US were to lean on 
anyone, it ought to be the Greeks.33
 
  For better or worse, it was this opinion that 
ultimately prevailed and, with that, the latest US suggestions were abandoned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens.  
33 Carlos C. Hall, Minister of the Embassy, to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 840, September 9, 1958:ibid., doc. 
747C.00/9-958. 
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Chapter XVII 
 
Avoiding the Macmillan Plan 
 
Despite the refusal by the Greek Government and Makarios to accept the Macmillan plan, 
the British Government decided to proceed with its implementation with only Turkish 
cooperation.1 This was no surprise since from the beginning; it had been the British 
intention to implement the plan once Turkish support could be ensured.  Although the 
State Department had come to believe that it was the Greeks who were the 
obstructionists, it did not mean that the US was not concerned about the potential 
consequences of a unilateral implementation of the Macmillan plan. The US was 
especially concerned about the arrival of the Turkish Government representative on the 
island, which was likely to incite another round of EOKA violence. Even more troubling 
to the Americans was the prospect that a defeat of the present Greek Government, in 
connection with Cyprus, might steer Greece away from its pro-western orientation.2
 
 
In a meeting with Zorlu on September 19, Rountree introduced the possibility that Turkey 
might designate the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia as its representative on Cyprus in 
order to make the implementation of the plan less traumatic for the Greeks. Zorlu initially 
balked at the idea, saying that he “did not think the position of the Turkish representative 
should be ‘diminished’” since that item was the only “advantage” to the Turks that the 
                                                 
1 Lloyd to Dulles, Message London, September 13, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 701. 
2 Memcon between delegations of the US and Turkey, New York, September 19, 1958:ibid., 702-703. 
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British plan offered. Moreover, the Foreign Minister did not believe that the Greek threat 
to withdraw from NATO was a serious one, and that Greece could eventually be induced 
to cooperate with the plan 3  Nevertheless, he agreed to present the initiative to Menderes 
who, a few days later, accepted it.4
The prospect of the implementation of the Macmillan plan alarmed the Greeks, who 
regarded it as the beginning of a shared sovereignty of Cyprus with the Turks. In an effort 
to forestall a unilateral application of the arrangement, Karamanlis and King Paul himself 
appealed to the US to intervene, warning that its implementation could have “dangerous 
repercussions not only for the internal conditions but also on the international relations of 
Greece.”
  
5 Indeed, Prime Minister Karamanlis had informed the Secretary General that 
Britain’s determination to proceed with its Cyprus plan would “undermine Greece's 
position in NATO.”6
On September 22, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to discuss the King’s letter. He told the 
Secretary that the US should notify the British Ambassador of the King’s appeal citing it 
as another reason for postponement. The President concluded the conversation with the 
warning not to “make any mistakes in a hurry. Once it's done, it's done."
   
7
The Americans were not taking Greek concerns lightly. A September 23 NIE report on 
Greece indicated that US believed that Greece’s reaction might very well include “at least 
 
                                                 
3 Rountree to Dulles, Circular Telegram 301, September 20, 1958: SDCDF: 747C.00/9-2058, NARA. 
4 Hall to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 1007, September 23, 1958:ibid., doc. 747C.00/9-258. 
5 King Paul to President Eisenhower, Message, transmitted in Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 789, September 
20, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 703-704. 
6 Editorial note, ibid., 704. 
7 Eisenhower to Dulles, Telcon, September 22, 1958, 10:50:Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1959, White 
House Telephone Conversations, Memoranda of Tel. Conv., DDE-Library. 
 229 
a partial disengagement from NATO” and additional further strain, if not the total 
disintegration of Greek-Turkish relations.8
The same day, Dulles met with Caccia to relay his concerns and brief the Ambassador on 
his conversation with Eisenhower.  The Secretary told the Ambassador about the 
President's reaction to his letter from the King and his opinion that a delay in the plan 
might be wise. He also warned that if the plan went forward, the Greeks would likely 
walk out of NATO, and even went so far as to suggest that the Turkish representative on 
Cyprus might well be assassinated.
  Although Dulles and Eisenhower were in 
agreement, the Secretary knew that the British were determined to move forward with the 
plan and thus would never agree.  
9
Despite these objections, the Prime Minister stood firm. Macmillan, in a message to 
Eisenhower on September 24 positioned himself as the lone champion of Turkish rights 
on Cyprus. He reiterated his determination to go forward, saying that the Greek 
Government was at present “not strong enough to accept any policy, and adding that 
therefore [t] the only hope is that in due course they will acquiesce.” The Prime Minister, 
did, however, agree with the suggestion that the appointment of the Turkish Consul 
would be a wise move in that it would somewhat ease the Greek position.
  
10
Macmillan believed that his uncompromising stance would eventually bring the Greeks 
around.  Hence it must have come as quite a shock to the British when the NATO 
  
                                                 
8 NIE 32-58: “The Outlook for Greece’s Stability and Foreign Position,” “September 23, 1958: FRUS, 
1958-1960, X, pt. 2, 635. 
9 Dulles, Memcon with Caccia, September 22, 1958: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1958, General 
Coresp. And Memoranda Series, Gen. A-D, DDE-Library. This conversation is also found in Dulles to 
Macmillan, Memcon: SDCDF, lot 44 D 199, NARA. 
10 Macmillan to Eisenhower, Message September 24, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 705-706. 
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Secretary General, with the blessing of the Americans, presented proposals not unlike his 
principles of July and those of the US in late August, with the added idea for a tripartite 
conference. 11
The Push for NATO Involvement 
 
 
On September 24, the NATO Secretary-General flew to Athens, where he was confronted 
by a “disturbingly emotional […] troubled, anxious, disoriented and bitter” Karamanlis.12 
Despite his skepticism, the Greek Prime Minister agreed to mull over the possibility of 
Greek participation in a tripartite conference on Cyprus, provided he was given some 
guarantee that Greece’s participation did not “imply Greek recognition of Turkish interest 
in Cyprus”13
 
 be given consideration. Spaak returned to Paris where he proposed the idea 
to the NATO council.   
For its part, the US, which had lent its support for the Macmillan plan up until its 
rejection by the Greeks, believed that, at this juncture, it needed to withdraw that 
commitment and vigorously support Spaak’s initiative for a conference. The Americans 
hoped that since the “substantive differences were so slight—at least in their opinion— 
that a “bridge could be found” that would not compromise Britain’s plan of action.14
 
   
Britain, which did not want to be viewed as obstructionist, accepted the conference 
initiative in principle, provided it was within the scope of the British plan, and did not 
                                                 
11 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 129. 
12 Roberts to FO, September 24, 1958: FO 371/136293, RGC 1071/14. 
13 Deptel to the Mission of to the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations and European Regional 
Organizations Topol 1025, Washington, September 29, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 713. 
14 Memcon between the US and NATO MC-16, September 27, 1958,“Secretary’s Trip to Boston”: ibid., 
710-711. 
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significantly hinder its application. The Turkish representative, however, in what Nolting 
described as a “violent and abusive speech” apparently penned by Zorlu, flatly refused to 
participate.15
 
 
In a meeting with Ambassador Caccia on September 29, Dulles, urged the British 
Government’s participation in the conference and expressed the hope that, while the US 
supported the British plan, that it might be further clarified in a conference.  Meanwhile, 
Turkey re-evaluated its hard-line position, backing away from Zorlu’s incendiary 
language, and agreeing to accept the initiative. Greece, on the other hand, felt betrayed 
and, in what had now become a familiar pattern, appealed to the Americans for support.  
 
By now, however, the US had grown frustrated with all the drama and diplomatic intrigue 
and was coming to believe that no proposal would ever satisfy the Greeks. President 
Eisenhower emphasized to Melas the “importance of having a sense of proportion” 
regarding the Cyprus dispute in the Ambassador’s farewell phone call. Similarly, the 
President, while underlining the US’s capacity to intervene in the dispute, cautioned the 
Greek King that “in pursuing its Cyprus policy Greece [should] measure its immediate 
objectives respecting Cyprus against its bonds of interest and interdependence with the 
other nations of the West.”16
 
 Clearly Eisenhower was warning the Greeks against any 
rash behavior that might cause their allies to withhold support in the event of a future 
threat or crisis.   
                                                 
15 Nolting, Embtel Paris Polto 803, September 28, 1958: ibid., 711-712. 
16 Memcon between Eisenhower and Dulles, September 29, 1958:ibid., 715; Eisenhower to King Paul I, 
Letter, September 30, 1958:ibid., 717. 
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Greek intransigence and weariness with the whole Cyprus soap opera was not the only 
reason that the US decided to fully back the British plan.  Another reason, according to a 
memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, was that the US now urgently needed British 
support to prevent the inscription of Chinese representation on the UN agenda, an issue 
which American policy makers regarded as crucial. 17 In 1958, tensions between the US 
and Britain following the Suez crisis had all but subsided and the two countries were 
enjoying “exceptionally close” and “increasingly coordinated” relations. Having 
recovered from Britain’s criticism of US involvement in Guatemala, the only real 
disagreement that remained was over Far East policy, specifically Chinese 
representation.18 The British agreed to support the Americans on this issue in return for 
their support in keeping Cyprus off the agenda.19
 
  
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Averoff accused the US of not only of switching support 
from the more acceptable Spaak plan but also of backing the unacceptable Macmillan 
proposals. Moreover, Greece believed that the Americans were also pressing her to 
participate in a conference that supported the new Spaak initiative endorsing the 
placement of the Turkish representative on the island, even though it was emphasized that 
neither the Greek or Turkish representatives would have a sovereign role or 
administrative authority20
                                                 
17 Dulles to Eisenhower, Memorandum: “Reply to Message from King Paul of Greece,” September 29, 
1958: Declassified Documents, doc. 1997 3176, 1; Official records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth 
Session, Annexes, Agenda item 8, document A/3851, “Question of the Representation of China in the 
United Nations:” United Nations Yearbook, 1958; “Editorial: “Quemoy and Matsu Again ,“ The New York 
Times, October 16, 1958, 6. 
   
18 “Current Foreign Relations,” Issue 43, October 29, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 70-71. 
19 Lodge to Dulles, Memorandum: “US Policy in the UN on Colonial Questions, such as Cyprus and 
Algeria,” January 12, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1359, NARA.. 
20 Herter to Karamanlis, Message included in Deptel Athens 1093, October 2, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, 
pt. 1, 722. 
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On October 3, Riddleberger reported that Averoff had made a counter-proposal 
suggesting that Greece might participate in a conference if the modified Macmillan plan 
was to include a plebiscite on independence after seven years which excluded both enosis 
and partition.21 Herter responded by instructing Riddleberger to advise the Foreign 
Minister that the US could not support his proposal as a “conference precondition,” 
adding that while Averoff was free to raise the plebiscite proposal at a conference based 
on the Spaak plan, the US did not hold out much hope that it would be accepted. 22
 
  
The NATO initiative definitively broke down on October 22, and Makarios rejected the 
idea for an international conference on October 26. The  following day, Macmillan wrote 
to Eisenhower saying that  Britain had decided “to let the Greeks simmer for a period,” 
adding that ”if we run with them now it will only consolidate them; if we do nothing, 
their self-doubting will take affect.”23
 
  
Despite the failure of the NATO initiative, Macmillan was not “unduly depressed,” and 
preferred to see the glass half full. While focusing on the progress that had been made, he 
pointed out the fact that Greece had at least “dropped their talk about leaving NATO.”24
 
 
In any event, both the US and Britain needed to conserve their resources and reserve their 
strength for the forthcoming UN debates, which threatened to be the most contentious 
yet.  
                                                 
21 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 907, October 3, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-358, NARA. 
22 Herter, Deptel Athens 1101, October 3, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 723. 
23 Macmillan to Eisenhower, Message October 27, 158: ibid, 732. 
24 Ibid., 733. 
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US Refusal to Support Greece 
 
On November 3 Lodge wrote to Dulles to inform him of a conversation he had with 
Queen Frederika of Greece where she had made an urgent plea for the “United States to 
adopt a hands off attitude on the Cyprus question—if it should come into the United 
Nations.” By "hands off" the Queen meant not only a public attitude, but also warned of  
working behind the scenes since such activities always had a way of getting back to  
Greece.   
 
The Queen explained that at present, Karamanlis was the only strong politician in Greece 
and that if the US became identified with being on the “wrong side” of the Cyprus 
question his government would fall, leaving only the King and the Queen to defend the 
western alliance.25
 
 The Americans, however, had heard this before, and in any regard, 
they had already cut a deal with the British about Cyprus in return for UK support on the 
all-important, but unrelated Chinese representation issue.  
From November 24 to December 4, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly 
discussed the Cyprus issue. The UK, Greece, and Turkey withdrew their resolutions 
almost immediately, and the contentious pro-Greek proposal sponsored by India was 
likewise withdrawn. A Belgian-sponsored resolution, which had been considered too 
pedestrian, was soon abandoned. Similarly, a Colombian resolution, supported by Greece 
calling for the UN and the Secretary General to work towards the advancement of a 
                                                 
25 Letter from the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge) to Secretary of State Dulles, November 3, 
1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt, 735. 
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“peaceful, just, and democratic solution to the problem,” also failed with 17 in favor, 17 
against, and with 47 abstentions.   
 
In the end, an Iranian solution calling for the three parties to the dispute to hold a 
conference to address the interim and final solution for Cyprus carried the day.  The 
resolution was approved by the Committee with the backing of the United Kingdom, 
Turkey, and the United States, The vote was 31 in favor, 22 against, and 28 abstentions. 
Of the NATO countries, only Greece and Iceland voted against the resolution.26
 
   
The Greeks were crushed— hung out to dry without US support and with only Iceland in 
their corner. They now faced the humiliating prospect of a UN motion supporting the 
kind of discussions they had already rejected from NATO. The lengthy and often bitter 
debate on Cyprus did little, at least at the time, to moderate the rigid positions of the 
parties to the dispute. Efforts to reach an agreement on a compromise resolution ended in 
failure, yielding only an anemic declaration by the President of the Assembly.  
 
It was probably during the later stages of these contentious debates, however, that the 
Turkish Foreign Minister and his Greek counterpart laid the foundation in private for the 
later fruitful discussions which would eventually result in a settlement for Cyprus. The 
Cyprus question needed to be resolved, and both Greece and Turkey were coming to the 
realization that neither enosis nor partition would ever be an acceptable resolution for the 
international community.  
 
                                                 
26 United Nations Organization, ed. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1958, 75. 
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 The following day, however, Averoff and Zorlu shocked everyone by co-sponsoring a 
compromise resolution on Cyprus which was introduced in the General Assembly on 
December 5 by the Mexican representative. The resolution called upon the parties to 
“‘continue efforts’ to reach a just settlement in accordance with the U.N. Charter.” It was 
adopted unanimously and without objection.27
 
   
                                                 
27 The resolution essentially reaffirmed Resolution 1013 (XI) of the 12th Session of the General Assembly 
For text of the Mexican resolution, see U.N. doc. A/Res/1287 (XIII): Official Documents of the United 
Nations System, New York.  
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Chapter XVIII 
  
Cyprus goes “on“and “off” like a dish at a cheap restaurant—Harold Macmillan, Pointing the 
Way 
 
 
The Search for a Final Settlement 
 
Following the final Greek humiliation in the General Assembly, Zorlu approached Averoff, who 
steeled himself for the abuse he believed was coming. The Greek Foreign Minister was only too 
familiar with the sharpness of his counterpart’s tongue, and he warned his colleagues that “he 
was afraid that he might not be able to restrain from being extremely rude to him.” Instead of the 
predictable deranged rant, however, Zorlu surprised the demoralized Averoff and 
uncharacteristically congratulated him on putting up such a good fight in the Political 
Committee.  While conceding defeat, Averoff steered the conversation towards the mutual 
dangers faced by both Greece and Turkey and lamenting the hatred “whipped up” between the 
two countries because they were “unwilling or unable to agree.”  Zorlu admitted that he, too, was 
“alarmed by the common dangers” facing both countries, and then offered to meet privately with 
his Greek counterpart to discuss their differences. Averoff agreed to the discussions, but only if 
the Iranian resolution was dropped. The following day, the British and Turkish delegations, with 
American encouragement, replaced the Iranian resolution with one sponsored by a Latin 
American country.1
                                                 
1 Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Lost Opportunities, 295-299; Foot, A Start in Freedom, 176-177. 
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On December 6 Zorlu and Averoff held a private meeting wherein the Turkish Minister 
explained that while his government favored the Macmillan plan because it would sooner or later 
lead to partition, he also said that he understood that it could not be implemented without Greek 
cooperation and without irreparably damaging Greek-Turkish relations. The American Embassy 
in Ankara held a similar view in that they believed that the plan could not be carried out without 
“incurring a grave risk of creating a New Palestine,” which they regarded as a greater threat to 
US interests than the present impasse.2
 
   
In light of the instability in the Middle East, it was more essential than ever to preserve the 
integrity of the NATO alliance. This was not only critical to the Americans. Turkey, too, realized 
that it needed Greece, since it was its only bond to NATO in an increasingly hostile region. 
 
With the support of the Greek Government Makarios had shifted his position from advocating 
enosis in favor of a guaranteed independence even before the final UN debate.3 Turkey also 
signaled it was open to discuss the possibility of a guaranteed independence solution with the 
Greeks—provided Britain or no one else was involved in the process and that Greece would 
agree to recognize the Turkish Cypriots on the island as a community, not just a minority.  For 
their part, Greece would also agree to discussions provided that the “Turks realized that eighty is 
more than twenty.”4
 
 
The initiative was likely a response from the Turks to Averoff’s anxious appeal to the Turkish 
Embassy in Athens on the eve of the UN debate, calling for Turkey to re-evaluate the “concept 
                                                 
2 Hall, Embtel Turkey 1470, November 14, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 742. 
3 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 1170, November 10, 1958:ibid., 738. 
4 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 153. 
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[of] ‘independence.”5 As Bahcheli points out, for Turkey, “ partition had been a maximalist 
position and Ankara was prepared to settle for less,”6
 
 meaning an administrative rather than a 
geographical partition, which at least theoretically, did not seem incompatible with the idea of 
independence.   
A few weeks earlier on November 18, Zorlu approached Dulles to explain the Turkish concept of 
partition was not necessarily calling for the division of the island but for a "kind of an intellectual 
partition,” namely, that the two communities must be given the idea that neither was being 
governed by the other. “He believed that the three concerned parties should work to achieve this 
end, adding that he did not think it desirable to “mix the United Nations” in this matter. 7
 
 Turkey 
was especially concerned that no committee be formed under the UN, since it was likely to 
exclude any form of partition in the settlement.  
A few short weeks before no one believed a settlement possible. Now, almost miraculously, 
Greece and Turkey were coming together to negotiate a final solution for the island. But both 
sides had their own motives for making concessions towards a final solution.   
 
There were several reasons for the drastic shift in Turkish policy. First and foremost, Turkey was 
largely driven by security concerns and fear of the communist threat from Syria, Iraq, and Iran.8
                                                 
5 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 1170, November 10, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.1, 737. 
 
These factors, combined with Khrushchev’s attempt to turn the international spotlight on the 
6 Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, 42. 
7 Memcon between delegations of the US and Turkey,  November 18, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 746; Rauf 
Denktash, on the other hand, took the hard-line view with regard to a solution for the island’s troubles: "We hope we 
shall never see an independent Cyprus!"  We are Turks, 100-000-strong, not Greeks, and this island is as much ours 
as theirs. The Greeks want freedom from the British. All right, we want freedom from the Greeks," quoted in “Bitter 
Breakdown,” Time, November 10, 1958. 
8 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 163-165. 
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“German Question” in mid-November with his ultimatum regarding Berlin, forced Turkey to 
confront the fact that it was surrounded by hostile entities.9  Moreover, a change in the 
government in Athens might also likely mean a shift towards a more neutral policy, thus 
breaking Turkey’s geographical bond with NATO and leaving her 360 mile common border with 
the Soviet Union even more vulnerable. Turkish concern over a Labour ascendency in London, 
with its stated commitment to the principle of self-determination, was another factor. Turkey 
realized that a partition solution within the UN would never pass since the widespread belief in 
the General Assembly favored independence as the best course. 10
 
   
Similarly, Greece realized that there was no hope of ever achieving enosis through the 
international body.  It was also faced with the danger of seeing partition become a reality if it 
continued on its uncompromising path.  As a result, the Greeks “began to consider independence 
an acceptable first stage solution of the Cyprus crisis.”11 Moreover, the murder of Catherine 
Cutliffe, the wife of a British soldier and a mother of five in Varosha, allegedly by EOKA, cost it 
its last remaining outside sympathizers and triggered wide-spread arrests, further undermining 
the organization.12
 
  
Finally, both Greece and Turkey were exhausted with the endless haggling over the island, and 
both were under severe domestic pressure to reach a settlement.  Furthermore, many Cypriots 
were beginning to believe that the revised Macmillan plan would be the best they could hope for, 
                                                 
9 Reference to the Second Berlin Crisis: In November 1958, Nikita S. Khrushchev launched a campaign to put an 
end to the Allied presence in West Berlin and to force the West to recognize the Soviet puppet regime, the German 
Democratic Republic. 
10 Embtel, Paris 2295, December 19, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 753; Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 163-165.  
11Süha Bölükbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus, (Lanham, 
Maryland: University of Virginia Press, 1988), 32. 
12 “The Warring Parties,” Time, October 1, 1958. 
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and tried to convince Makarios that this was the last chance to rescue the island from 
catastrophe. 13  Confronted by these realities, the Archbishop decided to split the difference and 
choose the middle ground, for the first time renouncing the cause of enosis in favor of a 
negotiated settlement based on guaranteed independence.14
 
  
Abandoning the Macmillan Plan 
 
The meeting between Averoff and Zorlu in Paris went so well that the two issued a joint appeal 
to Governor Foot to commute the executions of two Greek Cypriots that same night.15  Keeping 
with the spirit of reconciliation, EOKA, at the behest of Makarios, announced a unilateral truce 
on Christmas Eve in order that the negotiations might proceed in an atmosphere free of violence. 
In return, the British commuted the death sentences of four of the organization’s members.16  On 
that same day, the British and Americans were finally briefed as to the substance of the 
negotiations between the two Ministers and then only when it became necessary to inquire as to 
whether the United Kingdom had any objections to the core of the principles established thus 
far.17
 
  
Although London responded favorably to the bilateral discussions, the British warned the 
Americans not to offer direct encouragement to any of Averoff’s initiatives.18
                                                 
13 Belcher Contel Nicosia 102, August 16, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1658, NARA. 
 The Foreign 
Office agreed not to press the two sides with respect to implementing any aspects of the British 
14 “The Warring Parties,” Time, October 1, 1958; 
15 Editorial note in Embtel London 3289, December 20:FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt.1, 754 
16 Editorial note, ibid, 755. 
17 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 1485, December 24, 1958: ibid., 755-756. 
18 Whitney, Embtel London 3353, December 27, 1959: SDCDF, 747C.00/12-2758, NARA. 
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plans and decided to notify the US Embassy only if problems between the two arose rather than 
reporting any partial progress.19
 
   
When the US Embassy in London related the State Department’s anxiety over the potential 
consequences implementing the British plan would have on discussions between Greece and 
Turkey, John Mansfield Addis, Head of the FO’s Southern Department, was quick to point out 
that the concern was unfounded since there was really nothing to indicate that the two sides had 
made any progress since their meeting in Paris.20
You are aware in general terms of the promising development in regard to the Cyprus question which has taken 
place since the debate in the United Nations. Zorlu and Averoff have had direct discussions/1/ with a view to finding 
a new approach to the problems of Cyprus on the basis of restoring Greek-Turkish friendship. The two Foreign 
Ministers explained their ideas to the Foreign Secretary in Paris a week before Christmas/2/ and asked if Her 
Majesty's Government were agreeable to their continuing their discussions. From the account which they gave, it 
seemed clear that at that stage in their discussions no details had been settled and that they had not done more than 
exchange very general ideas.
   Macmillan, in a message to Dulles, made a 
similar claim, saying that Britain had not been given any details regarding the discussions and 
had intentionally avoided asking any questions, but understood that there had been no 
meaningful advancement:   
21
 
  
Macmillan appeared anxious to present the British as interested observers rather than as vested 
participants. Since the meeting in Paris, Britain had reluctantly chosen to adopt a laissez-faire 
stance, relying only upon information gleaned through brief exchanges in Ankara through 
diplomatic channels.  Macmillan was quick to point out to Dulles that Britain had only recently 
learned that Averoff and Zorlu would be meeting again in Paris in late January.22
 
 
                                                 
19 Whitney, Embtel London 3436, January 2, 1959: ibid. 
20 Barbour, Embtel London 3493 January 7, 1959: ibid. 
21 Macmillan to Dulles, Letter, January 17, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 757. 
22 Ibid. 
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Despite words of warm encouragement, Britain was still determined to push the Macmillan plan 
although Turkey was no longer pressing for it and, doing so, would likely endanger the fragile 
Greek-Turkish reconciliation.  While Britain repeatedly insisted it would accept any initiative 
that was agreeable to both the Greeks and Turks, its actions betrayed that claim. In an initiative 
reminiscent of 1956, Britain mounted a major operation against EOKA in the Troodos 
Mountains, contrary to the advice of the US. This was followed by a furious statement 
denouncing terrorism in Cyprus.23
 
  
On January 4, Governor Foot sent a message to Lennox-Boyd urging him to delay the 
publication of the Surridge Commission municipal report and the electoral bill for the Turkish 
House of Representatives, two fundamental features of the Macmillan Plan, worrying if Britain 
“could plausibly be accused of wrecking the best chance of an amicable settlement that has not 
yet appeared.”24
 
   
In the words of Holland, Britain had an “‘overriding obligation’ not to upset the apple-cart being 
pushed uphill by the Greeks and Turks.”25 The Governor’s request, however, was refused. 
Similarly, protests from Averoff were generally ignored. But when Zorlu also recommended that 
the publication be deferred, the British realized that it would be impossible to implement local 
provisions of the plan if the Turks were not in agreement.26
 
  
                                                 
23 In June 1956, the British mounted a major offensive against EOKA in the Troodos Mountains, but netted only a 
handful of its members. Instead of breaking the organization, EOKA widened its campaign to include additional 
towns and villages throughout the island and attacking the families of British servicemen; Barbour Embtel London 
3600, January 13, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1359; Belcher, Contel Nicosia 321, January 14, 1959: ibid., doc. 
747C.00/1-1459. 
24 Foot Telegram to Colonial Office January 4, 1959, Co 926/805. 
25  Ibid; Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, Holland, 301. 
26 Holland, ibid., 302. 
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When the Americans suggested that it might be wise to delay the publication of the Surridge 
Commission municipal report and the electoral bill, Macmillan, in a letter to Dulles, reluctantly 
agreed to a short delay for the latter if only to maintain the “the best possible atmosphere” for the 
upcoming talks in Paris, and only if they showed signs of progress.”27  Regarding the electoral 
bill, Macmillan, sounding more like Turkey’s lawyer than an interested party, insisting that “if 
the current talks come to nothing, we must be ready to fulfill our undertaking to the Turks to 
hold elections this year” [sic.].  Emphasizing Britain’s resolve to move half-speed ahead in 
implementing the plan, the Prime Minister added, “If we do not go forward, there is a risk of 
slipping back and losing the ground gained since last summer,” 28
 
 
Aside from Britain’s tepid support for the Greek-Turkish negotiations, Macmillan refused to 
stray from his course, since he had convinced himself that it had been British resolve that had 
made possible the spirit of reconciliation in the first place. “The steady advance of our 
progressive plan seems to have been an important factor in bringing about the improved attitude 
of both Greeks and Turks,” he said. 29 This, however, was only true with respect to Greek 
acceptance of the negotiations, for which the Americans could claim at least as much credit 
having departed from their former neutral position.30
                                                 
27 Macmillan to Dulles, Letter, January 17, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 758. 
  Holland points to a certain degree of 
jealousy on the part of Britain in this. Simply stated, Britain could not abide the fact that Greece 
and Turkey had been able to accomplish in a short time what they could not after years of trying. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 The belief that the Macmillan Plan itself had been the motivation for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was the 
conventional wisdom in Britain at the time. Macmillan later wrote “the impetus given by our plan […] was one of 
the main causes of the settlement […]: Riding the Storm, 668; Former Prime Minister Anthony Eden went as far as 
claiming in his memoirs that the Macmillan plan “brought international agreement:” Lord Avon, The Memoirs of Sir 
Anthony Eden, 413. The truth was that the threat by Britain to implement the plan had pressured the Greeks to find a 
way out by participating in direct negotiations with Turkey, Nicolet, 135. 
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Britain was also desperately trying to maintain a measure of control over the dynamics of the 
situation. 31
 
  
It was also apparent that both the Greeks and Turks were suspicious of British intentions and 
preferred to keep them away from the negotiations. While Averoff refused to comment publicly 
on their progress, he privately told the Americans that talks were “going well.”  Zorlu and he did, 
however, share a common concern that the UK might do something to “sabotage” the talks with 
continuing military operations on the island. He warned that if EOKA “reacted with a renewal of 
violence,” continuing negotiations would be impossible.  
 
Averoff believed that there were two “elements” in the British Cabinet that were working at 
cross purposes. The first were the “Tory die-hards” who were determined to hold Cyprus and 
would “use any means to torpedo the talks.” The second element involved Ministers 
“’indifferent’ to Cyprus overall but prepared to be ‘helpful.’”32
 
  Interestingly enough, he placed 
Macmillan in the latter group.  
Something Like a Miracle 
 
The negotiations in Zürich and London preceding independence were, in the words of Averoff, 
“hard fought and arduous.”33
                                                 
31 Holland, ibid., 300; 302. 
 Both sides understood just how much was at stake. Failure would 
have likely meant one of the following: the division of the island between Turkey and Greece, a 
tridominium, or the continuation of British rule.  
32  On January 30 Lennox-Boyd  that British military operations would continue despite EOKA declaration of a 
cease-fire, Samuel D. Berger, Counselor of the Embassy in Greece, Embtel Athens 1738, January 31, 1959:FRUS, 
1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 764-766. 
33 Roberts to Foreign Office, January 20, 1959 FO 144639, RG1073/6. 
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The Zürich
 
 negotiations took place from February 6-11, 1959, at the Dolder Grand Hotel and 
were attended not only by the two Foreign Ministers, but by Prime Ministers Menderes and 
Karamanlis as well. On February 11, the two sides announced that they had reached a settlement 
on the future of the island.  
"It would seem only tactful to inform the British government," purred a self-satisfied Averoff at 
the end of the meeting. It was clear that the Greek Foreign Minister was enjoying his new 
prestige.  The text of the proposed settlement was duly presented to the British Government on 
the same day.34  The official “Cyprus Settlement,” which would come to be known as the Zürich 
Agreement, consisted of the following: (a.) a draft of the Basic Structure of the Republic of 
Cyprus, (b.) a Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the UK, (c.) a Treaty of 
Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, (d.) a supplementary article inserted in the Treaty 
of Guarantee, and (e.) Agreed Measures for the new preparations.35
 
 
 It is important to remember that the basic structure of the constitution in the Zürich agreement 
was based on the less contentious features of the Macmillan Plan. The main difference was that 
plan was a final solution that eliminated the governmental representatives. In other respects, the 
communal chambers, municipal separation of the communities, and the principal of mutual 
cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Britain had all been agreed to by Athens prior the 
1959 conferences and were included in the final settlement.36
 
 
                                                 
34 “Something Like a Miracle,” Time, February 23, 1959. 
35 “Documents Relating to the Founding of Cyprus, Including the Treaty of Guarantee”, 1959: Documents on 
International Affairs, 1959, edited by Gillian King, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 15. 
36 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 171. 
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On February 14, Karamanlis returned to Athens for a discussion with Makarios, who lent his 
support to the agreement. On the same day, Averoff and Zorlu flew to London to consult with 
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd. The result of these consultations 
was an agreement between the three parties that certain areas of Cyprus should be retained under 
the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. A supplementary article was to be inserted in the Treaty 
of Guarantee to respect the integrity of the areas retained by Britain as well as secure Britain’s 
rights in connection with their usage. This included over-flight rights and the use of various 
facilities and roadways outside the Sovereign Base Areas. 
 
The London Conference opened at Lancaster House on February 17. The three parties were 
represented by their foreign ministers, while the Cypriots were represented by Archbishop 
Makarios and Turkish leader, Dr. Fazil Küçük. The British had not yet signed off on their part, 
but as Lloyd told Whitney, the agreement was “in the bag” unless “the rats get at it.”  The 
Ambassador could not help but believe that Lloyd not only had the leader of the rat pack, 
Makarios, in mind, but also his own “right-wing back- benchers” as well.37
 
   
                                                 
37 Whitney, Embtel London 4196, February 1, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 768.  
The Basic Structure provided for the Republic of Cyprus to have a Greek Cypriot President and a 
Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. One of the following Ministries—Foreign Affairs, Defense, or 
Finance would be delegated to a Turkish Cypriot. A council of Ministers made up of seven 
Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot Ministers would assist them. Final veto power would, 
however, rest with the President and Vice-President. The judicial system was to be regulated 
jointly by a Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice; these would be 
composed of one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot judge, each with a neutral president.  
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Each community was to have a respective Communal Chamber which would hold authority over 
taxation and all religious, cultural, educational, and personal questions relating to its community. 
The Civil Service would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots, respectively.  A 
Cypriot army would consist of 2,000 men with a 60:40 ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots. 
Separate municipalities in the five largest towns were to be created by their Turkish residents. In 
each of the towns, however, a coordinating body would be established, staffed by members of 
both communities to oversee the work that needed to be executed jointly. Finally, the President 
and Vice-President were to examine, within four years the question, of whether or not this 
separation of municipalities should continue. A very important stipulation was that the basic 
articles would be unalterable.  
The republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity, and security, 
as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or 
economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibit any activity likely to promote, directly 
or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island
Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee states:  
38
 
 
Greece, Turkey, and the UK would be guarantors of these provisions. A key component of the 
Treaty was Article III, which stated that in the event of any “breach of these provisions,” the 
guarantors should confer with each other to decide if “common or concerted action may prove 
impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole 
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present treaty.”39  That Greece, 
Turkey, and the UK would be guarantors of these provisions would later prove to be the most 
contentious and troublesome article in the Zürich 
                                                 
38 “Documents Relating to the Founding of Cyprus, Including the Treaty of Guarantee,” ibid. 
settlement. 
39 Ibid. 
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The Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey called for the creation of a tripartite 
Headquarters on the island, with contingents of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish officers, non-
commissioned officers, and soldiers. These could only be increased or reduced through an 
agreement by both the President and Vice-President. The aforementioned Greek and Turkish 
officers would be in charge of training the Army of the Republic. Command of the tripartite 
Headquarters would be on a one-year rotational basis, with a Cypriot, Greek, and a Turkish 
General Officer assuming the position for a period of one year.40 The Declaration by the 
Government of the United Kingdom formalized the transfer of the sovereignty of the island 
except for the base areas which would be retained under British sovereignty. It also included the 
aforementioned rights and Sovereign base areas retained by the British.41
 
 
Under the “Agreed Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus,” a time limit of 
one year was stated for the establishment of the Republic. These measures called for the 
establishment of a “Joint Commission  in Cyprus” responsible for completing an outline of the 
constitution;  a “Transitional Committee in Cyprus” charged with designing a blueprint for 
adjusting and restructuring the Governmental apparatus to facilitate the transfer of authority to 
the republic; and a “Joint Committee in London,” whose most important function was the 
preparation of final treaties, including “inter alia matters arising from the retention of the areas 
in Cyprus under British Sovereignty.”42
 
 This last item would be especially problematic in the 
swift establishment of the republic.  
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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 On February 18, the second day of the conference, the Archbishop raised a number of objections 
to the Zürich Agreement which was unpopular with the Greek Cypriots. Among them was the 
Turkish Vice-President’s final veto power. Makarios complained that while the Greek Cypriot 
President would have the trappings of power, he would not have the authority to exercise it. 
Makarios also objected to the number of seats allocated to the Turkish Cypriots in the House of 
Representatives— the 70:30 ratio between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and the defense 
alliance which granted Turkey the right to install troops on the island.43  Greek newspapers on 
the island reported that the area allotted to Britain for permanent bases, the Greek-Turkish ratio 
in the military forces, and the municipal divisions provided for in the five cities were also 
problematic for the Archbishop. 44
 
  
 The Greek public, who believed that Makarios had been manipulated in London into accepting 
the Agreements, immediately sought out a scapegoat and conveniently found one in “perfidious 
albion”45
 
 This was hardly the case. Greece and Turkey were both taken aback by the 
Archbishop’s obstinacy, and it was largely their resolve to do whatever was necessary to make 
the Agreements move forward.  The precise circumstances of how and why the Archbishop 
came to sign the Agreements are obscured by conflicting accounts and historical revisionism. 
Makarios, himself, was prone to revising history whenever it was politically expedient. When 
Makarios made the decision to endorse the idea of independence he may have well believed that 
it was only an interim phase and not necessarily the end of the road for enosis.  
                                                 
43 Whitney, Embtel London 4317, February 18, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-1859, NARA. 
44 Reported by Berger, Embtel Athens 1880, February 2, 1959: ibid, doc. 747C.00/2-1859. 
45Ibid.  
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Once the Greeks and the Turks reached their offstage agreement, the Archbishop found himself 
under pressure by a panorama of opinion on both the Left and the Right. Although he would later 
protest that he had been steamrollered by Greece into accepting the Agreements, and had not 
been properly consulted as to their substance, this charge was later refuted by Averoff.  Even 
supporters, who accompanied him to London and who would later become his critics, insisted 
that the pressure brought by the Greek Government was not nearly as strong as he had 
maintained.46  In hindsight, Averoff concluded that Makarios obduracy was due to his insecurity 
about his community’s support in London, since General Grivas had been furious that EOKA 
had not been properly represented in the Archbishop’s delegation. Averoff also went as far as 
claiming that the Agreements contributed to the later rift between Makarios and Grivas.47
 
   
Pressure by the Greek Government, however, cannot be entirely dismissed.  In an FO meeting on 
February 18, Averoff is reported as saying that “he had made it clear to the Cypriots that the 
Greek Government’s support for the Zürich Agreements and the Governmental Declarations was 
final and there would be no further changes in Greece’s foreign policy over Cyprus.” To 
emphasize their resolve, the Foreign Minister added that “the Greek Government would hold 
elections […] on this issue to demonstrate that the people of Greece agreed with them in refusing 
to support the Cypriots any further.”48
 
   
                                                 
46Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, 31-32. 
As to whether the Archbishop should be allowed to state his case at the final session of the 
conference, Selwyn-Lloyd thought he should, while Averoff believed he had already expressed 
his views and should not be given the opportunity to further obstruct the process. Zorlu agreed 
47 Averoff-Tossizza, ibid., 350. 
48 F.O Meeting, February 18, 1959, C.O 926/838, printed in Madden, 464-465. 
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saying, “the Agreements must stand or fall as a whole and were not negotiable to suit the Greek 
Cypriots.” The Turkish Foreign Minister added that the Archbishop “had been consulted at every 
stage and could only be asked whether he accepted the agreements or not.” 49 This position is 
confirmed by Karamanlis, who bluntly told the Archbishop that the Greek government was 
already committed to the Zürich
 
 agreement and had no intention of reneging on it.  
The Greek President laid down an ultimatum: take the agreement or suffer the “blame for 
wrecking the conference.”50  “How could you possibly have objections now when we had agreed 
in Athens to accept the British proposal that there should be no further discussions of any of the 
issues that had been settled in Zürich?” the Prime Minister asked. Karamanlis concluded the 
conversation by warning the delegation that “this is the end of the Greek government’s Cyprus 
policy, and if Makarios wants to carry on the struggle he will have to look elsewhere for 
support.”51
 
  
With only twelve hours to make a decision, Makarios spent the night "in prayer and reflection."52  
Resigned to the realities of the situation, the next morning, the Archbishop finally accepted the 
Agreements unconditionally. 
                                                 
49 In the end Selwyn-Lloyd persuaded the participants at the meeting to give Makarios a final opportunity to get his 
views on record:  “if he rejected the Zürich documents, there would be an immediate recess without allowing him 
any further debate. Then the three P.M.s would meet, affirm their agreed position and emphasize Makarios’ 
isolation:” Ibid, 465. 
That afternoon, the delegates approved the "agreed foundation for 
the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.” Afterwards, the three Prime Ministers signed the 
agreement in Menderes's hospital room, where he was recovering from a plane crash that had 
50 “Hotel Diplomacy,” Time, March 2, 1959. 
51 Averoff-Tossizza, ibid., 348. 
52 “Hotel Diplomacy,” ibid. 
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taken the lives of three members of his delegation. Macmillan then went before the House of 
Commons to pronounce it a "victory for reason and cooperation [...] a victory for all."53
 
 
 
The speculation on the Archbishop’s motives for accepting the Agreements prompted him to 
issue a statement in May 1959, explaining his performance at the Conference:  
I signed the London Agreements fully conscious of my responsibilities towards the people of Cyprus. Failure of the 
London Conference on Cyprus because of a refusal to sign would have had catastrophic consequences for the future 
of Cyprus…Because it has been said that I signed after strong pressure from the Greek Government, I declare that 
no power on earth could have compelled me to sign the agreements if I had believed them to be contrary to the 
interests of the people of Cyprus. In the conference room I fought to the last moment to achieve better terms in the 
proposed agreement. Finally, however, refusal to sign, I repeat again, would have heaped many aggravated troubles 
on the people of Cyprus…With regard to the Greek Government I honestly believe that it made every effort to 
achieve the best that was possible under the given circumstances. The fact that the Greek Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister drew my attention to the consequences which would result from the refusal to sign the agreements 
did not constitute pressure on their part, but the performance of a duty. I put my signature to the London Agreement. 
I do not repent, I do not retract.54
 
 
 In the end, the Archbishop’s reasons for placing his signature on the Agreements were not due 
to Greek pressure or even blackmail as many Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and some Western 
sympathizers would later claim, but because in not doing so, he risked the prospect of political 
isolation and responsibility for further violence and possible partition of the island.”55  While it 
might be tempting to characterize the Archbishop as a mere political opportunist in this regard, 
ultimately he was a pragmatist who believed that thirty percent of something, give or take, 
                                                 
53 Ibid.  
was better than a hundred percent of nothing. 
54  “Archbishop Makarios: Statement May 21, 1959,” printed in Madden, 468. 
55 Averoff-Tossizza, 350; While authors such as Christopher Hitchens attempt to portray Makarios as a statesman 
for accepting the Agreements despite his reservations, it is clear, at least in hindsight, that the Archbishop had 
virtually no choice in the matter: Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History, Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, 
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1984). 
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Chapter XIX 
 
  
Towards Independence 
The conclusion of the settlement meant that the British were finally free of the Cyprus morass. 
Needless to say, they were both elated and relieved. While some Tories lamented the loss of 
another jewel of the empire, most thought it was a small price to pay for peace on the island and 
the renewal of good relations with Greece along with the re-establishment of NATO unity.  The 
Americans, too, were pleased about the settlement and made it known in an official statement 
issued by the State Department on the day of the signing: “the United States wholeheartedly 
welcomes the conclusion of an agreement on the substance of the final settlement of the Cyprus 
problem,” adding that “the leaders of the three Governments concerned and the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities have earned the thanks of the entire free world.”1 The usually 
elsewhere engaged Eisenhower praised the Agreements as “a victory for common sense,” an 
“imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship,” and “a splendid achievement.”2  There is no 
doubt that these were heartfelt sentiments. The conclusion of the settlement removed the US 
from the untenable position of having to stand on the sidelines and do little more than urge “quiet 
diplomacy” and occasionally offer advice while Britain, Greece, and Turkey attempted to try to 
hammer out a solution.3
                                                 
1 “US Views on the Cyprus Settlement: Statement issues by the Department of State,” February 19, 1959: 
Department of State press release No.129, printed in “American Foreign Policy: Current Documents: 1959: Western 
Europe, 775. 
 It is not true or, more accurately as Nicolet puts it, it is an 
“inconceivable distortion of facts” that “Eisenhower forced Harold Macmillan to give up 
2  Quoted in Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, 124. 
3 Roy P. Fairfield, “Cyprus: Revolution and Resolution,” The Middle East Journal, vol.13, no.3 (1959):235-248. 
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sovereignty but denied the Cypriots real independence.” 4  As Stearns rightly argues: in the 
events leading up to Cypriot independence […] the United States was an interested observer but 
not a participant.”5
 
 
Defining American Interests 
 
 No sooner had the Agreements been concluded when preparations were underway to transfer the 
sovereignty of the island as “’as soon as practicable” for fear that any delay would create 
“difficulties.”6 Meanwhile, the Americans took advantage of this transitional period to secure 
their own interests on the island. On February 20, the Foreign Office reassured the Americans 
that they had taken steps to “safeguarded US interests” in the agreement and that these rights 
would also extend to all agreements signed prior to the end of British administration on the 
Cyprus.7 The Americans wanted, if possible, to sidestep any questions regarding the future of the 
vital communications and intelligence facilities on the island and “avoid giving Cypriots grounds 
for belief [the] question will be open for discussion.”8
  
  
First on the list was to secure the critical central net control post for the CIA’s Middle East 
Communications Activity (MECA) located outside of Nicosia, which had been functioning under 
State Department cover as the Radio Relay Station. It was the primary medium for electronic 
communications between all US diplomatic posts and CIA stations in the Middle East and 
                                                 
4 This  is only one of many overarching allegations made by journalists Brendan O’Malley and  Ian Craig in The 
Cyprus Conspiracy, America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, 74-75; Nicolet, United States Policy Towards 
Cyprus, 140. 
5 Stearns, Entangled Allies, 25. 
6 Select Documents, 465. 
7 Embtel London 4378 February 20, 1959: SDCDF, 747C.00/2 – 2059, NARA. 
8 Herter, Contel Nicosia 375, February 25, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 772. 
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Africa, and between these posts and Washington.9  Second, since 1949, the US had operated 
their Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) monitor station on Cyprus, which monitored 
foreign radio broadcasts from the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.10 Finally, the US had been 
trying to secure installation rights for its Voice of America (VOA) transmitter on Cyprus since 
1957 because Greece had denied the American request to install it on Rhodes.11  Although 
Greece later reconsidered the prospect of allowing the transmitter to be installed on Rhodes, the 
US finally concluded that Cyprus was “a better spot technically and several hundred miles closer 
to the target area.”12
 
  
On April 16, 1958, in what had become known as Project Delta, the British agreed in principle to 
allow the US to construct a VOA transmitter on Cyprus to provide enhanced coverage of the 
Middle East.13  In March, 1959, however, Consul Belcher voiced concern over the possibility 
that the operation rights might be linked to American aid for Cyprus, when Makarios, for the first 
time, requested the enormous sum of $20 million in economic assistance from the US and an 
equal sum from the UK—shamelessly suggesting not do so might be regarded by Cypriots as a 
“dereliction” of duty.14
 
 Considering the particular and general interests the US had in Cyprus, it 
was agreed in principle that aid for the new nation might be required. 
It was at this stage that the Americans realized they needed to be more proactive or risk 
jeopardizing not only the VOA program, but the entire communications infrastructure on the 
                                                 
9 Background Paper: US Communications Facilities, May 24, 1962Lot Files, Entry 3051B, Conference File 2116, 
Visit of the President of Cyprus to Washington D.C., 6/5-9/62, Briefing Book, NARA. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Position Paper for the Macmillan Talks, Washington, October 23-25 1957”Location of VOA Transmitter on 
Cyprus, “(no date) Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, WHCF, (Confidential File), 1953-61, State 
Department (October 1957) (2), doc. 4, DDE-Library. 
12  Belcher, Contel Nicosia 321, April 14, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 782. 
13 Staff Notes Prepared for President Eisenhower, April 16, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, XII, 298. 
14 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 391, March 6, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1 779-780. 
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island. From this point onward the economic advantages of hosting the facilities was brought 
forward in every discussion with the Cypriots. The programs suddenly became “offers” and it 
was pointed out that they needed to close the deal or risk losing the opportunity to Greece which 
had lately warmed to the idea of a VOA installation on Rhodes.15
 
  
The Archbishop insisted that he would be “more than happy” to have American communications 
facilities in principle, but made it clear that a “financial quid pro quo” was expected in exchange 
for extending “Cypriot hospitality.” Makarios asked Consul Belcher if the US ever paid “rent” or 
“royalties” under the “’existing arrangements’” that it had with the British. Belcher said no, 
explaining that the US paid rent only for antenna rights, but had bought the property on which 
the stations stood.  Makarios then interjected saying, “well, you know we will be poor and you 
will have to pay us something.” Belcher reiterated that at present the US did not pay rent and that 
there was no provision to do so under the current operation. It was apparent that the Archbishop 
was determined to extract the maximum return for his island. Considering the substantial amount 
of money that the US was already pouring into the Cypriot economy, Belcher sensed a bit of a 
shakedown, but overlooked it, believing it was important to first secure the agreements in 
principle and sweat the details at a later time. 16 On January 1960 Makarios finally signed an 
agreement declaring American communication facilities would be welcome on the island 
following independence.17
 
 
Lifting the Ban on AKEL 
                                                 
15 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 438, April 14, 1959: ibid., 782. 
16 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 169, October 10, 1959:ibid., 795-797. 
17 Barbour, Embtel London 3468, January 13, 1960: Ibid, 806-807; The existence of this agreement calls into 
question the assertion later made by O’Malley and  Craig that  “[the US Government] secretly carried on operating 
[communications facilities] after independence without raising the issue with the Cypriots:” ibid.,  82.This claim is 
also rightly refuted by Nicolet in ibid., 143. 
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The communications facilities were not the only matter troubling the Americans.  Now that the 
state of emergency was no longer in effect on the island, Governor Foot believed the time was 
right for lifting the ban on AKEL, which Harding had proscribed in 1955. The Governor 
defended his position by arguing that the struggle against EOKA had proven that banning an 
organization would only serve to strengthen it. In a conversation with Consul Belcher in May, 
Foot suggested that an effort be made to “beat them openly through promulgation of equal or 
better policies.”18
 
  
Needless to say, the Americans were not impressed by this risky argument, and were aghast at 
the prospect of the communists being permitted to operate freely on the island. Although 
officials in London largely shared the American concern, they were reluctant to challenge the 
Governor on this issue. An important reason for this was the earlier secret “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement” between Karamanlis and Menderes which called for the encouragement of Cyprus’ 
participation in NATO by Athens and Ankara and for the mother countries to lobby the President 
and Vice-President of the new Republic to ban the Communist Party on the island. It also called 
for a general amnesty for all former members.19 This in effect granted Turkey and Greece the 
extraordinary right to act as proxies for Cyprus in NATO and to influence the Cypriots to keep 
“the lid” on communist activities on the island.20
 
 
                                                 
18 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 482, May 19, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/5-1959, NARA. 
19 Madden, Select Documents, 461-462. 
20 Holland, Britain and the Revolt on Cyprus, 305; While a first draft of the NSC policy paper on Cyprus urged the 
full admission of Cyprus to NATO, the final draft stated that although the Cypriots “are not likely, at least in the 
initial years of their independence, to seek  membership in NATO,” the US should “take no initiative to secure the 
admission of Cyprus[…] but be prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised: NSC Report: 
“Statement of US Policy toward Cyprus” (NSC 6003), February 9, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 819-828; see 
also Chapter 20 of this text. 
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The US still held firmly to the view that “communist tactics are [designed] to exploit nationalist 
feeling in order to consolidate the position of local communist parties and to weaken Western 
influence and security.”21 Since the strength of the communist lay almost exclusively in the 
Greek Cypriot community and the labor movement, Makarios understood that lifting the ban was 
necessary to his political survival. AKEL was one of the best organized groups on the island, and 
its influence would only increase in the future. Makarios played no small role in influencing 
Foot’s decision to lift the ban. The Archbishop stated he was strongly in favor of lifting the ban 
“as soon as possible,” and that no further developments could induce him to change his mind. 
While Foot raised the question with the Colonial Office that lifting the ban might weaken the 
Archbishop’s position, he finally concluded that Makarios “knew best how to play the Cypriot 
political game.”22 When questioned by the British as to Ankara’s position regarding the 
legalization of AKEL, Zorlu replied that Turkey was not opposed, providing the action was 
limited to AKEL only and did not include the Cypriot Communist Party.23
 
 
For its part, the Foreign Office was also in favor of lifting the proscription against the 
organization.  According to Addis, the question of lifting the ban on AKEL had “been under 
constant review at high level [with] HMG” since the previous summer. While Britain 
sympathized with the American’s “strong views against lifting the ban” and recognized the broad 
range of opinion even within the HMG, “on balance,” it did not believe it could reverse the 
decision.  AKEL was legalized on December 4, 1959.24
                                                 
21 Lodge to Dulles, Report: “International Communism and the Cyprus Question, “ August 19, 1954:SDCDF, doc. 
747C.00/8-1954, NARA, 4. 
 The draft of the new NSC paper entitled 
22  Whitney, Embtel London 2801, November 30, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X pt. 1, 803. 
23 While Addis assured Zorlu that the British Government had no intentions of lifting the ban on the Communist 
Party, which had been proscribed in 1931, he also admitted that there “was in fact, little distinction between the 
Communist Party and AKEL:” Ibid. 
24 Ibid, 804. 
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“US Policy toward Cyprus “supplanted NSC 5718 of August 1957. It was amended to include a 
caveat stating that the US should [b]e prepared, as appropriate and feasible, to encourage the re-
imposition of the ban on the Communist Party of Cyprus.”25
  
   
Fine Tuning the Settlement 
  
While the Americans were occupied with communication facilities and communists, the British 
had its own troubles with the Cypriots. The details that had been sidestepped in the early days of 
the settlement were beginning to surface. Only two weeks after the Agreements had been signed, 
Consul Belcher expressed concern about the prospect of mutual cooperation between the two 
communities. Osmen Örek, one of the chief negotiators for the constitution and slated to become 
the first Minister of Defense for Cyprus, colorfully described the new government as “an 
automobile with Makarios at the wheel and Küçük controlling the gears and brakes.”26
 
   
The first controversy to emerge was questions about the economy, with the Greek Ambassador 
to Washington bitterly complaining that the Turkish Cypriots were requesting economic 
assistance from Turkey. This was not a welcome development since rather than unify the two 
communities; it further emphasized their separation through attachment to the mother country.27
The second problem centered on political cooperation—or lack thereof. A particular point of 
contention concerned the definition of the Turkish Vice President’s veto powers.
   
28
                                                 
25 Briefing Note for the NSC Meeting: US Policy towards Cyprus, January 20, 1960: White House Office, Office of 
the Special Assistant for National Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, doc. 2, DDE-
Library.  
  A third 
question concerned the Cypriot military. While the Greek Cypriots accused the Turkish Cypriots 
26  Belcher, FS Despatch Nicosia, March 5, 1959: SDCDF, quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 145. 
27 Liatis, Memcon with Laingen: “Cyprus,” March 12, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1259, NARA. 
28  von Faustmann, Hubert, Divide and Quit? The History of British Colonial rule in Cyprus 1878-1960, including a 
Special Survey of the Transnational Period, February 1959-1960, Dissertation, (Mannheim, Germany: University of 
Mannheim, 1999), 410-411. 
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of smuggling arms, they themselves were not completely innocent, having failed to surrender 
EOKA weapons to the British as per a prior agreement.29
 
  
Consequently, a furor erupted over the so-called “Deniz Incident,” which involved the 
interception by the British naval patrol of a Turkish caique smuggling arms.  Despite being 
caught red-handed, Turkey went on the defensive, acting like the aggrieved party. On October 
27, Zorlu summoned British Ambassador Burroughs to “recite his tale of woe” and protest Greek 
and British conduct with regard to the incident, calling it “the last straw” in a string of 
grievances.30 Still, the Greek Government was determined to not let the incident interfere with 
the implementation of the London-Zürich Agreements.31   Makarios’ reaction was to suspend the 
intra-communal talks.32
 
  
Adding to the troubles, the Archbishop was now haggling with Julian Amery, the UK’s chief 
negotiator, over the size and location of the Sovereign Base Areas. Makarios was adamant that 
Cypriot villages be excluded from the base perimeter, a demand that Britain could not concede. 
The size of the base also came into question, with both sides seemingly wrangling over every 
square inch, and Lloyd threatening to resurrect the whole London Agreement,33 prompting 
Macmillan to remark “[…] Makarios will bargain up to the last point, but will throw it all away 
on the difference between an area eleven miles by eleven, or six miles by six.”34
 
  
                                                 
29 Ibid; .Nicolet, ibid., 145-146. 
30 Cowles, Embtel, Ankara 1026, October 27, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 799. 
31  Briggs, Embtel Athens 1114, October 27, 1959:ibid., 800-801. 
32Ibid., 799-800; A statement by the Turkish Foreign office in regard to the Deniz incident, appeared to satisfy 
Makarios who indicated that it might lead to a renewal of the talks: Belcher Contel Nicosia 176, October 24, 1959: 
SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-2459, NARA.  
33 Faustmann, ibid., 404-409; Jones to Herter, Memorandum: Message from Mr. Lloyd Concerning Cyprus, 
“February 1, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-160, NARA. 
34 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961, (New York: Harper & Row publishers, 1972), 163. 
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Makarios also brought up the prospect of the bases area being ceded to the Republic of Cyprus 
should the British ever withdraw. Since Britain had no intention of ever doing so, they believed 
the point was moot. A proposal put forward by Kücük for a 100 square mile compromise for the  
British base area was deemed “unacceptable” by the Archbishop.35  Makarios countered with an 
offer for 80 square miles which was rejected by Britain. Governor Foot described the impasse as 
“brinksmanship with a vengeance.” He expressed concern that if the Cypriots failed to close the 
deal they would be making a “grave mistake” since if Amery left with no solution, it would be 
difficult to restart the talks. Foot was convinced that Makarios had no intention of trying to meet 
the British even halfway and knew that they would never concede to his demand for an 80 square 
mile base area. When Consul Belcher suggested that maybe the Greeks were counting on Britain 
to be reluctant to pay for another round of talks, the Governor responded by saying that he was 
“sure” that his government was willing to “endure considerable trials” and spend “millions” 
rather than give in. 36
 
   
In the end, the base area was limited to 99 square miles, while Makarios won over the question 
of ceding the base to the Republic of Cyprus should the British ever decide to leave. But it was 
Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod who swiftly brought an end to the Cyprus problem by stepping 
up the timetable for liquidating the colonial holdings of the British Empire, including Cyprus. On 
July 4, he announced in Parliament the agreements for independence for the island had been 
finally concluded.37
 
  
                                                 
35 Belcher, Embtel 420, April 4, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-560, NARA. 
The First Election 
36 Belcher, Embtel Nicosia, April 3, 1960: ibid., doc. 747C.00/4-560. 
37 Whitney, Embtel London 47, July 5, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-560; Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, 46.  
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At the first Presidential elections of December, 1959, the ultra nationalists Right and the 
communist AKEL concluded that there was someone they detested even more than each other, 
the Archbishop Makarios. The settlement which had officially repudiated enosis and granted 
Britain Sovereign Bases on Cyprus’s south coast left both groups dissatisfied—and not for the 
first time, the Right and Left abandoned their purported principles to unite in a common cause. 
The communists lent their support to the moribund right-wing candidate Ioannis Clerides and his 
Democratic Union party to run against Makarios. Their joint platform consisted of opposition to 
the newly-minted Zurich-London Agreements as the basis for independence, although for 
different reasons. The Democratic Union saw the Agreements as unworkable and a stumbling 
block to the goal of enosis, while AKEL, though not opposing the Agreements as such, feared 
the NATO-ization of Cyprus. 
During the campaign, the Archbishop made one speech denouncing the "modern hypocrites and 
Pharisees," and somewhat disbelievingly proclaiming that "I am the least interested man in these 
elections."38
 
  Makarios, who was the frontrunner, handily defeated Clerides 68.85 to 35.15 per 
cent.  Following the election, Makarios struck a deal with AKEL, offering the organization 5 
seats in Parliament out of the total 35 occupied by the Greek Cypriots, bringing to his side the 
strongest party on the island.  The remaining 15 seats were held by the Turkish Cypriots. On the 
basis of the Zürich and London Agreements, a constitution was drafted and Cyprus was 
proclaimed an independent state on August 16, 1960. 
                                                 
38 “The First President, “Time, December 21, 1959. 
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Chapter XX 
 
 
The problem of Cyprus, always an international rather than a colonial problem, has now been 
resolved and the island has become an independent Republic as the result of friendly agreement 
between all the countries concerned. Who dares to say that this is anything but a story of steady 
liberal progress— Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 
 
US Policy and the New Republic 
In theory, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus meant that those who led the struggle for 
enosis and the ones who had advocated partition of the island would now be required to 
collaborate on running the newly independent state. This would prove to be far more difficult in 
practice. While the constitution that emerged after more than a year and a half of wrangling 
reflected “the legacy of intercommunal strife rather than a model for sound government based on 
democratic lines,” for the Greek Cypriots it was probably the best arrangement that could be 
negotiated at the time.1
In some respects, the new Republic and the agreement which brought it into existence only 
served to intensify them. Fraser Wilkins, the new Ambassador at the Embassy in Nicosia noted 
that three months after independence the Greek and Turkish communities remained “preoccupied 
with communal phobia and post mortems on Zürich-London agreements,” which in his view was 
  The Zürich-London agreements may have created a state, but they could 
not compel the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots to bury old grievances and join in the spirit of 
mutual cooperation.  
                                                 
1 Crawshaw, The Revolt in Cyprus, 36; Michael Moran, “Cyprus and the 1960 Accords: Nationalism and 
Internationalism:”Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs,  June - July 2001 Volume VI – Number 2, 3. 
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a distraction from the internal and external Communist threat.2
In May 1959, Governor Foot raised the question of military aid to Cyprus. Foot informed Consul 
Belcher that he and his advisors preferred the Cypriot military to use the British equipment 
already in stock on the island provided it was free of charge.  In the event it required payment, 
however, the Governor favored US equipment if it could be provided without charge. After some 
reconsideration, however, Foot concluded that it might be best that the Cypriot army use 
equipment similar to that used by Greece and Turkey. Since Greek and Turkish officers would be 
in charge of training the Cypriot army, Foot reasoned that they should work with equipment 
already familiar to them. This, of course, meant US equipment like that used by NATO.   
 For Britain, independence meant 
that it was finally free of the burden of Cyprus, at least for the moment.  
Belcher, who was growing impatient with the issue, recommended that the State Department try 
to reach an early decision in this matter and strongly advised that the US should concentrate 
more on economic rather than military assistance to Cyprus.3 The State Department had already 
made the decision that the Cypriot army should be equipped out of the Greek and Turkish MAP 
(Military Assistance Program) surplus which, of course, had been supplied by the US.4 When 
Ambassador Briggs inquired whether the US would oppose the transfer of its MAP equipment to 
the Cypriot army, 5Acting Secretary Dillon said it had no objection, but warned that the transfer 
would not be enough to substantiate an increase in military assistance to Greece and Turkey as 
compensation.6
                                                 
2 Wilkins, Embtel Nicosia 248, November 18, 1960: SDCDF: 780A.00/11 – 1860, NARA. 
  
3 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 454, May 4, 1959: FRUS, 1958- 1960, X, pt. 1, 783. 
4  Dillon Deptel Nicosia 477, May 6, 1959: ibid., 786; Dillion, Deptel Paris 185, December 2, 1960:ibid., 841. 
5 Briggs, Embtel Athens 411, August 13, 1959:ibid., 790-791. 
6 Dillon, Deptel Athens 601, August 28, 1959: SDCDF, Cyprus, doc. 747C. 56/8-1359, NARA.   
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Secretary Herter suggested to his Ambassador in London that it might be useful to raise the 
question of financial and material support for the Cypriot army with the Foreign Office to get its 
views on how best to resolve the problem. 7 This was not merely a courtesy call to keep Britain 
apprised of its intentions. The Americans were clearly looking for a way to minimize the sticker 
shock of equipping and maintaining the Cypriot military, which was estimated at some ₤ 
2,000,000 annually. In other words, the US was trying to find a way to redistribute the enormous 
financial demands for investment in the new Republic. The Americans were more than happy to 
pass on the request for military aid to Greece, Turkey, and the UK. Moreover, since all three 
were NATO members, the US could be confident that Cyprus would be guided in the right 
direction. Britain, however, was not keen to honor the request for military equipment, but 
promised to consider it and hoped that the US would do the same. 8
An “Unimportant Matter” 
 
In October 1959, Belcher received a request from Makarios concerning the “unimportant matter” 
of the new Cypriot army. As he handed Belcher the letter containing the request for military aid, 
he portentously remarked, “this is [the] first time I have signed  [a] request on [the] part of the 
new republic to be for assistance on any kind. It is [the] first but I know it won’t be the last.”9
Washington expected any request for military assistance for Cyprus to come indirectly from 
Turkey and Greece. US officials wanted to avoid the military aid issue for a number of reasons, 
but mainly because they had yet to develop a cohesive policy in this regard. Makarios’ direct 
request, however, did raise a few “delicate questions:” 
  
                                                 
7 Herter, Deptel London 2380, September 23, 1959:ibid., 792; Embtel London 1221, September 3, 1959: SDCDF, 
doc. 747C.00/9-359, NARA. 
8 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 159-160. 
9 Makarios to Belcher, Letter, October 17, 1959 in Belcher, Contel Nicosia 171, October 22, 1959: FRUS, 1958-
1960, X, pt. 1, 798. 
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(1) Was Makarios' request made with knowledge and approval Kuchuk [sic.] and other members 
[of the] Transitional Committee and does it therefore represent [a] coordinated Cypriot request?  
(2) What is [the] relationship, if any, between Makarios' request and current talks of Cypriot-
Greek-Turkish military committee in Athens?  
(3) If none, are Greek and Turkish Govts privy this request?  
These questions could not be put to the Archbishop directly for fear that it would undermine his 
competence to represent the “Cypriot Govt-to-be,” or suggest that he might be “playing Greek 
community politics.”10
Military Assistance and the NATO Question 
   Two critical questions that the US would soon have to address, 
however, had yet to be raised: what US interest would be served by supplying military aid to 
Cyprus, and what was the prospect for Cyprus joining the NATO alliance? 
Initially, the Cyprus and NATO issue would appear to have been settled through the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement concluded in February 1959, where Karamanlis and Menderes had 
agreed to support Cyprus’ entry into NATO. The agreement, however, was not binding to any 
third party without its explicit consent.11
The conclusion of an NIE report dated October 6, 1959 was that “Cyprus will probably become a 
member of the UN and […] may remain in the Commonwealth, but will probably not join 
NATO. “
 Since it was merely an informal agreement between the 
Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, it did not bind Cyprus nor any of the Guarantors—nor did it 
settle the question for the US. 
12
                                                 
10 Herter, Deptel Nicosia 150, October 28, 1959: ibid., 801. 
A briefing note for the Planning Board Meeting scheduled for the following week, 
however, took a different view— suggesting that it might be a more secure arrangement if 
11 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the Internal Status of Cyprus, 158. 
12 NIE: “The Outlook for an Independent Cyprus, “October, 6, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 794. 
 268 
Cyprus became a member of NATO in its own right rather than trust in the agreements it had 
with Greece and Turkey. Accordingly, a section was inserted into the NSC report on US policy 
for Cyprus urging the US to “[s]upport the admission of Cyprus to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization as soon as feasible following independence.”13 In this regard the briefing note 
questioned if it were sensible for the US under all conditions to make Greece and Turkey 
responsible for direct military assistance to Cyprus. This was an important development in that 
from this time forward, the issues of NATO and military assistance would be linked.14
The offices of Budget and Treasury were the first to raise objections to NATO membership for 
Cyprus. The number crunchers worried over the escalating costs in military spending and an 
unrestricted policy of supplying arms to a small country such as Cyprus.
  
15 The Defense 
Department had broader concerns, and worried that if the US gave military assistance to Cyprus, 
every “newly-emerging independent country” would be queuing up to get its share: “the US had 
to draw the line somewhere […] and Cyprus is the place where the line should be drawn.”16
                                                 
13 Briefing Note for Planning Board Meeting, October 13, 1959:“US Policy Towards Cyprus, “ October 12, 
1959:White House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, NSC Series, 
Briefing Notes Subseries, Cyprus, US Policy toward, DDE-Library. 
 This 
was the view of the majority of the Planning Board, including the JCS. The State Department 
and the OCDM (Office of Civil Defense Mobilization), however, argued that the US should be 
prepared to consider military assistance “if encouraging the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey, 
and the UK failed,” and it was concluded that military assistance was “absolutely essential” to 
14 Nicolet, ibid. 160. 
15 Briefing Note for the Planning Meeting Board Meeting, October 23, 1959: “US Policy in Cyprus.” October 22, 
1959: White House Office, Papers of the NSC Staff, 1948-1961, DDE-Library. 
16 Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary of NSC, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the 
NSC, “December 1, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 805. 
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achieve American objectives.17
The Office of European Regional Affairs was among the first to sound the alarm about the 
wisdom of supporting the island’s entry into NATO. A memorandum dated November 3 
cautioned that supporting Cyprus’ ascendancy would undermine the effectiveness of the alliance 
and contribute nothing to the common defense.  Rather than taking in “an inexperienced and 
indigent unknown quantity as a full member,” the memorandum stated, “it would be preferable 
to extend the NATO area to cover an independent Cyprus, somewhat as the Treaty was extended 
to cover Berlin.”
  The question was did those objectives also include NATO 
membership for Cyprus?  
18
The decision as to whether direct military assistance should be provided to any nation by the United States should 
rest upon an estimate of its contribution to the military security of the United States […] The principal US military 
interests in Cyprus lie in the denial of Cyprus to USSR as a military base and, in the continued availability of British 
military as well as certain US facilities. The planned 2,000-man Cypriot armed force will contribute nothing to the 
preservation of these US interests. Further, the governments of Greece, Turkey, and the UK are obligated by the 
London Agreements of February 1959 to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Thus it is 
concluded that there is no military justification for the provision of US direct military aid to Cyprus.
  The assessment that Cyprus would be a dead weight on the alliance from a 
military point of view is reflected in the JCS memorandum of November 6: 
19
 
 
Furthermore, it was recommended that the already overextended MAP funds not be exploited to 
satisfy purely political objectives. This included replacing any Greek or Turkish MAP equipment 
that might be shifted to Cyprus.20
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
 The divergent views of the State Department, representing the 
minority, and those of the majority of NSC members, could not be reconciled before the crucial 
18 Russell Fessenden, Office of European Regional Affairs, to Jones (GTI), Memorandum:”Treatment of NATO 
Membership in NSC Paper on Cyprus,” November 11, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-359, NARA. 
19 Appendix, “US Policy on Cyprus,” to General Nathan F. Twining , Chairman of the JCS, Memorandum for the 
Secretary of Defense , November 6, 1959: White House Office , Office of the Special Assistant  for National 
Security Affairs; Records , 1952-61,NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, NSC 6003, Cyprus, US Policy toward, 
DDE-Library; also quoted in Nicolet, ibid, 161. 
20 Briefing Note for NSC Meeting, November 11, 1959: “US Policy toward Cyprus: “Declassified Documents, doc. 
1992, 2684. 
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meeting of December 1, 1959. President Eisenhower commented that he was unaware of any 
request from Makarios for military assistance. Upon learning that the initial request of 2 ½ 
million would only be the beginning, the President decided to delay any consideration of military 
assistance until he had an opportunity to consult with Dulles.21
 Not surprisingly, the British Chiefs of Staff had formulated similar views about the same time as 
the JCS, but the British assessment was even harsher: 
  
The proposed Cypriot Army and the Greek and Turkish contingents to be stationed in Cyprus are […] too small […] 
to be anything but an embarrassment to SACEUR if they were offered to NATO in an operational role, nor are they 
strategically required by him […] The Chiefs of Staff, therefore feel most strongly from the military point of view, it 
would be a grave disadvantage to admit Cyprus to NATO. 22
 
 
Moreover, the question of Cyprus in connection to NATO raised security concerns because as a 
member, Cyprus could veto the military plans of the Alliance. The exclusive use of the United 
Kingdom’s bases on the island could also be in jeopardy. Finally, the Cypriot Government would 
have access to sensitive NATO documents. Given the strength of the Communist Party and its 
antipathy towards the Alliance, this could pose a security risk.23
Similarly, a brief submitted to the Cyprus Ministerial Committee in January argued that 
admission of Cyprus to NATO could give the Soviets the opportunity to exploit any disharmony 
that might erupt within the Alliance: 
  
The only question referred for the consideration of [the] Ministers is whether Cyprus should become a member of 
NATO and whether a NATO headquarters might be established in the island. There are substantial military 
                                                 
21 The State Department and the OCDM  represented the minority; while the majority consisted of the Defense 
Department, Treasury, Budget, and JCS: Marion Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary of NSC, “Memorandum of 
Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the NSC, “December 1, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 805. 
22 Annex to COS Committee Minute: “Republic of Cyprus—Admission to NATO,” January 6, 1960: DEFE 11/430, 
also quoted in Nicolet, ibid., 162. 
23 Ibid.: Nicolet, ibid., 162; Mallinson, Cyprus: a Modern History, 90. 
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arguments against Cyprus becoming a member of NATO […] If Cyprus became a member of NATO, any dispute 
that may arise between Cyprus and either Turkey or the United Kingdom could be represented by the Russians as 
dissension within the NATO alliance […].24
 
 
The debate within the NSC regarding direct military assistance to Cyprus was finally resolved in 
late January 1960, following Makarios’ sudden assurance that the US could retain 
communication facilities on the island. This development removed the main argument of the 
State Department that military aid might serve as a good bargaining chip when it came to US 
interests. The immediate response of the State Department was to draft a negative response to 
Makarios’ request for military assistance, pointing out that this was a matter for the Guarantor 
Powers and not the US. If the Archbishop had expected to be compensated for his decision he 
was in for a disappointment. 25
With that issue more or less resolved, two more questions still remained. First, how should the 
US handle any potential Greek and Turkish requests to replace their MAP equipment that they 
may intend to deliver to Cyprus? Eisenhower expressed concern with the idea of giving two US 
allies arms that might be used against a third ally. On this question it was decided not to make a 
decision, since the argument for keeping this option open still had some appeal. Rather than 
choose between the minority and majority views, Eisenhower instead decided to have a clause 
inserted into the new NSC paper stating, “any such request should be referred to the National 
Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing.”
 
26
                                                 
24 Brief submitted to the Cyprus Ministerial Committee, January 1960: Quoted here in Mallinson, ibid., 91. 
 
25 Belk to Gordon Grey, Special Assistant o the President for National Security Affairs, Memorandum: “Cyprus,” 
January 20, 1960: White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-
61, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Cyprus, US Policy toward, 1959-1960, DDE-Library.  
26 Boggs, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the NSC, February 4, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, 
pt.1, 816-819. 
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 Now all that remained was the question of NATO membership for Cyprus. Despite confirmation 
that Cyprus was not presently covered by the North Atlantic Treaty,27 the final decision was 
made that the disadvantages for Cyprus’ admission to NATO far outweighed the advantages. 
Accordingly, the final version of the NSC  Report on US Policy toward Cyprus stated that since 
Cyprus was “not likely, at least in the initial years of independence, to seek membership in 
NATO,” the US should “[t]ake no initiative  to secure the admission of Cyprus to NATO but be 
prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised.”28
The above evidence should be enough to finally put to rest one of the favorite themes of the 
conspiracy theorists namely, that the US forced independence on Cyprus with the intent of 
cultivating the island for inclusion in NATO.
 
29
Epilogue 
  Unfortunately, old memes, like old habits, die 
hard and, in this instance, it might be easier to persuade the true believer to abandon his search 
for relics of the True Cross.   
In May, 1960 Consul Belcher was forced to remind the State Department that the negative reply 
to Makarios’ request for military aid, which had been prepared in January, had never been 
dispatched. He had concluded that while the American Government was anxious to safeguard its 
interests in Cyprus, it wanted to do so on the cheap.  In a scathing appraisal of the US 
Government’s performance thus far, Belcher stated that the “[p]olicy decision to persuade allies 
to shoulder the burden of necessary aid [is an] excellent one in many areas of the world,” it is 
                                                 
27 “Applicability of  North Atlantic Treaty to Cyprus,“ undated,  attached to Eisenhower to Makarios, Telegram 
from the USS Des Moines, December 16, 1959: Ann Whitman File, International Series, Cyprus, DDE-Library. 
28 NSC Report: Statement of US Policy toward Cyprus, “NSC 6003, February 9, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 
825-826. 
29 This has long been an article of faith not only among conspiracy-minded writers such as O’Malley and Craig, but 
also a general belief among many Greek Cypriots: cf. The Cyprus Conspiracy, 68-86. 
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not, however, sufficient for Cyprus, since “we have vital interests in both monitoring and radio 
relay facilities.”30
 The State Department was slow to take the hint. Only after a second reminder in July by the new 
American Consul General L. Douglas Heck did officials finally give permission to advise 
Makarios and Küçük of the State Department’s decision. Heck was also quick to remind officials 
to be prepared to receive further requests for aid from the Archbishop.
   
31  Not coincidentally, the 
disappointing news came only after the final settlement in British-Cypriot negotiations on the 
Treaties, including specifics relating to the acreage the UK would be allowed to retain for its 
SBAs.32 The State Department was reluctant to jeopardize these negotiations by counseling the 
Archbishop to look to the British for economic and military assistance.33
In September 1960, the Soviet Ambassador to Athens visited Cyprus and promised aid in the 
form of several shiploads of grain.
 
34   To counter this offer, Fraser Wilkins, who had been called 
on to replace Belcher, recommended a program that included plans for increased grain shipments 
and economic aid, stepped-up American and cultural information programs, dispatching  labor 
organizers to strengthen non-communist labor unions (SEK), and a one-time military assistance 
for the Cypriot army.35
                                                 
30 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 458, May 3, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.5-MSP/5-360, NARA. 
  The State Department responded by explaining that while it was  aware 
of the steady deterioration of non-communist trade unions, it believed no progress could be made 
in reorganizing SEK as a counter to the PEO until Michael Pissas, the Secretary-General of the 
31 L. Douglas Heck, Consul-general, Contel Nicosia 16, July 8, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 833. 
32 Boggs, Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the NSC, February 4, 1960: ibid., 816. 
33 Nicolet, ibid., 164. 
34 Wilkins, Embtel Nicosia 161, September 28, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 836. 
35 Wilkins, Embtel Nicosia 248, November 18, 1960: SDCDF: 780A.00/11 – 1860, NARA. 
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trade union movement in Cyprus, was removed.36
On the economic and political level, Wilkins was a little more successful. Concern over the 
Soviet shipment of grain had prompted the State Department to re-evaluate its position and, in 
November, a request by the Government of Cyprus for economic aid was finally approved. 
  Regarding the military aid request, Wilkins 
was again told that equipping the army was the responsibility of Greece and Turkey.  
37
1960 marked the end of the Eisenhower Administration. It had been a long eight years. In that 
time, Cyprus had morphed from a question to a dispute and finally to a resolution, albeit a 
tentative one. John F. Kennedy would not only inherit the legacy of the decisions made by the 
Eisenhower Administration vis à vis Cyprus, but also be forced to make a few of his own.    
  
Moreover, after noting the decline of communist influence in the trade unions, a decision was 
made that the US would train non-communist union leaders in the US while an American trade 
unionist would be brought to Cyprus.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
36 The Embassy regarded Pissas as “corrupt and self-seeking.” The Minister of Labor agreed that he should be 
eliminated: Wilkins, Airgram Nicosia G-39, October 11, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 837. 
37 Dillion, Memorandum for the President: “PL 480 Aid for Cyprus, “November 8, 1960: Ann Whitman File, 
Dulles-Herter Series, Herter, Christian, November 1960, DDE-Library. 
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Conclusions 
 
Prior to the internalization of the Cyprus problem in 1954, the American position towards the 
conflict could best be described as ambivalent. Believing it had no dog in the fight, the US 
preferred to fall back on its traditional ideals of liberal democracy and anti-colonialism while 
disdaining Britain for its colonial stance. The first Greek appeal at the UN, however, drove home 
the realization that the Soviet Union now had a venue in which to engender disharmony among 
the Western allies by exploiting the Cyprus problem. Hence, internationalization changed 
everything.  
 
While sympathetic to the Greek desire for self-determination for the island, the Americans were 
faced with trying to reconcile its principles with the realities of the Cold War and its traditional 
support for Britain which maintained that, due to its strategic importance, Cyprus could never be 
fully independent. Eventually the Americans got over their evasive stance and, gradually, 
political pragmatism came to dictate US policy towards the island. 
 
While relations between the US and Britain were often stormy during the 1950s, due to the 
frequent ham-handedness of British diplomacy, undermining of American initiatives, and most 
importantly, the Suez crisis, the special relationship survived.  
 
By the late 1950s, however, Prime Minister Macmillan, unlike his American counterpart, was 
not quite as obsessed with the security of NATO’s southeastern flank. Following the military 
excursion into Egypt, the British began a re-evaluation of the utility of military installations on 
the island and concluded that it would be more efficient to retain bases on Cyprus instead of 
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retaining the island as a whole.  Moreover, Britain’s detonation of the hydrogen bomb in 1957 
caused an upsurge in British military confidence which contributed to the downgrade of the 
strategic value of Cyprus. At this stage, Britain’s primary objective was to work to rid itself of 
the troublesome island but, in a manner that allowed it to save face while still keeping a military 
foothold there. It was also at this point that Britain began seriously contemplating partition as a 
viable way out of the Cyprus morass. The Middle East Crises of 1956 and 1958 enhanced the 
strategic importance of Turkey, causing Britain to minimize Greek fears and actively consider 
the Turkish preference for partition as a solution. 
 
When it came to UN involvement and Cyprus, more often than not, the US found itself 
supporting, or at least not actively opposing, Britain’s attempts to prevent Greece from taking the 
issue to the international forum. When American self-interest was at stake, however, US officials 
had little difficulty in linking unrelated issues such as the question of Chinese representation to 
the Cyprus problem in order to gain British support. 
 
Above all, the US feared the deterioration of NATO’s southern flank and communist exploitation 
of ally disunity. The Eisenhower Administration, which had always regarded the Cyprus problem 
through an East-West prism, tended to minimize regional and internal conflicts in an attempt to 
convince Greece, Turkey and, most importantly, the Cypriots themselves that their own desires 
and disagreements were secondary to the real threat of a disruption of the NATO alliance. It 
should be remembered, however, that it was not only the Western powers that had an interest in 
the island. Greece and Turkey also had a stake in resolving the Cyprus question and each hoped 
to gain maximum leverage over the other in the process.  
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The conclusion of the Zürich-London Agreements in 1959 came as a relief to both the US and 
Britain, but also presented new challenges. Although far from perfect, they seemed to satisfy all 
parties, at least in the short term. After years on the backburner of American foreign policy, 
Cyprus now would be cultivated for its value in the ongoing struggle for Soviet containment. No 
longer under the protection of Britain, the US now needed to mark out its own interests and deal 
with Cyprus, not as a colonial backwater, but as an independent state.  
 
While the US believed that the Cyprus settlement was a move towards stimulating NATO 
harmony, it would prove to be only a temporary reprieve. Almost immediately, inter-communal 
tensions threatened to derail the fledgling Republic and reignite tensions between Turkey and 
Greece. Rather than ending the story, the creation of the Cyprus Republic would trigger a much 
stronger and more active US involvement than ever before, one which in 1960, no one within the 
US Government could ever had anticipated.   
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Appendix 1 
NO. 5475. TREATY OF GUARANTEE. SIGNED AT NICOSIA ON 
16 AUGUST 1960 
 
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part, 
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, 
territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and 
regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common 
interest, 
 
II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created 
by that Constitution, 
Have agreed as follows:  
 
Article I 
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its 
independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its 
Constitution. 
 
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic 
union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any 
activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other 
State or partition of the Island. 
 
Article II 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of 
the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and 
guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic 
of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its 
Constitution. 
 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far 
as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either 
union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island. 
 
Article III 
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity 
of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and 
enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the 
Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the 
Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date. 
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Article IV 
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to 
the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those 
provisions. 
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the 
three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim 
of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. 
 
Article V 
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original 
texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia. 
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the 
registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed the present Treaty. 
DONE at Nicosia this sixteenth day of August, 1960, in English and French, 
both texts being equally authoritative. 
 
For the Republic of Cyprus: 
Ο ΚΥΠΡΟΥ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ, (Archbishop Makarios) Fazil 
For Greece: 
Küçük 
G. CHRISTOPOULOS 
For Turkey: 
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
Vecdi Türel 
 Sir Hugh Foot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reprinted from King Gillian. Ed. “Documents Relating to the Founding of Cyprus, Including the Treaty of 
Guarantee, 1959.” Documents on International Affairs, 1959. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 
www.kypros.org/Constitution/Treaty.htm 
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Appendix 2 
CYPRUS: Statement of Policy 
August 15, 1958 
On June 19, 1958, the Prime Minister presented to Parliament a statement of the 
policy which Her Majesty's Government intends to pursue in regard to the Cyprus problem 
for a period of seven years. This policy was explained by the Prime Minister to the House of 
Commons in broad terms and its outline and main practical features were described in the 
Parliamentary Statement of Policy of June 19, 1958 (Command paper 455). As Parliament 
was informed, the policy has been the subject of friendly and confidential consultations and 
discussions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the last few days the Prime 
Minister has had the opportunity of personal meetings in Athens and Ankara with the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey, which have enabled him to acquaint himself at first hand 
with the views of their respective governments. 
After the most careful consideration of the views expressed to him by the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and, in the light of the advice tendered by the Governor of 
Cyprus regarding the situation in the island, Her Majesty's Government have decided to 
proceed to give effect to the policy as announced to Parliament in the following manner : 
An Order in Council has already been approved authorising the preparation of 
electoral rolls in the island. This is expected to take two to three months. Meanwhile in 
accordance with the spirit of the decision whereby the communities are encouraged to order 
their own communal affairs, the Governor will where local circumstances make this desirable 
authorise the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils. When 
the electoral rolls are complete it will be possible to hold elections for the two Houses of 
Representatives. The preparations for the elections should involve consultations between the 
Governor and leaders of the two communities. If, as Her Majesty's Government earnestly 
hope, violence ceases, this will make possible the return of those at present excluded from 
the island in order that they may play their part in these electoral processes and in 
consultations on the details of the system of representative government and communal 
autonomy set out in the statement of policy. As soon as the Houses of Representatives have 
been elected, they will be asked to elect their representatives to the Governor's Council, 
which will then become the authoritative body to deal with all matters not specifically 
devolved upon the Houses of Representatives or reserved to the Governor at his discretion. 
With regard to the Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments as 
proposed in the statement of policy, Her Majesty's Government feel on reflection that the 
representatives of other sovereign Powers could not suitably sit as members of the Council 
under the chairmanship of the Governor. It would be more correct to regard them as specially 
appointed representatives of their countries with direct access to the Governor and with such 
other facilities as they need to carry out their functions. Her Majesty's Government invited 
the Governments of Greece and Turkey to appoint their representatives accordingly with 
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effect from October 1. The establishment of this system of communal assemblies charged 
with certain specific functions, and of the Governor's Council charged with other more 
general duties does not exclude and should with general good will facilitate the development 
of some form of representative institution serving the interest of the island as a whole. 
As regards the proposal for dual nationality, it does not appear that there is need for 
urgent action in this matter. Further enquiries have revealed that any special provision of this 
kind would require carefully devised legislation in view of the complexities of international 
law; it is, therefore, wiser to defer action pending the consideration of the legal and other 
aspects. 
Finally, Her Majesty's Government appeal with confidence for support from all 
concerned for the two major concepts which underlie their policy. The first is a period of 
calm and the cessation of violence in the island. The second is the deferring for a period of 
seven years of any final solution without prejudice to the future or the views and aspirations 
of any parties concerned. At the same time such a period cannot be a period of stagnation. 
Her Majesty's Government feels that the form of growth and development which they 
propose is one suited to the needs of the moment, and in conformity with the two principles 
which appear to be generally accepted by all concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reprinted from King Gillian. Ed. “Documents Relating to the Founding of Cyprus, Including the Treaty of 
Guarantee, 1959.” Documents on International Affairs, 1959. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 
www.kypros.org/Constitution/Treaty.htm 
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Appendix 3 
Dear King Paul: 
To Paul I, King of the Hellenes 
 I would like to tell you that I very much appreciated your letter of March 15, 1957. Your views 
on the Cyprus problem, especially with respect to Archbishop Makarios, were of great value to 
me and my associates at Bermuda and during the Conference I took the opportunity of urging 
that the Archbishop be released.2  
It is encouraging to learn that the Archbishop has recently been offered the opportunity of 
leaving the Seychelles.3 His release presents a great opportunity and, as you stated in your letter, 
marks 'a definite step toward a possible solution of this thorny problem'. I sincerely hope that 
with your advice and encouragement the Greek Government will do everything possible to use 
this opportunity for the purpose of creating an atmosphere which will lead to constructive 
negotiations between the leaders of the Cypriot communities and the British authorities.  
Further, I would urge you to consider the possibility that NATO could at the same time play a 
useful role in considering the international aspects of this question.4 If the domestic and 
international aspects of the problem could be more clearly separated, and if they are approached 
with courage and resourcefulness, I believe that this painful problem can gradually but certainly 
be solved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.5  
Thank you again for your letter. Please accept the best wishes of myself and Mrs. Eisenhower 
and convey our greetings to Queen Frederika.  
Sincerely  
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Appendix 4 
 
 
 
Letter from US Secretary of State Dulles to Greek Prime Minister Papagos, 
September 18, 1955 
 
 
I have followed with concern the dangerous deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations caused by 
the Cyprus question. Regardless of the causes of the disagreement, which are complex and 
numerous, I believe that the unity of the North Atlantic community which is the basis of our 
common security, must be restored, without delay. 
 
Since the time, almost a decade ago when Communist expansion first posed a serious threat to 
the free world, the close and friendly cooperation of Greek and Turkey has proved a powerful 
deterrent to Communist ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. In Korea, Greek and Turkish 
troops fought valiantly, side by side, to repel the Communist aggressors. 
 
I cannot believe that in the face of this common achievement, any problem will long disrupt the 
course of Greek-Turkish friendship. Nor can I believe that the unhappy events of the past two 
weeks will reverse policies of cooperation which were initiated twenty-five years ago under the 
far-sighted leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal 
 
Atatürk. 
 
Since 1947 the United States has made very considerable efforts to assist Greece and Turkey to 
maintain their freedom and to achieve greater social and economic progress. We have extended 
this assistance—and extend it now—because we believe that the partnership of Greece and 
Turkey constitutes a strong bulwark of the free world in a critical area.  
 
If that bulwark should be materially weakened, the consequences would be grave indeed. I urge 
you therefore, to make every effort to assure that the effectiveness of your partnership is not 
impaired by present disagreements. 
 
I am confident that the spirit of close cooperation that Greece and Turkey have so often 
demonstrated in the past as fellow members of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and the Balkan Alliance will enable you to transcend immediate differences in the 
interest of free world unity. 
 
Reprinted from Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1955, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1956), 167. The exact letter was written to both Papagos and Menderes which cause much 
consternation in Greece since the Greeks believed that Dulles failed to differentiate between victim and aggressor. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden  
July 31, 1956 
 
 
DEAR ANTHONY: From the moment that Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company, my thoughts have been constantly with you. Grave problems are placed before both 
our governments, although for each of us they naturally differ in type and character. Until this 
morning, I was happy to feel that we were approaching decisions as to the applicable procedures 
somewhat along parallel lines, even though they were, as would be expected, important 
differences as to detail. But early this morning I received the messages, communicated to me 
through Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan telling me on a most secret basis of your 
decision to employ force without delay or attempting any intermediate and less drastic steps. 
 
We recognize the transcendent worth of the Canal to the free world and the possibility that 
eventually the use of force might become necessary in order to protect international rights. But 
we have been hopeful that through a Conference in which would be represented the signatories 
to the Convention of 1888, as well as other maritime nations, there would be brought about  such 
pressures on the Egyptian government that the efficient operation of the Canal could be assured 
for the future. 
 
For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my conviction that some such method must 
be attempted before action such as you contemplate should be undertaken. If unfortunately the 
situation can finally be resolved only by drastic means, there should be no grounds for belief 
anywhere that corrective measures were undertaken merely to protect national or individual 
investors, or the legal rights of a sovereign nation were ruthlessly flouted. A conference, at the 
very least, should have a great educational effect throughout the world. Public opinion here and, 
I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such 
efforts. Moreover, initial military successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become 
far too heavy. 
 
I have given you personal conviction, as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom even 
of contemplating the use of military force at this moment.  Assuming, however, that the whole 
situation continued to deteriorate to the point where such action would seem the only recourse, 
there are certain political facts to remember.  As you realize employment of the United States 
forces is possible only through positive action on the part of the Congress, which is now 
adjourned but can be reconvened on my call for special reasons. If those reasons should involve 
the issue of employing United States military strength abroad, there would have to be a showing 
that every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty had previously been exhausted. Without 
such a showing, there would be a reaction that could seriously affect our peoples’ feeling toward 
our Western Allies. I do not want to exaggerate, but I assure you that this could this could grow 
to such an intensity as to have the most far-reaching consequences.  
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I realize that the messages from both you and Harold stressed that the decision taken was already 
approved by the government and was firm and irrevocable. But I personally feel sure that the 
American reaction would be severe and that the great areas of the world would share that 
reaction. On the other hand, I believe we can marshal that opinion in support of a reasonable and 
conciliatory, but absolutely firm position.  So I hope that you will consent to reviewing this 
matter once more in the broadest aspects. It is for this reason that I have asked Foster to leave 
this afternoon to meet with your people tomorrow in London. 
 
I have given you here only a few highlights in the chain of reasoning that compels us to conclude 
that the step you contemplate should not be undertaken until every peaceful means of protecting 
the rights and the livelihood of great portions of the world had been thoroughly explored and 
exhausted. Should these means fail, and I think it is erroneous to assume in advance that they 
must fail, then world opinion would understand how earnestly all of us had attempted to be just, 
fair and considerate, but that we simply could not accept a situation that would in the long run 
prove disastrous to the prosperity and living standards of every nation whose economy depends 
directly or indirectly upon East-West shipping.  
 
With warm personal regard—and with earnest assurances of my continuing respect and 
friendship, 
As ever        D.E. 
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Appendix 6 
 
 
 
Message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower  
 
March 31, 1957 
 
Dear Friend: Thank you for your letter about Archbishop Makarios. As you say, this was a 
difficult decision for us and you will have seen that it was not taken without loss for the 
Government. I do not believe that the Archbishop has changed his views in the Seychelles; he is 
the Bourbon of Cyprus. But events in the island and in the world are surging past him. Harding 
has beaten terrorism militarily, and the world now recognizes that Cyprus is an international 
problem.  
 
I am sure that your aid in persuading all concerned to face reality could be of decisive help. Of 
course my right-wing assume that we released the Archbishop at your request, so private 
pressure by you would be better than public statements. 
Warm regards, as ever 
 
Harold Macmillan 
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Appendix 7 
 
Persons of Interest 
John Mansfield Addis  Head of the Southern Department, British Foreign Office, late 50s. 
Winthrop Aldrich  US Ambassador to the UK, 1953-1957. 
George Venable  Allen US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and 
African Affairs, 1955-1956; Ambassador to Greece, 1956-1957; 
Director of USIA, 1957-1960. 
Sir Roger Allen  UK Ambassador to Greece, 1957-1962. 
Julian Amery  UK chief negotiator on the SBAs. 
W. Park Armstrong, Jr. Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State for Intelligence, 
1950-1957. 
Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza Greek Foreign Minister, 1956-1963. 
Walworth Barbour US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Mutual Security and 
European Affairs, 1954-1955; Counselor, US Embassy, London, 
1955-1956; Deputy Chief of Mission, 1956. 
Mehmet Baydur Counselor, Turkish Embassy to the US, late 1950s. 
Taylor Garrison Belcher US Consul in Cyprus; Consul General, 1957-1960. 
Samuel David Berger Counselor, US Embassy, Greece, 1958-1961. 
James Lampton Berry US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South 
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